Chief Operating Officer / India
The wider physical account changed the operating promise
- Operating employees
- 172
- Four station heads; 242 company employees
- Annual non-capital operating expense
- ₹32 crore
- Capital and professional approvals remain separate
- Career since June 1993
- 33 years
- Civil works through regional hydro operations
Decisions & consequences
012017: the receiving arrangement did not cover the proposed removal
As regional operations head I supported a sediment-removal programme covering 30,000 cubic metres at one fictional station. The initial ₹5.4 crore proposal concentrated on the work quantity, contractor availability and preferred schedule. I had not given equivalent attention to the receiving arrangement. Qualified review established that the documented destination and its permissions supported 18,000 cubic metres for the proposed programme, leaving 12,000 cubic metres without an established authorised receiving scope.
I withdrew support for authorising the full quantity on that basis. The unsupported 12,000 cubic metres stayed outside the permitted work programme while the responsible environmental, engineering and contractual owners examined alternatives. This case does not describe material being dumped without permission. Nor does it imply that a location’s physical capacity alone establishes an acceptable receiving arrangement. The documented conditions mattered alongside the quantity.
Management approved a further ₹62 lakh and eight weeks for the coordinated redesign and review. The plan was divided so that the supported scope could be considered under its existing conditions and the remainder would require a separate decision after suitable arrangements were established. The original ₹5.4 crore was a proposal, not an incurred amount later recovered. The review expense was not represented as the price of an automatically available permission, and the later stage was not described as completed before it had been authorised.
The result was a smaller immediate commitment and an explicitly unresolved second part. That was less convenient than the original schedule, but it made the operating account faithful to what the organisation could actually support. I changed my own review practice to ask where material would go and what conditions governed that destination before accepting the headline maintenance quantity. The leadership lesson was not a technical disposal method. It was that my recommendation had stopped too early in the physical chain, and the missing part had to change the decision rather than remain a qualification outside it.
2023: daily totals could not settle a continuing release condition
A retrospective operating review examined sixty daily release records at a fictional station. The aggregate quantities appeared consistent with the planned daily volumes. The relevant internal operating plan, established by qualified owners for that site, also required evidence about conditions within each day. Only forty-one records initially retained adequate interval detail. Nineteen daily totals therefore could not by themselves establish the continuing condition being discussed.
Some colleagues wanted the aggregate account to stand because no contrary event had been established. I asked that the limitation remain explicit. Missing interval evidence did not prove a physical breach, but it also could not establish that the condition had been met throughout the period. The relevant environmental and technical owners needed to interpret the records and decide any further response through the appropriate process. I did not introduce a general flow threshold or claim that this invented internal requirement represented the law at all Indian hydro projects.
Management authorised ₹48 lakh and ten weeks to reconstruct the evidence where legitimate source records existed and improve preservation for subsequent reporting. The review established adequate detail for fifty-five of the sixty days. Five remained unresolved. We did not fill those gaps with invented measurements, interpolate them into a compliance conclusion or describe better future recording as proof of the past. The supported and unresolved periods remained separate in the account sent to the CEO.
The decision consequence was to withdraw the proposed unqualified statement about the full period and retain the limitations alongside the reported volumes. The exercise did not establish ecological outcomes or certify statutory compliance. It improved the honesty of the operating evidence and the process for keeping it. I wanted the organisation to distinguish an absence of established adverse evidence from a positive demonstration of the claimed condition. That distinction belongs in management’s recommendation before the board or a customer is asked to rely on it.
2025: a spare in stores was not yet a transportable recovery option
A recovery-planning review considered forty-eight replacement components intended for stations in the fictional portfolio. The planning account treated their presence in stores as sufficient support for the corresponding recovery arrangements. Civil-engineering review of the proposed access route identified a problem: the original vehicle configuration carried a gross load of twenty-four tonnes against the documented eighteen-tonne limit applicable to the reviewed route. The account had established possession, but not a supported means of delivery.
I held the affected movement assumptions out of the recovery commitment while qualified transport, civil and safety owners examined the options. No overloaded journey is represented as having taken place. The limit concerned the reviewed gross vehicle load and route conditions, not a universal payload allowance. I did not ask the operating team to improvise a crossing or to treat management urgency as an engineering approval.
The company allocated ₹92 lakh and twelve weeks for the coordinated replanning. Thirty-six components could be assigned professionally reviewed modular transport arrangements whose planned gross vehicle loads were sixteen tonnes under the stated conditions. Twelve components still lacked an acceptable route arrangement and remained outside the supported recovery plan. The revised account did not claim that all thirty-six movements had already occurred. Actual movements would still require the responsible owners to confirm the conditions and permissions at the time.
The practical result was a differentiated recovery position: some resource assumptions now had an examined route, while others remained unresolved despite the components being physically present. That distinction changed what operations could responsibly promise about availability. I asked station heads to retain access and receiving conditions beside the stock account instead of allowing a spare count to stand alone. The case is about the completeness of a management commitment, not instructions for loading, lifting or operating on a constrained route. Those decisions remained with the qualified teams whose review the programme had initially omitted.