A 2024 operating review described a pooled spare motor as support for a six-machine group. Engineering assessment established compatibility with four machines, while two required different interfaces. The shared item name and the existence of stock had made the coverage appear broader than it was. I asked that the resilience account identify the actual machines supported and the unresolved needs, rather than retain a six-machine claim because the arrangement was convenient to describe.
We approved a ₹1.2 crore specific-spares programme to address the uncovered requirements. Specialist colleagues retained authority over selection, installation and the conditions for safe return to service. The capital and inventory decision could support their work, but it did not replace it. Holding a compatible spare also would not establish that a future interruption could be resolved immediately, because people, diagnosis, installation and other operating conditions could still affect recovery.
The trade-off was to commit resources to less interchangeable support than the original pooled description implied. A single shared arrangement looked efficient in the stock account. Its value depended on actual compatibility, however, not on how many machines appeared beside it in a presentation. The review therefore had to preserve both the four-machine coverage and the two-machine gap. Neither fact should erase the other: the pool was useful within its limits, but the limits mattered to the claim being made about the factory.
The outcome was an approved programme and a more accurate support account. It was not proof of zero downtime or universal resilience. I would bring the same distinction into a board discussion about operating continuity. Directors should ask what assets and circumstances a mitigation actually covers, what remains outside it and which specialist decisions are still required. A reassuring stock figure becomes useful only when it is connected to the equipment and recovery process it is meant to support.