Apr 2019 — Present
Chief Strategy Officer
Tsuravelle Industries
- Sector
- Precision motion products and industrial assemblies
- Ownership
- Private company; founder family 68% and institutional investors 32%
- Company scale
- JPY 148 billion company revenue in 2025
- Employees
- 4700 company employees at October 2026
- Geography
- Japan; headquarters in Nagoya
- Reporting to
- Chief Executive Officer
- Team
- 56 strategy colleagues through six direct reports at October 2026
- Financial scope
- JPY 1.15 billion delegated 2026 function expense; separate capital, engineering, operating, quality, safety and employment authorities
Mandate
Define the industrial work the company intends to pursue and connect investment, portfolio and partnership choices to that direction.
Outcomes
- Supported the 2021 decision to stop new bids in three commodity-component families while preserving assessment of existing commitments.
- Recommended the JPY 4.6 billion flexible-assembly direction in 2023 without claiming the unlike budget difference as a saving.
- Required a clearer decision-rights account for the proposed equal-equity partnership in 2025.
Decisions in context
The CSO remit requires me to make the company’s industrial direction visible in choices that can otherwise be discussed separately. A capital proposal, a bidding decision and a partnership schedule each say something about the business we are preparing to become. I work to connect those accounts without assuming the professional authority that belongs to the people who design, operate and approve the undertaking. My fifty-six-person function has its own expense delegation. It does not control all manufacturing investment or employment decisions. Executive presentations to the board began with this appointment, but no statutory service is claimed. The later cases show both an investment selected and volume left outside the new pursuit. I want the record to retain that balance because a direction cannot be explained only through the activities it adds; it also needs an honest account of what the institution gives up.
Reason for the move
Appointed CSO after industrial-portfolio leadership; current role.
Apr 2013 — Mar 2019
Director of industrial portfolio
Tsuravelle Industries
- Sector
- Industrial portfolio and acquisition strategy
- Ownership
- Privately held manufacturing company
- Company scale
- JPY 97 billion company revenue in 2018
- Employees
- 3500 company employees in 2018
- Geography
- Japan; manufacturing portfolio and assembly-engineering integration
- Reporting to
- Chief Strategy Officer
- Team
- 34 portfolio colleagues through four direct reports in 2018
- Financial scope
- JPY 620 million annual portfolio-function expense in 2018; transaction approval and factory resources separately governed
Mandate
Connect changes in the industrial portfolio with the capability they are intended to contribute.
Outcomes
- Kept customer-specific application knowledge central to the 2016 assembly-engineering acquisition account.
- Retained the distinction between JPY 18.5 billion business revenue and the JPY 420 million integration-preparation expense.
- Challenged a factory-consolidation story that did not yet explain how the acquired capability would survive integration.
Decisions in context
Portfolio responsibility made the acquisition rationale a continuing question rather than a completed transaction document. The assembly-engineering business was relevant partly because of how it addressed individual customer requirements. I wanted the integration proposal to explain how that capability would contribute to the wider direction before using physical overlap as the main measure of progress. Colleagues seeking a simpler consolidation account had a legitimate concern about pace and value. My role was to keep their argument alongside the capability being protected, with preparation expense and uncertainty visible. Engineering, operating and employment leaders retained the practical decisions. The director title described an executive function and carried no statutory seat. This appointment prepared me for the CSO role by showing how a strategic reason can be weakened after a decision if the subsequent measures reward something different from what the institution originally intended to obtain.
Reason for the move
Promoted to CSO as industrial direction required coordinated portfolio, investment and partnership choices.
Apr 2007 — Mar 2013
Head of corporate planning
Tsuravelle Industries
- Sector
- Corporate planning in industrial manufacturing
- Ownership
- Private founder-family manufacturing business
- Company scale
- JPY 54 billion company revenue in 2012
- Employees
- 2100 company employees in 2012
- Geography
- Japan; planning across industrial divisions
- Reporting to
- Director of industrial portfolio
- Team
- 17 planning colleagues through three direct reports in 2012
- Financial scope
- JPY 260 million annual planning-function expense in 2012; engineering capacity and staffing decisions remained separately owned
Mandate
Produce an industrial plan whose resource assumptions describe the people and capabilities actually available.
Outcomes
- Owned the 2009 addition of two eighteen-person engineering lists before reconciling twelve shared colleagues.
- Corrected the resource account to twenty-four distinct people and retained JPY 85 million in replanning.
- Separated divisional responsibilities from an unsupported claim of additional independent engineering capacity.
