Chief Executive Officer / India
The growth story needed an operating account
- Company employees
- 280
- March 2026; seven executive direct reports
- Company revenue
- ₹96 crore
- FY 2025–26;₹5.9 crore operating profit; franchise retail sales excluded
- Retail experience
- 30 years
- Merchandising through CEO and executive statutory director
Decisions & consequences
01Closing the prestige shop I had argued to open
As COO I supported a 2019 prestige-shop opening that absorbed ₹2.3 crore of investment. The location made the brand visible and gave the commercial team a setting it was proud to show. By the 2022 review, the shop's preceding twelve-month contribution was negative ₹42 lakh after direct store costs and before head-office allocations. I was now CEO, and my earlier sponsorship made it tempting to ask for more time without a sufficiently different operating plan.
Alka Derqeshi asked us to separate the sunk opening investment from the decision still available. We reviewed the shop's role in customer access, nearby locations, online relationships and service before recommending closure. A direct-store loss alone would not have captured those wider effects. Equally, the phrase brand presence could not substitute for evidence that those effects justified keeping the location.
The board approved a ₹68 lakh closure programme covering the agreed exit, transition and related work. Of twenty-four shop colleagues, eighteen transferred within the business and six agreed separation arrangements through the appropriate professional and employment process. Customer communication and access to service were part of the programme. The network moved from thirteen owned shops to twelve.
Some colleagues argued that closure would publicly contradict the confidence of the opening. I explained that continuing to fund a weak recommendation would not repair the earlier judgement. I owned that sponsorship and brought the alternatives to the board rather than treating closure as a finance decision imposed on retail. The wider network review did not promise that every customer or sale would transfer elsewhere.
We did not report the ₹42 lakh annual negative contribution as an achieved recurring saving, or treat the ₹2.3 crore opening investment as newly recovered cash. The outcome was a funded exit with its consequences recorded. I learned that a CEO must be willing to change the business in a way that makes an earlier personal decision look less successful. The obligation is to the choice now available, not to preserving the story told when the shop opened.
Funding the support behind a four-location franchise pilot
In 2024 we considered a broader franchise expansion for the travel-goods brand. Local partners could contribute capital and knowledge of their markets, but the proposed network would still depend on our range support, training, service and escalation arrangements. The number of interested locations was easier to present than the central capability needed to support them.
I recommended a four-location pilot with ₹1.1 crore of centrally funded preparation and support. Partners funded their own agreed local commitments, and the arrangements underwent appropriate commercial and professional review. The programme did not transfer every brand obligation to the operator merely because the premises were independently funded. Our team had to be able to support the customer experience associated with the name.
By March 2026, two pilot shops were trading, one remained in preparation and one had been withdrawn. I reported those states separately. Four approved locations did not mean four openings, and an interested partner did not establish company revenue. Franchisees' retail sales were also kept separate from the company's own ₹96 crore revenue account.
Some colleagues wanted to use the pilot approvals as the basis for a wider recruitment campaign. I preferred to examine the operating evidence from the trading shops and the reasons for delay and withdrawal before widening the offer. That did not mean waiting for a perfect model. It meant deciding which support obligations were understood and which would multiply if we recruited faster.
The programme established two operating partner locations and a clearer account of the central work, while leaving the wider rollout decision open. We did not claim that the pilot investment had already been recovered or that the same arrangement would work in every market. I learned to describe franchise growth as a shared operating commitment rather than a way to count more doors with less company capital. The capital may sit in different hands, but the customer still encounters one brand.
Buying a service capability and funding the work after acquisition
In 2025 we proposed acquiring an eighteen-person bag-care operation. Our travel-goods brand already depended on external service relationships, and I wanted a stronger internal capability to assess and handle appropriate repair work. The strategic argument was not that every product should be repaired or that ownership would remove all service limitations. It was that a continuing customer obligation deserved an accountable place in the business.
After appropriate diligence and professional review, the board approved ₹4.8 crore consideration and a separate ₹42 lakh integration programme. The latter covered the work of connecting case handling, systems, training and referral routes from shops and online operations. We did not describe the purchase price as the full cost of making the capability useful, or combine the two amounts into a claim about a return already earned.
The operation's eighteen colleagues joined the business and are included in the March 2026 company headcount. Qualified service staff retained assessment of individual cases, and customer terms and permissions continued to govern the work. The acquisition did not create a universal repair promise or silently change existing customer entitlements.
A defined review of 120 cases recorded seventy-four completed repairs, eighteen assessed as unsuitable for repair and twenty-eight still pending. Those figures described that group at the review date. We did not call the pending cases failures or imply that the completed group proved every future request could be handled. The board needed to see the continuing work as well as the acquisition milestone.
Some colleagues considered integration an operating detail that could follow the strategic announcement. I treated it as part of the investment recommendation. If the capability was important enough to buy, it was important enough to fund, staff and review after ownership changed. The outcome was an acquired service team with a defined integration programme and a visible case account. I learned to judge an acquisition through the responsibility it makes possible, and the work still needed to exercise that responsibility well.