Denzil Qevrathi · Chief Executive Officer · India
My contribution would be to examine whether an enterprise can continue fulfilling its service proposition when the original people, contracts or commercial assumptions change. I have had to decide what records an acquisition must bring, how quiet arrangements should fund continuing attention, and when a broader customer request exceeds the company's professional role. I also know the temptation to confuse a founder's personal usefulness with the organisation's capability. On another board, I would use that experience to ask about the business rather than offer myself as its substitute CEO. I have served as an executive statutory director since 2009, but that is not the same as experience as an external independent director. The proposed board should assess how well I can listen, learn its context and contribute without importing the authority or assumptions I hold in my own company.
Served as a director
Executive statutory director; not an independent appointment
March 2009 onward
Co-founder and executive director since incorporation in March 2009; COO until August 2016 and CEO from September 2016. One current directorship and no external board seat.
| Capacity | Committees |
|---|---|
| Ready to join | Strategy committee considering acquisition scope, service economics and leadership continuity, subject to appointment review · Risk committee examining enterprise commitments and the responsibilities retained by other parties, after induction |
I am considering a first external seat with a recurring service company that is preparing leadership continuity, examining acquisition choices or revisiting the economics of its customer promise. Strategy or risk participation may be appropriate after eligibility review and induction; I am not presenting myself as ready to chair a specialist committee immediately. The board should include complementary financial, legal and relevant professional competence. I would value a chair who expects a founder to explain his own errors as well as the choices he now defends. My executive statutory experience supplies a perspective, not proof of independence in a new setting. The contribution I seek is collective judgement about what the enterprise can responsibly promise and sustain, with management retaining execution and with enough candour to recognise when the most useful answer is a narrower proposal, a slower timetable or a decision not to proceed.
The proposed ₹14 crore acquisition contained twelve benefit-administration arrangements. After ₹45 lakh of diligence, eight had reconciled starting records and four did not. I favoured proceeding before operating colleagues challenged the responsibility we would inherit. A board contribution would ask what must be understood before the company commits and what can reasonably remain for integration. The unresolved four did not prove misconduct or loss, and declining did not save the full asking price in an economic sense. Directors need both the opportunity and the uncertainty described accurately. My experience could help them question an attractive growth story without treating every incomplete record as a reason to avoid every acquisition. Qualified advisers and management would retain their respective work; the board's task would be to judge the proposed commitment on intelligible evidence.
Our ₹46 lakh relationship programme involved six leaders and ten customers. Seven agreed handovers completed; three still required me. I would ask a board how succession is being observed in the work rather than inferred from titles or training attendance. Customers may need time to trust a successor, and the founder may still be limiting the transfer by answering too quickly. The unfinished three are not a verdict on the leaders' ability. They identify dependencies that need explanation and action. Directors can examine whether management has provided authority, resources and a realistic timetable without taking over individual customer conversations. My own involvement belongs in that scrutiny. A founder's confidence in the team is useful context, but it should not displace an account of where the company still relies on the founder being present.
Five customers left through agreed administration handovers costing ₹36 lakh, while four others renewed. I would help a board examine what the enterprise owes when future income no longer makes the work attractive. That requires distinguishing agreed exit responsibilities from additional requests and preserving the authority of employers, trustees and qualified professionals. The completed handovers did not certify receiving providers or settle benefit entitlements. The four renewals also did not establish a causal return from the portability approach. A board should be able to discuss the expense without requiring management to invent a reputation benefit large enough to make every departure look profitable. The relevant question is whether the business model honestly funds the obligations it creates, including the obligations that remain when a customer exercises its choice to leave.
I would begin with the receiving company's own service proposition and economic model, not with a presentation of my five cases. Induction should help me understand what customers rely on, which obligations sit elsewhere and where the company makes a commitment that extends beyond a transaction. I would listen to financial, operating and professional colleagues through arrangements agreed with the chair. I would then use selected board decisions to test whether my questions improve the account of alternatives, costs and uncertainty. The review should include occasions when my founder experience was less relevant than I first assumed. I would seek feedback on whether I had remained within oversight rather than directing management. Preparation and follow-up would need real calendar space, and any proposed committee contribution should follow learning of its specific remit rather than an automatic assumption that a long executive career makes immediate chairing appropriate.
My ownership, executive role and continuing Tezmavi responsibilities need to be examined before accepting another seat. Connections through the other founders, the strategic investor, the employee vehicle, employer clients and professional counterparties may affect participation. I would seek qualified review of the Companies Act independence requirements, any applicable SEBI LODR provisions, and committee or directorship limits relevant to the proposed company. My assessment pass cannot resolve those questions. The twenty-four-day provisional allowance must accommodate induction, preparation, travel, scheduled meetings and exceptional work alongside the CEO role. The three customer relationships still requiring me also belong in that capacity assessment. I would not bring confidential benefit records or unpublished customer terms into an external board discussion. If recurring exclusions or competing duties made informed participation impractical, I would decline rather than rely on disclosure alone to make the appointment workable.
I am a 14%shareholder and executive director of Tezmavi, not independent of that company. Any external appointment must examine connections through its founders, strategic investor, employee vehicle, clients and professional counterparties before determining eligibility or independence.
IICA Independent Directors’ Databank: Proficiency assessment passed
This fictional career records IICA databank registration in February 2026 and a proficiency-assessment pass in August 2026. No exemption is claimed. These preparation facts do not determine independence or suitability for a particular appointment.