Six roles in places where people wait, travel or receive

Mandate

Reduce second delivery attempts before the April 2024 overtime cap for drivers, and change how customers and shippers understand what home delivery costs.

Outcomes

• Cut the share of parcels needing a second attempt from 13.6 per cent to 7.9 per cent, saving about 2.1 million driver hours a year, without a recipient fee.
• Expanded lockers from 1,050 to 5,600; pickup points rose from 2.8 to 14.1 per cent of parcels.
• Led the public explanation of the April 2024 price revision; revenue per parcel rose from ¥668 to ¥733 and operating margin from 2.9 to 4.6 per cent.
• Removed links from all Kazemachi text messages; calls about suspect messages fell 72 per cent and app users rose to 9.4 million.
• Grew luggage forwarding from 380,000 to 1.46 million bags a year.

Decisions in context

I joined Kazemachi in April 2021, six years after its drivers had first staffed a luggage counter for me at Mikasane Railway. The president's brief was blunt: the overtime cap for drivers would arrive in April 2024, and the company could not carry its parcels with fewer driver hours unless customers and shippers behaved differently. Marketing had until then meant brand advertising and seasonal campaigns. I rebuilt the team around customer research, digital channels and shipper marketing, and moved most of the budget from advertising into lockers, notices and the telephone line. Three decisions defined the period: declining a recipient fee for redelivery, publishing the reasons for the 2024 price revision and removing links from our text messages. Each cost something visible. By March 2026 the second-attempt rate was 7.9 per cent, revenue per parcel was ¥733 and operating margin had recovered to 4.6 per cent.

Reason for the move

Current role. Not seeking an executive move; considering one outside directorship with the consent of Kazemachi's president and board.

Mandate

Rebuild the loyalty programme around people living in Kyushu and move bookings from intermediaries to the airline's own channels.

Outcomes

• Raised the share of bookings through the airline's own website and app from 46 to 63 per cent.
• Grew active loyalty members from 610,000 to 840,000 between 2017 and 2019 through a resident tier for Kyushu households.
• Designed the 2020 refund policy: cash by default, an optional 110 per cent credit and a one-year status freeze.
• Kept formal refund complaints below 150 across the 2020 cancellations; 58 per cent of 2019's active members had booked again by March 2021.

Decisions in context

Sorahane was a mid-sized domestic airline whose most loyal customers lived in Kyushu, while its loyalty programme had been designed for business travellers from Tokyo. I reported to the executive vice president for commercial and led 58 people in marketing, digital sales and the programme. We introduced a resident tier for Kyushu households, rewarded family travel and moved bookings away from intermediaries, raising direct sales from 46 to 63 per cent of the total. Active members rose from 610,000 to 840,000 by the end of 2019. Then, in the spring of 2020, bookings fell by nearly 90 per cent. I wrote the board paper recommending cash refunds by default against the finance team's preference for credit, and spent the following year managing the consequences. I left in March 2021 for Kazemachi, which offered a seat on an executive committee and a problem I had first met on a railway platform.

Reason for the move

Invited to lead marketing at a listed company whose delivery model had to change, as an executive officer reporting to the president.

Mandate

Build overseas visitor demand for the hot-spring and coastal lines without crowding out the residents who depend on them.

Outcomes

• Grew overseas-visitor journeys from about 400,000 in the year to March 2013 to 2.3 million in the year to March 2017.
• Raised visitor-pass revenue to ¥2.6 billion a year.
• Opened the company's first luggage-forwarding counter with Kazemachi in 2015; it handled 64,000 bags in its first year.
• Introduced timetables and signage in four languages and a reserved-seat allocation for residents on two peak services.

