Chief Strategy Officer / India
The second account changed the preferred option
- Years across research, advisory and insurer strategy
- 38
- Research, advice and continuing insurer responsibility
- Strategy employees through three heads
- 14
- ₹4.6 crore annual strategy function expense
- Current foundation directorship
- 1
- Unpaid adult-learning foundation appointment; six annual days
Decisions & consequences
012017: the equal-weight average that overstated the growth case
I prepared a strategy paper supporting an ₹18 crore programme request using a 12.5 percent combined growth illustration. One segment started at ₹100 crore premium with an assumed 20 percent increase; the other started at ₹900 crore with an assumed 5 percent increase. I had averaged the two rates equally. Finance challenged the calculation before the request reached approval. The implied closing amounts were ₹120 crore and ₹945 crore: ₹1,065 crore against a ₹1,000 crore starting base, or 6.5 percent growth. These were scenario inputs, not reported results or a claim about the insurer’s later premium.
The immediate temptation was to replace the headline percentage and continue with the programme recommendation. I withdrew the paper instead. Its spending argument had used the larger growth account, so the correction needed to reach the decision rather than stop at the spreadsheet. We spent ₹54 lakh over ten weeks on a revised commercial and operating analysis within the authorised review budget. Finance checked the segment definitions and weights; professional owners revisited the assumptions and what the proposed programme would actually contribute. The ₹18 crore request was not approved through the original paper.
The revised account retained separate segment scenarios and explained their combined effect. It did not present 6.5 percent as an assured future result or suggest that correct arithmetic removed uncertainty about the inputs. Management deferred the original programme pending a new investment case. The review expense was an actual cost in this fictional account, not converted into an invented saving equal to the unapproved request. No later investment or premium result is claimed here.
My mistake was allowing a familiar-looking average to carry more authority than the underlying business mix justified. The lesson was not merely to check a formula. When an assumption changes, the recommendation built on it must be reopened. I now ask for the starting bases and the route from scenario to spending before an attractive percentage becomes the centre of a strategy presentation.
2023: twelve distribution brands concealed one large relationship
A distribution review described twelve partner brands as a broad channel base. The largest single brand accounted for 18 percent of a defined ₹800 crore annual channel-premium population. Ownership analysis showed that four of the twelve brands belonged to one corporate group and together accounted for 44 percent, or ₹352 crore, of that same population. The figure did not describe the insurer’s entire premium book, an asset concentration or an underwriting exposure. It described dependence within the channel we were examining.
The initial proposal was to continue managing each brand relationship separately because the contracts and local teams were different. I recommended a group-level commercial scenario alongside those individual accounts. If priorities changed across the owner’s businesses together, twelve names would not necessarily provide twelve independent routes. Legal and commercial colleagues examined the actual agreements and control relationships. We did not infer a regulatory breach from the percentage or import a concentration limit from another jurisdiction.
Management considered a ₹6.8 crore, eighteen-month diversification programme. I proposed an initial ₹1.4 crore stage for evaluating and establishing feasible alternatives, with the balance requiring a further decision. That first stage was authorised; the whole programme was not. The work examined practical access, service capacity and terms rather than assuming any new brand would reduce dependence. Existing partner commitments continued under their agreed arrangements. The account does not claim that concentration subsequently fell or that the group relationship ended.
The useful result was a more accurate decision about the relationship we already had. The 18 percent single-brand view remained true within its definition, but was insufficient for the question management was asking. The 44 percent group view added a different boundary, not a reason to label every related partner unreliable. My strategic responsibility was to make that boundary visible and recommend a proportionate next step, with professional assessments and unfinished alternatives kept in the paper.
2025: a smaller route preserved the next distribution choice
A proposed distribution arrangement offered access to 600 outlets across six districts. The commercial outline required two years of exclusivity and an initial setup of ₹11.6 crore plus ₹5.2 crore annual operating expense. The attractive outlet count dominated the first discussion. A closer review showed that the proposed restriction would also affect how we could work with 240 existing partner locations in the same defined territory. Those locations were not additional outlets inside the 600 count, and neither count represented policies sold or premium secured.
I asked the team to compare the opportunity with the choices the exclusivity would remove. Commercial and legal owners examined the terms, while operations assessed the practical service model. Strategy did not pronounce the agreement unlawful or decide what any clause legally meant. My recommendation was that management should see the cost of restricted alternatives before treating the wider reach as the preferred direction. A rapid negotiation was not a substitute for that comparison.
The parties developed a smaller nonexclusive option covering 120 outlets, with ₹3.2 crore initial setup and ₹1.1 crore annual operating expense. The appropriate approval body authorised this limited route after professional review. It preserved the ability to work with existing partners, subject to their own agreements, while operating evidence developed. It did not secure the entire 600 outlet proposition at the smaller price. The different scope and terms were the reason the two options could not be compared as though they delivered an identical benefit.
We kept the lost immediate reach visible as an opportunity cost. The authorised route was not described as a proven commercial success, and no premium or profit outcome is invented. Management would need actual operating evidence before proposing expansion. My contribution was to make room for a commitment that matched what we knew and left another choice available. In strategy, preserving an option matters only when the account also states what was paid, what was forgone and what evidence would justify using that freedom later.