Make the assumptions part of the strategic choice

A 2022 proposal offered ₹2.4 crore additional annual fee income for a defined receivables-credit arrangement. The commercial summary described it as a better-priced version of work we already performed. Credit and legal review showed that the proposed contract would move a specified part of buyer-default exposure to us that the earlier arrangement left with the supplier. The extra fee accompanied a different responsibility. It was not simply more income for an unchanged service.

The commercial sponsor wanted to proceed because the prospective volume fitted our growth plan. Risk colleagues presented a severe conditional scenario with ₹8.6 crore loss exposure in the defined programme. That amount was not an expected annual loss or a prediction, and I did not subtract it mechanically from the annual fee to announce a forecast deficit. It showed that the company needed to assess a different risk allocation, capital demand and operating capability before accepting the proposition.

I recommended declining the offered arrangement in its current form. The CEO supported the recommendation after the qualified owners reviewed the alternatives. We continued discussion of a narrower service whose terms would require their separate approval, without describing that discussion as an executed replacement contract. The company gave up the proposed ₹2.4 crore annual fee opportunity and the associated projected volume. No loss was thereby measured as avoided, because the rejected scenario never became an observed outcome.

The decision changed how I wanted strategy papers to describe pricing improvements. A higher fee can be commercially attractive and still be inadequate for the different responsibility it asks the company to accept. I would bring credit and legal analysis into the first comparison, before a familiar product label makes the new arrangement appear routine. My role was to make the strategic choice reflect the assessed exposure, not to reinterpret the contract or set an underwriting limit through a growth recommendation.

In 2023 I supported a broad extension of a programme's funded period from 45 to 75 days. The commercial model projected ₹5.4 crore additional annual income before incremental funding cost. I had treated that line as persuasive evidence without rebuilding the amount of money the same monthly flow would occupy. Finance challenged the omission. I agreed to restate the comparison using a simple steady-state illustration before defending the original recommendation.

The illustration assumed ₹60 crore of funded principal originated each 30-day month, with uniform flow and repayment at the stated duration. At 45 days, the average funded amount was ₹90 crore; at 75 days, it was ₹150 crore. The extra ₹60 crore carried ₹7.2 crore annual funding cost at the stated 12% assumption. Against ₹5.4 crore additional income, the comparison was ₹1.8 crore negative before other incremental costs and credit effects. The rate was a planning assumption, not a current market quotation, and the model was not a forecast of realised loss.

Commercial colleagues argued that the longer period could attract additional business. That was possible, but it required a separate volume and risk case rather than being used to excuse the missing cost in the existing one. I withdrew the broad-extension recommendation and asked finance, credit and commercial owners to examine a narrower proposition with different terms and customer economics. No customer obligation was changed through this planning exercise. The alternative remained subject to the relevant approvals rather than being counted as a completed launch.

The consequence was an attractive growth statement removed from the plan and further work required before any extension. I did not call the uncommitted ₹60 crore a saving; it was a funding requirement the rejected proposal would have created under its assumptions. The case exposed my own incomplete comparison. I now want the duration and funded amount alongside projected income from the beginning, so the strategy discussion does not ask the CFO to discover the balance-sheet demand after the commercial narrative has already acquired momentum.

A 2024 programme proposed ₹250 crore of exposure across twenty-four legal buyers. No single buyer represented more than 19% of the projected amount, and the initial strategy paper used the number of entities to support a diversification claim. Risk review identified nine economic groups behind the twenty-four names. The largest group accounted for 46% of the proposed programme, or ₹115 crore. Separate legal names had not established separate economic exposure.

The relationship team argued that the entities operated different businesses and should not be treated as one undifferentiated risk. Risk colleagues examined the actual links and dependencies rather than assume that either the entity count or the group label settled every question. I asked the strategic comparison to retain their assessment and show the effect of the limit they considered appropriate. My team did not assign a credit classification or override the approved risk process.