Decisions in context

Mikasane hired me to sell its slow lines to visitors from abroad just as arrivals to Japan began to climb. I started with a team of three and a budget of ¥90 million, and built partnerships with travel agencies in Seoul, Taipei and Hong Kong, a visitor pass for rail and bus, and timetables in Japanese, English, Korean and traditional Chinese. Overseas-visitor journeys rose from about 400,000 a year to 2.3 million. Success brought its own problem. Residents, including schoolchildren, were standing on two-car trains filled with luggage, and two hot-spring towns complained formally to the company. I proposed a reserved-seat allocation for residents on two peak services and our first luggage-forwarding counter, run with Kazemachi. Both cost some visitor revenue and both reduced complaints. I learnt Korean during those years, and I learnt that a tourism success measured only in arrivals can become a local grievance.

Reason for the move

Wanted to run marketing for a whole commercial business, including loyalty and digital sales, rather than a single segment.

Mandate

Find out why repeat customers stopped ordering, and reduce the cost of parcels that failed to reach them.

Outcomes

• Cut failed cash-on-delivery parcels from 6.8 to 4.4 per cent through a confirmation call and a postcard sent before dispatch.
• Raised the twelve-month repeat-purchase rate from 41 to 47 per cent.
• Built a postal and telephone panel of 2,000 customers, used for every catalogue redesign.

Decisions in context

I joined Sayodo Direct as its first customer research manager, expecting to study catalogue design. Within weeks the research had led me to the warehouse. The company's customers were mostly over sixty-five, many living alone, and a cash-on-delivery parcel that failed three times came back at our cost and often ended the relationship. I built a panel of 2,000 customers who answered by post and telephone, because online surveys reached their children rather than them. The findings were practical: customers forgot what they had ordered by television, could not find the carrier's slip and did not answer unknown numbers. A confirmation call, a postcard before dispatch and clearer packaging cut failed deliveries from 6.8 to 4.4 per cent. In 2010 I took on the wider customer-experience role, including returns. I completed an evening MBA during these years and left when Mikasane offered me a chance to work in travel.

Reason for the move

Wanted to market travel, where customer behaviour in the regional economy was changing fastest.

Mandate

Bring consumer research into the agency's work for transport, retail and food clients.

Outcomes

• Led planning for a private railway's campaign to move commuters to off-peak travel, which shifted about 4 per cent of morning journeys within a year.
• Introduced observational research, including accompanied shopping trips, to the agency's retail accounts.
• Wrote the agency's first guide to research with older consumers, used in training until 2012.

Decisions in context

Moving into planning in 2002 gave me what I had wanted from advertising: a reason to study people properly. Hanzaki's planners were expected to explain why consumers behaved as they did and to turn that into a brief. I worked mainly on transport, supermarket and food accounts, leading small teams and research budgets of up to ¥40 million. The work I remember best was for a private railway that wanted commuters to travel outside the morning peak. Surveys said people would shift if offered points; observation showed that they would shift only if their employers allowed it. The campaign that followed addressed employers as much as commuters and moved about 4 per cent of morning journeys within a year. I also wrote the agency's first guide to research with older consumers. By the end of 2007 I wanted to answer for results directly, on the client side.

Reason for the move

Wanted to be accountable on the client side for what a campaign changed, not only for the campaign.

Mandate

Manage campaigns for transport and retail clients from brief to delivery.

Outcomes

• Managed a private railway's commuter and leisure campaigns for four consecutive years.
• Moved a supermarket chain's weekly flyer to a regional format that cut print costs by 12 per cent.
• Joined the planning department after two years of requesting a transfer.

Decisions in context

I joined Hanzaki Advertising in April 1998 straight from university, as one of fourteen graduate account executives that year. The work was practical and often repetitive: managing schedules, approving proofs, attending client meetings and carrying messages between the client and the creative team. My clients were a private railway in the Kansai region and a supermarket chain with weekly flyers in three prefectures. The railway account taught me how transport companies think about demand, in timetables and load factors, and the supermarket account taught me how quickly a regional customer notices when a national template ignores local habits. I redesigned the chain's flyer format around regional editions, which also reduced its print costs by 12 per cent. I asked twice to move into planning, where research was done, and was transferred in April 2002.

Reason for the move

Transferred to the planning department.