Six seats at the negotiating table

Mandate

Reset portfolio and export strategy after the loss of the company's largest export market, and give the board a clear basis for choosing which businesses, customers and markets to keep.

Outcomes

• Sold the Riverland commercial-wine business to Brackenlea Beverage Partners for A$117m in February 2024; EBITDA margin rose from 11.4 per cent in FY2023 to 18.3 per cent in FY2026.
• Proposed the 20 per cent export-market limit adopted in May 2024; the reopened Asian market reached A$42m in FY2026 at prices per case 14 per cent above FY2019.
• Led the redeployment that grew other Asian sales from A$23m in FY2021 to A$58m in FY2024 while the largest market was closed.
• Moved A$7.5m of trade investment into two retailer advertising formats that beat price promotions in controlled tests.
• Consolidated ten cellar doors into six while wine-club membership grew from 38,000 to 61,000.

Decisions in context

I became chief strategy officer in July 2019, sixteen months before the duties that closed our largest export market. My mandate had been to plan premium growth; within a year it had become a plan for a smaller and less dependent company. I led the work that redeployed our Barossa and Coonawarra wines to other Asian markets, the review that ended in the sale of our Riverland business, the response to our largest customer's request for exclusive labels, the export concentration limit and our controlled tests of retailer advertising. I own no profit-and-loss account, so each recommendation has had to persuade the executives who run the businesses concerned. I lead 22 people with five direct reports, present every transaction and the annual strategy review to the board, and report on export concentration to the Audit and Risk Committee. Revenue was A$502 million in FY2026, lower than when I started, and EBITDA was A$92 million.

Reason for the move

Current role. Not seeking an executive move; considering one non-executive directorship with the Tarrowin board's consent.

Mandate

Turn a scattered set of Asian distributor relationships into a profitable regional business for the company's premium wines.

Outcomes

• Grew Asian revenue from A$52m in FY2015 to A$141m in FY2019, at EBITDA margins above the group average.
• Replaced 19 distributors with 11 longer-term partners and introduced allocation of the scarcest Barossa wines.
• Opened a Tokyo sales office in 2017 and built Japan to A$11m of revenue.
• Allowed one market to reach 39 per cent of export revenue by FY2019, a concentration I later had to unwind.

Decisions in context

I moved to Singapore in March 2015 to run Tarrowin's Asian business, then A$52 million of revenue spread across nineteen distributors with little in common except our labels. Over four years we consolidated to eleven partners, opened a sales office in Tokyo and introduced allocation of our scarcest Barossa wines, which let us raise prices in the markets that valued them most. Revenue reached A$141 million by FY2019, and the business earned margins above the group average. Most of the growth came from one market whose appetite for premium Australian red wine seemed limitless at the time. By FY2019 it supplied 39 per cent of our export revenue, and I presented that figure to our board as progress. In Singapore I learnt how to build distribution in markets with very different rules for importing and selling alcohol. A little later I learnt what it costs when a business comes to depend on one of them.

Reason for the move

Appointed chief strategy officer and returned to Adelaide.

Mandate

Write a premium growth strategy and find acquisitions that would widen the company's regional portfolio.

Outcomes

• Led the A$46m acquisition of a Langhorne Creek producer in 2014, adding 240 hectares of vineyard and a winery.
• Wrote the 2013 export plan that established the Singapore regional office.
• Introduced contribution-per-case reporting for every wine in the portfolio.
• Prepared the first review of the Riverland business, which the board then decided to keep.

Decisions in context

Tarrowin's chief executive hired me in September 2012, and I knew the company's wines well from the buyer's side of the table in England. The board wanted to grow its premium wines but had no clear view of which ones earned their keep. With a team of six, I introduced contribution-per-case reporting across the portfolio and wrote the 2013 export plan that proposed a regional office in Singapore. In 2014 I led the A$46 million purchase of a Langhorne Creek producer, adding 240 hectares of vineyard and a winery with spare capacity for red wine. I also prepared the company's first review of its Riverland business, which already earned thin margins, setting out the case for and against a sale. The board decided to keep it. On the evidence then available I think that was a reasonable decision, and nine years later I brought the question back with different evidence.