The authorised risk owners set a ₹70 crore ceiling for the largest group in the proposed programme. The other ₹135 crore remained in the planning comparison, producing a revised ₹205 crore proposal. We removed ₹45 crore of planned volume rather than preserve the ₹250 crore headline after changing its assumptions. The revised group share was about 34.1%, not the earlier 46%; we did not claim it had fallen to a round 30% threshold. Each underlying exposure still required its normal approval.

The commercial team had less volume to pursue through the original relationship structure. That was the cost of the revised proposition, not an accounting loss or evidence that the related buyers had acted improperly. The case changed the way I describe breadth in a strategy paper. A larger list can be useful for understanding routes to market while remaining insufficient to support a claim about economic independence. I would seek the group analysis before presenting the opportunity as diversified, and make the resulting volume trade-off visible to the people responsible for the growth plan.

A 2025 portfolio-purchase assessment reviewed 4,800 invoices with ₹96 crore aggregate face value. The seller's summary emphasised the count and short stated terms. Our defined review identified ₹7.2 crore of invoices subject to recorded commercial disputes and ₹2.4 crore of agreed credit notes within separate, non-overlapping groups. Those amounts had different implications. An agreed reduction was not the same as a dispute whose eventual outcome remained uncertain.

The acquisition sponsor wanted to apply one percentage adjustment and submit a firm bid quickly. Credit, legal and servicing colleagues asked for evidence about the disputed population and the treatment of the credit notes. I supported a conditional, unfinished assessment rather than use a convenient discount to make the evidence gap appear priced. The company spent ₹18 lakh on additional review and did not submit an unconditional purchase commitment at that stage. The cost was real even though the transaction remained undecided.

The planning account separated ₹86.4 crore of invoices outside those two identified groups from the ₹7.2 crore disputed group and ₹2.4 crore agreed reductions. The ₹86.4 crore was not certified as fully collectible merely because those findings did not apply to it. Credit assessment, eligibility, documentation and the proposed purchase terms still mattered. We retained the seller's evidence requests and the owners responsible for resolving them, with the final bid subject to the relevant approvals.

The decision sacrificed speed and left the strategy pipeline less complete. It did not establish that the seller's whole portfolio was poor or that every dispute would result in a loss. I would specify the evidence required for a firm recommendation before allowing the invoice count and face value to become the principal acquisition story. My contribution was to keep the object of the decision clear: the company was assessing rights and risks under proposed terms, not buying the certainty implied by a spreadsheet total.

A 2025 expansion discussion relied on a ₹90 crore funding requirement in its stated scenario. The cheaper alternative assumed a rolling facility renewed every thirty days at 10.0% annualised cost. A twelve-month committed arrangement was modelled at 10.8%, with different contractual conditions. These were illustrative comparison assumptions, not current market rates or a promise of availability. The strategy paper initially treated the lower annualised percentage as though the two arrangements supported the same planning horizon.

CFO Saba Tezvuri asked what the expansion would do if the rolling facility were not renewed on the assumed terms while the underlying customer exposure continued. The commercial sponsor expected renewal because the relationship had worked before. I did not treat that expectation as equivalent to a commitment. I supported rebuilding the strategy around the longer committed arrangement, subject to treasury, legal and board approval of its actual conditions and the growth programme itself.

At a constant ₹90 crore drawn for a full year, the 0.8 percentage-point difference implied ₹72 lakh additional annual cost. The actual amount would depend on utilisation, fees and terms, which the qualified owners needed to assess. We retained those limits rather than present the simple interest illustration as the entire facility price. A commitment also has conditions; it does not remove every liquidity risk or make a growth plan sound regardless of customer performance.

The recommendation accepted a higher modelled cost for a different funding horizon and reduced the programme's projected contribution accordingly. I did not claim that the premium represented a measured loss avoided. The rejected rolling assumption had not produced an observed failure. I would bring the duration of the financing into the first growth comparison next time. Strategy should not borrow confidence from a familiar lender relationship while leaving the CFO to explain later why the underlying commitment is shorter than the business plan it is expected to support.