Chief Executive Officer / India
Recovering the promise and changing the business behind it
- Enterprise workforce
- 261 employees
- Exhibition transport, storage and packing services
- FY 2025–26 revenue
- ₹112 crore
- ₹68 crore transport and ₹44 crore storage/packing
- Annual operating responsibility
- ₹87 crore
- FY 2026–27; separate ₹9 crore capital programme
Decisions & consequences
01Recovering the three opening-date commitments I had approved together
In 2018 I accepted three exhibition assignments whose opening windows overlapped. Reviewed separately, each looked commercially attractive and operationally manageable. Taken together, the plan needed nine crew teams at the same time, and we had six available. I was COO and owned the approval. The overlap was present in the dates we had accepted; it was not a later change that could be blamed on a customer.
The commercial team wanted to preserve all three assignments. Sanjay’s operating account made the capacity gap explicit and challenged the assumption that the usual arrangements could absorb it. We considered the combination of suitable partner capacity and changes to work windows that customers could approve. The response did not treat an extra name on a roster as equivalent to the specialist team the work required. Nor could the company simply change a customer’s access window unilaterally because our original promise had become difficult.
We spent ₹42 lakh over four weeks arranging partner support and revised windows with the customers. The revised plan was fulfilled. That result is narrower than saying every original movement happened on time or that the episode established a perfect safety record. We had changed the plan through an agreed process and incurred additional cost to meet the commitments in that revised form. The outcome did not make the initial approval a good decision.
The trade-off was accepting the financial and relationship cost of reopening promises already made. I retained my own approval error in the account and changed how concurrent assignments were examined before commitment. Commercial and operating leaders needed one combined capacity picture rather than three individually persuasive papers. The case still shapes my CEO work because a recovery can look like evidence of organisational resilience while hiding a repeatable management failure. I want the enterprise to learn from the recovery without making exceptional effort the ordinary way it sells a service.
Building a repeat-fit crate capability with its use conditions intact
In 2023 I approved a selected repeat-fit crate programme for recurring exhibition movements. The commitment comprised ₹1.2 crore capital and ₹22 lakh preparation expense. We developed 120 crates for defined uses, with suitability reviewed against the intended contents and handling requirements. The strategic purpose was to build a repeatable packing capability rather than treat every movement as a fresh one-off purchase or assume any reused container would be appropriate.
The commercial team wanted a simple message about reusable packing. Sanjay wanted the use conditions to remain visible so the asset count did not become a promise that every exhibit would fit. Clients and qualified specialists retained decisions about their contents; the programme did not provide a general conservation, structural or artistic approval. I supported the investment on the basis of the selected recurring work and the discipline needed to keep suitability under review.
Over eighteen months, the 120-crate set supported 216 recorded movements. Each crate had at least one recorded use in the programme, so 96 movements occurred beyond those first 120 uses. That account describes activity within the selected set. It does not establish the maximum service life of every crate, the suitability of an unreviewed next assignment or a quantified saving in emissions. We did not add an environmental result simply because repeat use was a desirable feature of the proposition.
The trade-off was committing capital and preparation effort before all later use was known, while retaining a more qualified commercial explanation than a universal reusable-packing offer. The bounded result was a working capability that supported repeated movements under defined conditions. I would examine its future through condition, fit, repair and actual use rather than celebrate the purchased asset count alone. The case shows how I want the enterprise to invest: state the useful service being built, keep the professional boundaries clear and report what the equipment actually did without turning a promising operating practice into an unsupported universal claim.
Charging for the specialist availability the customer wanted reserved
In 2025 we piloted a service proposition that made reserved specialist capacity explicit. Some exhibition customers valued knowing that an agreed team capability would be available around their programme dates, while the existing ad-hoc model depended on availability when an assignment was requested. Keeping capacity ready carried a cost even when every reserved period did not become a movement. I wanted the agreement to describe that commitment rather than leave it hidden inside optimistic assumptions about later work.
Six customers considered the pilot. Four chose a capacity-reservation arrangement, and two preferred to continue on an ad-hoc basis. We kept both choices understandable. A reservation covered defined capacity and dates under the agreed terms, not an unlimited right to every crew in the business. Customers whose needs did not justify that commitment were not presented as having made the wrong decision by choosing a different service pattern.
In one selected agreement, the annual service amount was ₹1.8 crore, including reserved availability. It was not a base amount to which the same reservation would be charged again. Direct cost was ₹1.3 crore, leaving ₹0.5 crore before central overhead and other enterprise costs. I did not label that remainder net profit. The figures illustrated how the agreement carried the cost of readiness within the commercial account instead of depending on an unspecified future volume to explain it.
The trade-off was committing capacity to an agreed customer programme and giving up some freedom to sell the same availability elsewhere. The company also needed clearer planning than a simple queue of accepted jobs. The bounded outcome was a proposition four pilot customers chose and an example whose economics made the obligation visible. No company-wide margin increase or perfect fulfilment record is claimed. The decision connected the lesson from the overlapping assignments with a more deliberate commercial model: availability should be a service the enterprise understands and agrees to provide, not an invisible promise discovered only when several opening dates arrive together.