EVP – Risk and Resilience — Secure Electronics Organisation

The mandate

A secure-electronics organisation has won a multi-year order book whose conversion depends on controlled technology, constrained components, qualified manufacturing and customer-furnished information. Growth has outpaced the maturity of first-line risk ownership. The board has planned a new EVP – Risk and Resilience role before backlog pressure turns local exceptions into structural delivery exposure.

Approximately 1,650 employees and material partners span programmes, engineering, manufacturing, supply, quality, cyber, security and customer support from Singapore across the wider region. The EVP owns enterprise risk, operational resilience, crisis readiness, first-line control and board assurance, reporting to the Group Chief Executive or nominated sponsor. Security, export, safety and quality authorities retain independent decisions.

The first risk view will follow order conversion, not departments. Customer requirement, technical data, design, part, production, test, acceptance and support form one chain. The EVP will identify where ownership changes and ensure no critical exposure falls between programme, function or supplier.

Risk appetite must be operational. Thresholds for unapproved technical access, counterfeit or unknown provenance, single-source dependency, overdue configuration decision, test failure and delivery concentration should trigger clear action. General statements of low tolerance cannot guide a shift leader or programme executive.

Controlled information is a delivery dependency. Licence, caveat, customer approval and system access may determine whether work can start. The EVP will ensure programmes plan lead times and alternates rather than treat delayed authority as compliance administration. Unauthorised workarounds require immediate containment.

Component resilience needs provenance and qualification. Scarcity can encourage brokers, substitutions or lifetime buys. The risk framework will require source, authenticity, effectivity, storage and technical approval. Schedule pressure cannot lower assurance; customer and board acceptance is required where residual exposure remains.

Industrial capacity should be tested against scenarios. Equipment failure, utility loss, workforce absence, cyber containment and supplier disruption can affect controlled programmes differently. The EVP will define minimum viable operations and alternative routes, including the time and approvals needed to use them.

Cyber resilience extends into engineering and factory systems. Network isolation may protect data but stop production or erase visibility. Exercises will involve programme, manufacturing, security and customer communication, with transaction and configuration reconciliation after recovery.

Supplier risk will be managed beyond financial health. Ownership, foreign influence, security posture, sub-tier dependence, process qualification and incident reporting matter. Critical suppliers require joint exercises and credible alternatives. Certifications alone will not establish programme-specific resilience.

Customer-furnished equipment and information need clear custody. Loss, corruption, delay or ambiguous configuration can stop output and create liability. The EVP will ensure receipt, storage, access, use and return controls are tested and reflected in programme risk.

Issue management must verify effectiveness. Closing an action because a procedure changed is insufficient. The risk team will sample normal operations and look for workaround recurrence. Extensions need compensating controls, owner and board visibility when appetite is exceeded.

First-line leaders will own risks and attest evidence. The EVP will coach and challenge, not operate every control. Where a programme cannot explain its highest exposures and fallback, leadership capability is part of the risk. Objectives will include early escalation and accurate forecast.

Board reporting will show order-book exposure, control confidence, concentration, scenario consequence and decision. Aggregated heat maps should not hide one restricted programme's critical dependency. The EVP will state where management accepts risk and where independent challenge disagrees.

Culture is integral. Engineers and operators need confidence to stop uncertain work without being blamed for schedule. Deliberate bypass, reckless conduct and good-faith escalation require different consequence. Leadership behaviour during disruption will be observed and addressed.

What you will own

• Order-book and programme risk architecture.
• First-line appetite and control ownership.
• Export, security and controlled-information dependency.
• Component provenance and supplier resilience.
• Industrial, cyber and crisis continuity.
• Customer-furnished asset and data custody.
• Issue effectiveness and board assurance.
• Risk culture, talent and succession.

The first 12 months

Within 60 days, trace priority order conversion, identify unowned dependencies and place controls around any uncontrolled access, provenance or continuity exposure. Propose operational appetite thresholds.

By month six, complete industrial and cyber exercises, establish critical-supplier plans and implement evidence-backed first-line attestations. Test customer-furnished custody.

At twelve months, achieve 95% verified closure of high-risk actions, reduce unplanned single-source schedule exposure by 40% and complete realistic resilience tests for every critical programme. No unauthorised technical-data use or unqualified component should enter delivered configuration, and all appetite breaches must reach governance within agreed times.

What the sponsor will examine

• Risk ownership following the entire delivery chain.
• Appetite thresholds changing live decisions.
• Authority delays treated as programme dependencies.
• Provenance maintained under component scarcity.
• Recovery reconciling configuration and controlled work.
• First-line leaders explaining residual exposure.

The person

You bring 22–28 years in risk, resilience, security, quality or operations within aerospace, defence, electronics or another controlled high-reliability sector. Your record includes long-duration order books, Asian supply networks, cyber-industrial scenarios and board assurance.

Candidates must demonstrate a delivery they stopped because provenance or authority failed and a resilience plan that changed after live exercise. The permanent role is onsite in Singapore. Required security and export eligibility applies.

Compensation and terms

Base compensation is SGD 420,000–570,000 plus annual incentive and long-term participation linked to delivery risk, resilience, provenance, control and leadership. This permanent Singapore executive works onsite and is accountable to the Group Chief Executive or nominated executive-committee sponsor. Planned hiring precedes further order-book ramp.

Confidentiality

The organisation, programmes, customers, technologies, suppliers, controlled data, risks and resilience plans remain confidential. Further disclosure follows eligibility, conflicts and signed confidentiality. Applicants must not contact defence organisations, customers or authorities to identify the client.