Decisions in context
Joining the manufacturer gave me responsibility for assumptions colleagues would carry into their own commitments. The engineering-team mistake was an early lesson in that responsibility. Two divisions could each describe an eighteen-person team while sharing twelve people, so the organisational account and the distinct resource count were different questions. I had supported the plan before testing that distinction. Sae Kuzuhara’s challenge required a correction and a less ambitious immediate schedule. I wanted the revised account to preserve the cross-divisional work without treating shared colleagues as a problem to remove. Engineering and employment decisions stayed with their owners. The role taught me to examine the unit behind a strategic number and to keep my own contribution to an error visible when describing the subsequent improvement. It also showed why an attractive corporate plan needs operational evidence without allowing the planner to replace the judgement of the operating professionals.
Reason for the move
Moved to industrial-portfolio leadership after six years inside the corporate planning process.
- Sector
- Industrial business research and advisory
- Ownership
- Private advisory company
- Company scale
- JPY 5.2 billion company fee revenue in 2006
- Employees
- 160 company employees in 2006
- Geography
- Japan; industrial investment and portfolio assessments
- Reporting to
- Partner responsible for industrial assignments
- Team
- 16 engagement colleagues through three direct reports in 2006
- Financial scope
- JPY 140 million annual advisory-delivery expense in 2006; no client capital-approval authority
Mandate
Explain how an industrial proposal connects a manufacturing asset with the customer work and business direction it is intended to support.
Outcomes
- Led assessments that kept technical capability questions with qualified client specialists.
- Distinguished the client’s proposed capital commitment from the resources used to prepare our advice.
- Developed an interest in following the strategic account through implementation inside a manufacturer.
Decisions in context
Engagement management required me to make the team’s analysis useful to the people deciding what kind of industrial business to develop. A capacity comparison could be numerically clear and still leave the customer purpose uncertain. I worked with colleagues to explain that purpose and to identify where the client’s engineering or operating evidence was needed. Our delivery budget paid for the assignment; it was not authority to decide the client’s investment. I increasingly wanted to understand how a recommendation changed once it encountered competing demands inside the organisation. Moving into Tsuravelle was a deliberate response to that interest. It gave me a continuing relationship with the plan and made the quality of its assumptions more consequential for my own work. The advisory years supplied a way of asking questions, while the in-house role would test how well I could keep those questions alive after the presentation ended.
Reason for the move
Joined Tsuravelle to take continuing responsibility for corporate planning rather than conclude at the advisory recommendation.
- Sector
- Research supporting industrial business strategy
- Ownership
- Private research and advisory firm
- Company scale
- JPY 1.8 billion company fee revenue in 1999
- Employees
- 70 company employees in 1999
- Geography
- Japan; manufacturing-sector research
- Reporting to
- Engagement manager
- Team
- Member of a seven-person research team with no direct reports
- Financial scope
- No independent expense delegation or client investment authority
Mandate
Clarify the definitions behind industrial business comparisons and the limits of the conclusions they support.
Outcomes
- Learned to distinguish factory scale from the application capability relevant to a customer.
- Prepared research that separated a proposed capacity figure from verified operating performance.
- Referred technical and safety interpretations to qualified specialists rather than infer them from business labels.
Decisions in context
I entered industrial research after studying business administration, without claiming an engineering qualification. The work made that boundary practical rather than merely biographical. I could reconcile a business comparison and ask what a capacity figure meant, but I needed specialists to explain the manufacturing capability behind it. Within a small research team I learned how quickly a concise measure could become the reader’s dominant account of a company. That made definitions important: installed assets, possible output and demonstrated performance could not be exchanged casually. I began to ask what customer work the business was trying to do before treating more capacity as a self-evident improvement. The appointment gave me the analytical habits that later informed corporate strategy, while leaving substantial technical and operating learning to the professionals whose judgement the business account needed to represent accurately.
Reason for the move
Promoted into engagement management after six years of research and client-assessment work.
What I am looking for next
I would like to contribute to industrial choices where the company needs a clearer relationship between the work it intends to win and the assets or partnerships it proposes to build. The useful conversation may concern an acquisition capability, a volume opportunity being declined or the authority behind a joint product direction. My experience would add a strategic interpretation alongside the engineering, operating and financial expertise already present, rather than replace those disciplines.
A first board appointment would require preparation for collective responsibility and a suitable institutional context. I could initially discuss twenty annual days, subject to employer agreement and the actual workload, including preparation and exceptional demands. I would want the chair to assess whether the contribution complemented the board and whether my current connections created an unsuitable conflict. This invented record is a model of how that discussion might begin. A real candidate would need verified appointments, permission to describe industrial cases and a clear account of the competence still to be developed before taking on the proposed responsibility.