Reason for the move

Asked to run the Asian business the export plan had proposed.

Mandate

Give a supplier that sold three-quarters of its output through two supermarket groups a strategy for the growth of their own brands.

Outcomes

• Led the exit from three categories in which supermarket own brands had made our position uneconomic, removing A$84m of revenue.
• Redirected A$22m of trade investment to two categories where our brands held a price premium.
• Introduced store-cluster analysis of promotions, which cut loss-making promotional weeks by a third.
• Negotiated three-year joint business plans with both major supermarket groups.

Decisions in context

I joined Tamberlee as head of strategy in February 2007, shortly after returning from England. The company made biscuits, snacks and sauces and sold about 75 per cent of them through Australia's two largest supermarket groups. From 2009 both retailers expanded their own-brand ranges quickly, often at prices well below ours, and in 2010 I became general manager of customer strategy to lead our response. We withdrew from three categories, including plain biscuits and two sauce lines, giving up A$84 million of revenue, and moved A$22 million of trade investment into savoury snacks and premium biscuits, where shoppers still paid for our brands. I also built store-cluster analysis of promotions, which showed that a third of our promotional weeks lost money. Tamberlee taught me to separate the categories a retailer intends to own from those in which a brand can still earn its place on the shelf.

Reason for the move

Invited to join Tarrowin, in the industry I had grown up in.

Mandate

Grow the chain's sales of Australian and New Zealand wine and, from 2004, build a credible own-label wine range.

Outcomes

• Grew Australian and New Zealand wine sales from £118m to £180m between 2002 and 2006.
• Expanded the own-label range from 38 to 112 wines, with sales reaching £96m.
• Reduced the share of Australian wine sold on deep promotion from 46 per cent to 31 per cent of volume.
• Introduced annual supplier scorecards covering availability, quality complaints and promotional compliance.

Decisions in context

I joined Kilbracken in September 2001 as category manager for Australian and New Zealand wine, then the largest part of the chain's wine range. My job was to choose the range, negotiate with suppliers and plan promotions, and I was good at asking for deeper discounts. In 2004 I took on the chain's own-label wines as well and grew the range from 38 wines to 112, sourcing many of them from the same regions as the branded wines they sat beside. I studied part-time for an MBA at Kingsmere School of Business, finishing in 2005. By 2006 I had come to dislike some of what I was doing. Nearly half our Australian volume was sold on deep promotion, which trained shoppers to wait for a discount and left suppliers with little to invest in their brands. We reduced that share to 31 per cent. I left in January 2007 to bring my family home to Australia.

Reason for the move

Returned to Australia with my family and wanted to work for a supplier rather than a buyer.

Mandate

Analyse markets and build strategy recommendations for consumer-goods, retail and agribusiness clients.

Outcomes

• Worked on fourteen engagements for retailers, food manufacturers and agricultural businesses.
• Led the analysis behind a food supplier's response to a supermarket range review, which kept 80 per cent of its listings.
• Built the market-entry model for a wine company's study of British supermarket distribution.
• Promoted to engagement manager in 2000.

Decisions in context

I joined Ferrabee Consulting in Melbourne in February 1997, straight from my honours year. It was a small strategy firm of about seventy people whose clients were mostly retailers, food manufacturers and agricultural businesses. As an analyst I built market models and interviewed buyers, growers and store managers; from 2000, as engagement manager, I ran teams of two to four consultants. Two of my fourteen engagements shaped what followed. One helped a food supplier respond to a supermarket range review and keep most of its listings. The other assessed whether an Australian wine company should sell through British supermarkets, and it showed me how little I understood about the people who decide what reaches a shelf. I left in mid-2001 to learn that side of the business directly, as a buyer in London.

Reason for the move

Wanted to learn the buyer's side of a supermarket negotiation, and was offered a buying role in London through a contact from a client project.