Shahid DezqemtiLeadership review 2026

The journal · Strategic capacity

The scarce review week belongs in the strategy

A portfolio is not feasible merely because every initiative has a sponsor and a budget. The people qualified to assess it may already have a fuller calendar than the plan admits.

A strategy presentation can make a crowded programme list look orderly. Each initiative has a start date, an owner and a line of expenditure. The page may still omit the resource that determines whether the commitments are possible: the limited time of colleagues whose professional judgement is needed before work can proceed responsibly. Their contribution is often shown as a review milestone rather than a capacity requirement. That representation can make a bottleneck disappear from the paper while leaving it entirely present in the organisation.

In Qevzenti's 2022 planning round, eleven proposed initiatives required 110 specialist review weeks within a nine-month period. The relevant teams had 72 weeks available for that work after continuing responsibilities. The gap was not a disagreement about whether the initiatives were attractive. It was a question about how much qualified assessment the organisation could undertake in the stated window. As CSO, I could coordinate priorities and ask for alternatives. I could not declare that the professional work should take less time because the portfolio otherwise failed to fit.

Capacity has a skill and a calendar

A total number of weeks is a useful beginning, but it is not a complete schedule. An underwriting specialist's available week is not necessarily a substitute for an actuarial specialist's week. Work may also need to occur in a particular sequence, with one assessment supplying information for another. I therefore want the capacity conversation to retain the kind of expertise and the period in which it is needed. Otherwise a reassuring aggregate can conceal an impossible local commitment.

Sponsors sometimes suggest that the initiative can start and the specialist questions can follow. That can be reasonable when an early stage is genuinely separable and its limits are explicit. It becomes dangerous when preliminary expenditure or external communication makes the later review politically difficult to refuse. A decision described as preparation may create pressure to continue. The approving body should understand which early actions preserve choice and which begin to consume it.

Another response is to seek additional people. That deserves examination, but an available person is not automatically ready to perform the required assessment. Relevant knowledge, authority, onboarding and supervision all matter. I would not treat hiring or outside support as instant interchangeable capacity. Nor would I assume that a specialist's estimate is beyond discussion. The constructive challenge concerns the scope of the assessment, the evidence available and possible sequencing, while preserving responsibility for the professional conclusion.

In our case the recommended portfolio became seven initiatives requiring 68 weeks, with four weeks retained as reserve. The four deferred initiatives accounted for the remaining 42 weeks in the original request. The arithmetic matters because it shows what was actually removed, rather than implying that all eleven would somehow be delivered through greater enthusiasm. It remains a planning account: allocating review time does not establish that every assessment will be favourable or that every initiative will reach completion.

Deferral is a decision with a cost

I dislike describing an initiative as parked when the organisation has made no decision about what that means. The sponsor may retain staff, maintain an external expectation or continue unofficial preparation. The apparent reduction in commitments then exists only in the central presentation. A genuine deferral needs an account of what stops, what continues, who is informed and what conditions would justify reconsideration. That account should be proportionate, but it should be visible.

The four deferred sponsors in our exercise had developed useful proposals. Their disappointment was not evidence that they misunderstood enterprise priorities. Some improvements would arrive later, and some preparation might need revisiting. I wanted those consequences described alongside the capacity constraint. A strategy function should not make a hard choice look costless merely because the constraint is clear. The board can then evaluate whether the proposed sacrifice is preferable to a different selection or a different timetable.

Our selected seven received an authorised ₹8.4 crore preparation budget. That figure was not their total capital requirement and did not remove the need for later funding decisions. Keeping that distinction in the paper helped prevent selection for preparation from being interpreted as unconditional approval of an entire programme. The choice was to spend a defined amount examining a feasible set of initiatives, with professional reviews still able to change the recommendation.

I also wanted sponsors to understand how the decision could be revisited. A deferred initiative should not need to invent a new crisis to earn attention, nor should it return automatically because a calendar quarter has changed. The useful conditions might concern newly available expertise, a changed business need or evidence that a dependency has been removed. Naming those conditions makes reconsideration part of the strategy rather than a reward for the sponsor with the loudest voice.

Reserve is not permission to make the same promise again

The four weeks left after the 68-week selection were not an invitation to approve another four-week initiative immediately. A reserve has a purpose precisely because an assessment may reveal work that was not fully visible at the planning stage. Once it is allocated to another commitment, it is no longer reserve. That is simple arithmetic, yet organisations can repeatedly spend the same apparent flexibility in conversations that never meet in one decision record.

At the same time, a small reserve should not be presented as proof that the portfolio can absorb every surprise. The type and timing of expertise still matter. An unexpected demand may require another prioritisation decision, even when the aggregate calendar appears to have room. I prefer a clear escalation discussion to an implicit expectation that specialist colleagues will absorb the difference through additional hours. Capacity planning should describe the work the organisation has chosen, not transfer the unresolved choice into individual workload.

The broader lesson is that strategy includes the ability to assess a proposition, not just the ambition to pursue it. A board can approve a programme list, but that approval does not create qualified attention or resolve dependencies. In this fictional account, recommending fewer initiatives was an affirmative choice about the standard of examination we wanted them to receive. I would judge the quality of the strategy by whether colleagues could explain that choice, its sacrifices and its limits, rather than by the length of the original list or the number of green milestones on a page.