Naval-Shipyard Separation Architecture Director — Marine Engineering

The mandate

The naval-repair yard is moving into a separately controlled entity, but dry-dock allocation, heavy lifts, certified weld procedures, controlled stores, engineering libraries and specialist trades remain shared with commercial construction. The transaction boundary follows land and payroll, not the sequence by which a secure repair package is surveyed, planned, executed, tested and returned to service.

The deliverable is a Secure Shipyard Separation Architecture defining work-package decisions, physical and information boundaries, shared-asset scheduling, certification custody, controlled-material flows, transition services, Day-One safeguards, standalone capability and exit tests. It must protect classified and export-controlled work without duplicating scarce dock or trade capacity where an auditable shared service remains permissible.

Milestone one at week six accepts the asset, work and authority baseline; security and certification constraints close at week twelve. Day-One design lands at week eighteen, shared-asset protocols at week twenty-four and standalone capability plans at week thirty-two. Four secure-work rehearsals conclude by week forty-two; the accepted architecture and funded exit backlog close at week forty-four.

Acceptance requires client teams to execute unseen dock conflict, controlled-material discrepancy, engineering-change, specialist-trade shortage and information-boundary breach scenarios under accountable security and technical authority. The Divestiture Executive and Yard President sign only when each critical service has measurable performance, tested fallback, custody evidence, funded exit and no dependency on consultant-held interpretations.

The client supplies transaction boundaries, programme assumptions, facility and asset registers, work histories, certifications, security classifications, workforce and supplier data, technology maps and cleared decision owners. Exclusions include access adjudication, classified-data handling beyond granted need, vessel engineering, certification, live dock scheduling, supplier selection, legal interpretation, collective consultation, physical construction and command of naval work.

Why this is external work

Commercial and naval leaders both rely on the same scarce assets and cannot independently arbitrate what must separate, remain shared or be duplicated. A security-cleared external operator can expose actual workflow dependencies and create testable boundaries without becoming the security authority, certifying engineer, transaction advocate or yard commander.

What you will own

• Trace naval repair packages through survey, planning, engineering, materials, dock, trade execution, testing and release.
• Map shared docks, lifts, shops, procedures, stores and specialists against capacity, security and certification constraints.
• Define Day-One physical, decision and information controls for secure work crossing retained commercial interfaces.
• Design auditable shared-asset scheduling with priority, conflict, substitution, escalation and contingency rules.
• Specify standalone capabilities and transition-service exits with cost, lead time, evidence and accountable owners.
• Rehearse dock conflict, controlled-store variance, engineering change, trade shortage and boundary breach.
• Deliver the architecture, service catalogue, control matrix, capability roadmap, rehearsal record and accepted backlog.

Candidate qualifications

• Architected shipyard, defence-industrial or secure heavy-engineering separations involving genuinely shared operating assets.
• Held yard authority across dock planning, engineering, certified trades, controlled materials and vessel handover.
• Designed secure physical and information boundaries without assuming classification or export-control authority.
• Converted scarce shared-asset dependence into measurable services, conflict rules, secure contingencies and independently observed operational exit tests.
• Worked with naval customers, commercial programmes and transaction teams while preserving technical accountability.
• Transferred a separation architecture through cleared client-led scenarios involving compound operational failures.

Non-negotiables

• Eligible for required access and available onsite for twelve Busan cells and four rehearsals.
• Direct shipyard or secure heavy-engineering separation experience is required; generic defence consulting is insufficient.
• Will disclose shipbuilders, navies, suppliers, classification bodies, investors and transaction advisers.
• Will not adjudicate access, certify work, handle unnecessary classified data or schedule live docks.

1. 49 words maximum. Describe a shipyard asset that could remain shared only after its conflict rules were redesigned.
2. 49 words maximum. How would you test certification custody across a newly separated operating boundary?
3. 49 words maximum. Which access or nationality constraints could affect your availability for this work?