The stockroom taught me to question a favourable measure

A plant manager once showed me a favourable unit-cost report beside a row of finished components waiting for orders. I had helped prepare the report. The arithmetic reflected the production volume, but the operating decision had left the company holding more stock. I was a junior analyst and did not have authority to change the schedule. I did have a responsibility to ask what our chosen measure encouraged people to do. That question has stayed with me through thirty-two years in industrial finance.

I began at Dorsavel Components in September 1994 after completing a business-economics degree at Velsaran Institute that June. My work involved cost records, stock reconciliations and explanations for the plant controller. I learnt to trace a figure through the production process before treating it as evidence of performance. Material consumed, work completed and goods dispatched were related events, but they did not always happen in the same reporting period. A warehouse could hold the consequence of a decision that looked efficient on a factory worksheet.

In April 2000, I became plant controller. The appointment gave me a team and a closer relationship with production, engineering and purchasing. I was expected to explain financial movements and challenge proposals, while the plant manager retained operating authority. A cheap material purchase could be expensive if its quantity exceeded realistic demand. A maintenance interruption could appear avoidable until an engineer explained the failure being prevented. I learnt to ask for the operating alternative rather than use the budget as the only definition of a good decision.

I joined Alverenne Motion Systems as divisional controller in July 2007. The group manufactured precision components for industrial equipment, and the division served customers with different order patterns and engineering requirements. The role broadened my attention from factory efficiency to the economics of the customer relationship. Two accounts with similar reported margins could consume very different amounts of technical support and production flexibility. I began working with commercial colleagues to make those demands visible, without assuming that every cost allocated to an account could disappear if the account left.

In January 2014, I moved into group financial planning. The company was preparing a broader investment programme and later admitted a long-term minority investor in 2017 while the founding family retained control. By the end of my planning appointment, the group had 980 employees and EUR142 million of annual revenue. I helped compare plant proposals using the demand and capability each assumed. A faster machine did not necessarily improve the enterprise if the next process or the customer schedule could not use its output. The best proposal sometimes involved repairing an existing asset and accepting a different cost profile.

I became CFO in July 2019 and an executive director in January 2021. These are separate appointments with different responsibilities. I lead fifty-two finance colleagues through five direct reports and report to the chief executive. The group now employs 1,240 people across plants in the Netherlands, Belgium and Czechia. Its 2025 revenue was EUR186 million and operating profit EUR16.8 million. My board contribution includes the wider consequences of our resource choices, while my executive responsibility remains the preparation and integrity of the financial account.

One inventory review made the distinction between an attractive number and an economic improvement particularly clear. A defined slow-moving cohort began at EUR9.6 million of carrying value. Over eighteen months, EUR3.2 million was used in production and EUR1.1 million was written down, leaving EUR5.3 million. The lower closing balance was not an equivalent cash release. Consumption used material the company had already paid for, and the write-down acknowledged a loss in carrying value. I wanted the board to see both movements instead of celebrate one unexplained stock-reduction percentage.

I have taken the same care with customer and investment decisions. A EUR16 million account required a fuller explanation of engineering effort and delivery demands before its economics could be judged. A machining-cell proposal needed comparison with a credible rebuild, including downtime and continuing maintenance. These choices taught me to value a finance function that can explain consequences without claiming to own every operational answer. My next external contribution should use that experience while preserving time to learn another enterprise. I am interested in boards that want to examine what a promising measure leaves out before turning it into a company-wide incentive.