From the hot end of a furnace to the chief strategy officer's chair

Mandate

Rebuild group strategy around the housing cycle, set an energy pathway for kilns and dryers, and reshape the portfolio with an operator's discipline.

Outcomes

• Set a A$300 million walk-away price for Pindarra Roofing against a A$410 million asking price in 2021; bought Kurrawong Frame & Truss for A$96 million, 5.8 times EBITDA, in July 2024.
• Closed Bendarra Kiln 1 in September 2023, avoiding a A$31 million reline and lifting Victorian kiln utilisation from 64 to 86 per cent.
• Recommended a hybrid dryer for Brisbane line 2 with A$28 million of federal co-investment; commissioned in March 2026, using 38 per cent less gas per square metre.
• Brought gas contracts above three years or A$20 million a year to the board; about 70 per cent of forecast kiln and dryer demand is now contracted to 2030.
• Introduced an annual, board-approved trough case that binds every capital decision.

Decisions in context

I became chief strategy officer in July 2021, after four and a half years running the windows division. The managing director asked for three things: a group strategy built around the housing cycle rather than last year's volumes, a credible energy pathway for our kilns and dryers, and portfolio changes made with the discipline of someone who would have to live with them. I lead sixteen people in strategy, corporate development, market insight and energy strategy, with four direct reports, and I represent Marrangal on the board of our plasterboard joint venture. Much of the work has been saying no at the right moment: to a roof-tile acquisition at the peak, to relining a kiln at post-2022 gas prices, to an all-electric dryer the grid could not yet power. The decisions to proceed, Kurrawong and the Brisbane line, came from the same trough test. Revenue has grown from A$1.55 billion in FY2021 to A$1.86 billion in FY2026.

Reason for the move

Current role. Not seeking an executive move; considering one non-executive directorship with the Marrangal board's consent.

Mandate

Restore margin in a division losing apartment work to imported window systems and carrying an ageing extrusion press.

Outcomes

• Closed the 1989 extrusion press in mid-2019, avoiding a A$24 million upgrade; redeployed 31 of its 85 people to glazing.
• Withdrew from loss-making high-rise apartment windows, giving up about A$61 million of annual revenue.
• Commissioned a A$19 million insulated-glass line; double-glazed units rose from 9 to 41 per cent of output.
• Raised EBIT margin from 2.1 per cent in FY2017 to 8.4 per cent in FY2021.

Decisions in context

This was my first and only operating role, and I took it because the managing director thought a strategist should carry a P&L before advising others on theirs. The division sold aluminium windows and doors to volume builders, custom builders and, until 2019, apartment developers, from five fabrication plants and an extrusion press in Melbourne. It earned a 2.1 per cent margin when I arrived. I closed the press, withdrew from high-rise apartment windows where imported systems held the advantage and built an insulated-glass line in Melbourne. The 2020–21 surge in new-home building then tested every choice. When our Malaysian profile supplier slipped seven weeks in 2021, I spent most of that autumn on the telephone to builders and learnt how quickly a supply decision becomes a customer's problem. By FY2021 revenue was A$455 million and the margin 8.4 per cent. I left the division with a stronger leadership team and a list of what I would do differently.

Reason for the move

Asked to return to group strategy as chief strategy officer when the previous head of strategy retired.

Mandate

Build a corporate development function and reshape a portfolio that still carried businesses outside housing.

Outcomes

• Sold the loss-making concrete-pipe and precast business for A$64 million in 2015.
• Bought a Perth window fabricator for A$38 million in 2014, taking the windows division into Western Australia.
• Sold 40 per cent of the plasterboard business to Hayatsu Gypsum for A$165 million in 2016, with a licence to its board-forming technology.
• Introduced a written walk-away price into every transaction paper.

