Six roles between the factory gate and the delivery depot

Mandate

Make two plants, a fast-growing supplier base and a seasonal order book predictable while volume grew, and build an export supply chain.

Outcomes

• Idled one of two Chongqing assembly lines in 2024 instead of matching a 12 per cent price cut; gross margin held at 13.9 per cent.
• Recalled 7,900 vans in 2023 with 98.7 per cent completion in five months; field connector failures fell from 41 to 5 per million.
• Cut the third quarter's share of Changsha output from 42 to 29 per cent, and lost-time injury frequency from 1.9 to 0.6 per million hours between 2021 and 2025.
• Grew exports from 9,800 vehicles in 2022 to 24,000 in 2025 under a three-year ro-ro agreement.
• Reduced incoming supplier defects from 186 to 61 parts per million between 2022 and 2025.

Decisions in context

I joined Tanzhou in March 2021, when it was growing faster than its plants could comfortably absorb. Deliveries had reached 84,000 in 2020, the board had approved a second plant outside Chongqing the year before, and Changsha ran a frantic third quarter every year to meet the parcel carriers' autumn orders. My mandate from the president was to make operations predictable while volume grew. In my first two years we levelled the build plan, brought battery-pack quality under closer control and took export logistics into operations. Since 2024 the work has been shaped by the price war, in which we idled one Chongqing line rather than chase volume, and by the lessons of the 2023 recall, which changed how we deal with suppliers. Deliveries reached 138,000 in 2025, with 24,000 exported. Because Tanzhou had supplied vans to Kuanhe, I took no part in any Tanzhou negotiation with Kuanhe during my first year.

Reason for the move

Current role. Not seeking an executive move; considering one independent directorship with Tanzhou's consent.

Mandate

Lower the cost of moving a parcel between hubs and make the November peak predictable.

Outcomes

• Cut line-haul cost per parcel from RMB 0.31 to RMB 0.24 between 2016 and 2020.
• Raised on-time line-haul arrivals from 91 to 97 per cent.
• Planned five November peaks, reaching 58 million parcels a day, without closing a hub.
• Organised franchisees' purchase of 12,000 electric vans from three manufacturers.
• Reduced recordable injuries at sorting hubs by 44 per cent.

Decisions in context

Kuanhe Express hired me to run the part of a parcel network that customers never see: the sorting hubs where parcels change trucks and the line-haul fleet that moves them between cities overnight. I led 6,400 people across 64 hubs and 5,200 trucks, reporting to the chief executive. The central problems were cost and predictability. Line-haul trucks often left half full to keep to departure times, and each November peak was planned from the previous year's experience rather than from a forecast. We rebuilt the departure schedule around consolidated loads, cutting line-haul cost per parcel from RMB 0.31 to RMB 0.24, and planned each peak backwards from the parcel forecast, hub by hub. I also organised the purchase of 12,000 electric vans for franchisees from three manufacturers, which is how I came to know Tanzhou. I completed a part-time executive MBA in Hangzhou during these years.

Reason for the move

Asked to run operations at a vehicle maker after five years as one of its customers.

Mandate

Raise supplier quality while the joint venture replaced imported components with locally made ones.

Outcomes

• Cut incoming defects from 410 to 85 parts per million.
• Supported a rise in local content from 62 to 81 per cent.
• Built a 40-engineer supplier development team that worked inside suppliers' plants.
• Led supplier readiness for three model launches.

Decisions in context

As director of supplier quality at Jiangcheng Aubrecht, I was responsible for the quality of about RMB 36 billion a year of parts from 380 suppliers, at a time when the joint venture was replacing imported components with locally made ones. Local content rose from 62 to 81 per cent during my five years, and every new local supplier had to reach the standard our German partner's own plants expected. I led 160 engineers and built a supplier development team of 40 who worked inside suppliers' plants rather than auditing them from a meeting room. Incoming defects fell from 410 to 85 parts per million. The role taught me how defects travel through a supply chain and how often the supplier knows before the carmaker does. By 2016 I wanted to understand what happened to vehicles after they left the factory, and I moved to a parcel carrier to find out.

Reason for the move

Wanted to see vehicles from the side of the operator who has to keep them working.

Mandate

Launch final assembly at a new plant, then run its body, paint and assembly shops day to day.

Outcomes

• Launched final assembly at Plant 2 in 2008 on its planned date.
• Raised first-time-through at final assembly from 82 to 91 per cent.
• Halved lost-time injuries at the plant between 2009 and 2011.
• Introduced team-leader training for assemblers on fixed-term contracts.

Decisions in context

Jiangcheng Aubrecht recruited me in April 2006 to manage final assembly at its second Wuhan plant, then under construction. I spent two years preparing the line and its team and launched it in 2008. In 2009 I became deputy plant manager, responsible for the day-to-day running of the body, paint and assembly shops and 3,800 people. Many of our assemblers were on fixed-term contracts and had never worked in a car plant, so we built a team-leader programme that explained the reason for each standard rather than only the standard itself. First-time-through at final assembly rose from 82 to 91 per cent, and lost-time injuries at the plant halved between 2009 and 2011. I learnt the discipline of a German production system and the limits of imposing it without explanation. I moved to supplier quality in 2011 because most of our defects were arriving through the receiving dock.

Reason for the move

Promoted to lead supplier quality for the joint venture.

Mandate

Bring the company's quality systems up to the standard that joint-venture carmakers required of their suppliers.

Outcomes

• Rebuilt the measurement laboratory and passed a joint-venture caliper approval at the second attempt.
• Cut customer warranty returns by 46 per cent between 2003 and 2005.
• Gained approval as a supplier to two joint-venture carmakers.

Decisions in context

Kunwei Braking Systems was a private brake maker in Zhuzhou supplying trucks, buses and, increasingly, the passenger-car joint ventures then expanding across China. I joined as a quality engineer and became customer quality manager in 2004. Our first submission of a new caliper to Jiangcheng Aubrecht was rejected because our measurement system could not show repeatable results. I rebuilt the laboratory, retrained its technicians and passed at the second attempt. Over the following two years we cut customer warranty returns by 46 per cent and were approved as a supplier by two joint-venture carmakers. In 2005 I reported a suspect batch of brake pads to a customer before it had found the problem; containment cost us money, and the customer increased our business the following year. I left when that customer asked me to manage assembly at its new plant.

Reason for the move

Recruited by a customer, Jiangcheng Aubrecht, to manage final assembly at its new plant.

Mandate

Improve weld quality and fixture reliability in the cab body shop.

Outcomes

• Redesigned the main cab welding fixtures and cut weld rework by a third.
• Wrote the body shop's first standard work instructions.
• Trained 30 welders on the new fixtures.

Decisions in context

I joined Hengxiu Light Truck Works in Xiangtan straight from university, as a process engineer in the cab body shop. The plant was state-owned, built about 18,000 light trucks a year and employed 3,800 people, many of whom had worked there for decades. Its welding fixtures were worn, and nearly a fifth of cabs needed weld rework before painting. With two technicians I redesigned the main fixtures, wrote the body shop's first standard work instructions and trained 30 welders to use them. Weld rework fell by a third. The older welders taught me more than my degree had about how steel behaves under heat, and how much a worker knows that never reaches a drawing. In 2001 the plant was merged into a provincial industrial group and most engineers were moved into administrative roles. I wanted to stay in production, so I moved to a private brake maker in Zhuzhou where quality engineering was growing.

Reason for the move

After the merger most engineers moved into administration; I wanted to stay in production.