Chief Strategy Officer / India
Give the alternative enough detail to choose it
- Company offices
- 32
- Seven western and southern states
- Strategy and partnership colleagues
- 12
- Three managers; March 2026
- Annual function budget
- ₹6.8 Cr
- Strategy expense; no individual lending delegation
Decisions & consequences
01Replacing a four-state exclusive proposal with a bounded dealer pilot
A dealer consortium offered a programme expected to generate ₹180 crore of annual equipment-finance disbursements across four states. It wanted an exclusive relationship for the specified product range in those territories. The commercial paper emphasised the volume and the lower cost of introductions. Our planning review showed that the consortium's share of projected new originations would rise from 15% to 44%. That concentration concerned future new business, not 44% of the existing loan portfolio.
I asked the team to compare the offer with a non-exclusive arrangement and to describe what the company would give up under each. The consortium's sales leaders argued that exclusivity justified their investment in training and joint activity. Our regional managers liked the immediate pipeline but worried about restricting relationships they had developed with other dealers. Risk and legal colleagues examined the proposed responsibilities separately. I did not treat their review as an obstacle to be priced away by a larger volume forecast.
I recommended an eighteen-month non-exclusive pilot with a ₹60 crore programme ceiling and explicit review points. Individual applications still required the usual credit decisions; the ceiling was not a disbursement instruction. The consortium accepted the smaller arrangement after negotiations. We gave up the original scale and some certainty about its promotional effort. We also retained access to other relationships and a clearer basis for comparing the consortium's contribution with its continuing demands.
The first eight months produced ₹38 crore of disbursements under the programme. That established activity within the pilot, not proof of mature credit quality or the annual volume originally proposed. We retained the cost of partner support and the reasons applications did not proceed in the review. The decision allowed the company to learn about the relationship without granting the full restriction before it had evidence. I would not claim that exclusivity is always wrong. In this case, its cost to the lender's future choices was too large to leave implicit inside an attractive acquisition forecast.
Shrinking a refrigerated-trailer rollout after rebuilding its exit assumptions
A proposed refrigerated-trailer programme assumed that a used asset could realise 42% of its original invoice value at the modelled exit point. That assumption helped support a 240-vehicle rollout and a modelled three-year programme contribution of ₹9.4 crore. The percentage came from headline disposal observations that did not consistently deduct refurbishment, transport and selling costs. It also obscured differences in configuration and condition between the observed assets and the proposed financed population.
I asked asset specialists and risk colleagues to examine comparable disposals and the work required before another operator could use the equipment. We retained the range of observations rather than choose the most attractive example. A 27% net planning assumption was better supported for the proposed case. Finance rebuilt the programme model, reducing the projected three-year contribution to ₹3.1 crore under the revised assumptions. Those figures were planning outputs, not realised earnings or a valuation of an existing portfolio.
The business-development team objected that the smaller return would make the proposal difficult to approve after months of dealer discussions. I recommended a 24-vehicle pilot rather than either proceed at full scale or reject the segment permanently. The pilot required evidence about service availability, use patterns and the assumptions that could later affect disposal. Credit and asset review remained with their authorised owners. Strategy did not use the revised percentage as a blanket valuation rule for every application.
Management approved the smaller experiment and deferred the broad rollout. That reduced near-term volume and left the company's opportunity cost visible. It also created a more credible learning plan. The pilot could test operational and customer assumptions, but it could not establish a mature resale outcome within a few months. We stated that limit in the review timetable. I wanted the company to distinguish questions it could answer early from those requiring a longer observation period, rather than treat the existence of a pilot as permission to restore the original optimistic model.
Testing four seasonal districts before committing to permanent offices
Regional colleagues proposed four new offices after a busy equipment-buying season. The paper estimated ₹160 crore of annual addressable finance demand, using recent enquiries and dealer expectations. The proposed fixed-office programme would cost ₹2.4 crore before the recurring cost of operating the sites. The enthusiasm was understandable: local relationships were available, and competitors were visible. The question was whether the observed season supported the annual market assumed in the investment case.
My team worked with the regional managers to separate replacement cycles, repeated enquiries and purchases outside the freight and cold-chain segments we intended to serve. We examined when equipment was used and when customers expected to replace it. The revised addressable planning case was ₹72 crore, with uncertainty retained around conversion and financing preferences. This was not a claim that total district commerce was only ₹72 crore. It was a narrower estimate of the opportunity relevant to the proposed programme.
Regional managers worried that delaying full offices would signal a lack of commitment and allow other lenders to secure dealer attention. I proposed a year of shared service desks and scheduled field visits, with ₹64 lakh approved for the trial. Operations specified the service obligations, while credit retained its assessment process. The arrangement could support a limited presence and gather evidence, but it would not offer every convenience of a permanent office. That limitation was explained to partners rather than hidden in the launch plan.
The company deferred the ₹2.4 crore fixed-office programme and began the trial. The ₹64 lakh was a real programme expense, not a permanent saving equal to the difference between two unlike options. We set review questions about distinct enquiries, service demand and activity outside the peak season before reconsidering offices. The strategic result was a decision that matched the strength of the evidence. Local knowledge remained central, but its observations were connected to the duration and scope of the commitment the company was being asked to make.
Buying qualified inspection coverage before building a company facility
A proposal for an owned equipment-inspection centre sought ₹4.8 crore of capital expenditure. Its supporters wanted consistent reports and direct access to specialist staff. The demand forecast assumed that 78% of the proposed facility's capacity would be used. Our review of the geographic spread of likely cases and the time required to move assets showed a planning utilisation closer to 34%. A central facility could be well equipped and still poorly located for much of the work.
I compared the ownership proposal with qualified external coverage in the relevant operating areas. Procurement, operations and asset specialists assessed three providers and defined the work, evidence and review process. The alternative required ₹95 lakh for a twelve-month service programme, with company specialists retaining responsibility for accepting reports and escalating concerns. It did not transfer credit judgement to the providers or establish that every external report would be adequate. The company still needed a capability to specify and examine the service it bought.
The proposed facility sponsor argued that outsourcing would limit learning and leave the lender dependent on suppliers. I agreed those were material risks and included them in the recommendation. We retained an internal review role and specified the records needed to compare provider quality. I recommended the service programme while demand remained dispersed, with the ownership option to be reconsidered if volume, geography or supplier performance changed sufficiently. The decision was conditional on observed need, not a general belief that capital investment was undesirable.
Management approved the twelve-month arrangement and did not commit the ₹4.8 crore facility spend. We did not call the full capital amount a saving against a one-year operating expense. The alternatives had different lives, obligations and potential benefits. The result was qualified coverage with continuing supplier dependencies and a more disciplined basis for reconsidering ownership. I wanted the company to retain the capability to judge the work, while avoiding a permanent asset whose initial business case depended on utilisation the available evidence did not support.