Decisions in context

I was asked to build a corporate development function at a time when Marrangal still owned businesses that had little to do with housing. The concrete-pipe and precast business, which sold into civil infrastructure, had lost money in four of the previous six years, and I led its sale in 2015 for A$64 million. In 2014 I led the purchase of a Perth window fabricator for A$38 million, which took the windows division into Western Australia. The largest piece of work was the 2016 sale of 40 per cent of our plasterboard business to Hayatsu Gypsum for A$165 million. We wanted Hayatsu's board-forming technology and its long-term thinking more than its cash, and I spent eighteen months negotiating a shareholders' agreement that both sides could live with in a downturn. It was in this role that I began writing a walk-away price into every transaction paper, after watching a process drift upwards under its own momentum.

Reason for the move

Wanted to run a P&L before advising others on theirs; the managing director offered the windows division.

Mandate

Give the group a housing forecast it could plan capacity against, in the middle of a downturn.

Outcomes

• Built the commencement forecasting model, by state, dwelling type and product, that has underpinned budgets since 2010.
• Recommended mothballing rather than closing a Queensland concrete-block plant in 2009; it restarted in 2011 within ten weeks.
• Prepared the group's first scenario plan in 2010, adopted for the five-year strategy.
• Led a capacity review of six brick kilns that deferred one rebuild by four years.

Decisions in context

I joined Marrangal in July 2008 to strengthen its planning, and within months found myself modelling a slowdown as it unfolded. Commencements fell, stimulus for first-home buyers and public building arrived, and demand recovered at different speeds in different states. The company's forecasts at the time were national totals adjusted by sales managers, and they missed both the fall and the recovery. With three analysts I built a model by state, dwelling type and product, fed by approvals and housing-finance data and reconciled each quarter with our own despatches. It became the basis of the budget from 2010. In 2009 I argued for mothballing a Queensland concrete-block plant rather than closing it, and it was producing again within ten weeks of the 2011 recovery. I also prepared the group's first scenario plan, which gave the executive team a shared language for upside and downside.

Reason for the move

Promoted to build and lead a corporate development function.

Mandate

Deliver capacity, pricing and market-entry work for manufacturers in building materials, packaging and steel products.

Outcomes

• Managed 14 engagements between 2005 and 2008.
• Built the firm's first demand model for housing materials by state and product.
• Completed an MBA part-time while working, in 2005.

Decisions in context

I joined Merrigan Kestle & Co. in Sydney as a consultant in February 2002, after five years on a furnace floor, because I wanted to understand how owners decided which plants should live. The firm advised industrial and resources companies on capacity, pricing and market entry. My clients included makers of cement, glass and paper packaging, steel products and building materials, and several engagements turned on the same question: how much of a cyclical market should one company's capacity serve? I became an engagement manager in 2005, leading teams of three to six, and built the firm's first housing-materials demand model by state and product. I also completed an MBA part-time at the Halloran Graduate School of Management, finishing in November 2005. I left in 2008 because a consultant hands over a recommendation just as the interesting part begins, and I wanted to stay for the outcome.

Reason for the move

Wanted to own the consequences of recommendations inside a manufacturer rather than hand them over.

Mandate

Improve furnace efficiency and support the engineering case for rebuilding furnace 2.

Outcomes

• Built the energy and pull-rate model used in the A$22 million furnace 2 rebuild case in 2000.
• Raised the recycled-glass share of the batch from 28 to 41 per cent, cutting gas per tonne by 9 per cent.
• Introduced shift-level energy reporting at the hot end.

Decisions in context

I joined Torrensvale Glass Containers in Adelaide as a graduate process engineer in February 1997, three months after finishing my degree. The plant made bottles and jars for wine, beverage and food customers in two gas-fired furnaces, and it was owned by a European packaging group that judged it against plants on three continents. I worked at the hot end, where the batch is melted, and became furnace process engineer in 1999. That year furnace 2 approached the end of its campaign, and the owners weighed a A$22 million rebuild against closure and bottles shipped from Asia. I built the energy and pull-rate model for the rebuild case. The furnace was rebuilt smaller in 2000, the recycled-glass share of the batch rose from 28 to 41 per cent and gas per tonne fell by 9 per cent. I left in early 2002 because I wanted to understand how the owners had made their decision, not only supply its numbers.

Reason for the move

Wanted to understand how owners decide which plants live, which the role could not teach.