A broad equipment range can serve different workplaces well, but that does not mean the whole range belongs in every standard package. A supplier may favour a comprehensive bundle because it is simple to present, order and dispatch. The customer may experience the same bundle as an unexplained collection of parts, some useful immediately and others requiring a different task or configuration. I want the product team to understand that difference before treating completeness as an inherent benefit. A coherent offer explains what is common, what is optional and what must be assessed before a choice is appropriate.
The fictional Pravellen accessory case began with thirty-six parts in a proposed standard bundle. Research across 180 sites found 108 routinely using twelve core parts, while seventy-two needed a broader selection. We chose a twelve-part core with explicit options. In a ninety-six-site pilot, fifty-eight selected the core and thirty-eight added options. The decision did not establish that optional parts were generally unnecessary, nor did the recorded selections demonstrate a financial saving or a clinical benefit. They described how that defined offer was chosen in the pilot.
Separate routine work from the full catalogue
I would begin by examining the work each accessory supports. Frequency alone does not settle importance: a rarely used part may still be necessary for a particular task. Equally, a part should not become universal merely because it exists in the supplier’s catalogue. Product research needs to distinguish the routine configuration from requirements that depend on the setting, task or other equipment. The relevant specialists must assess compatibility and any clinical or quality conditions. A product manager cannot infer those conclusions from a purchasing pattern or a broad preference survey.
The full-bundle proposal had practical attractions. Commercial colleagues could explain one package, and operations could avoid some selection complexity. I would take those advantages seriously rather than dismiss them as resistance to a more thoughtful product. Moving to options creates work for the supplier as well as the customer. The decision should therefore compare the complete experiences: a simple order that may contain an unclear assortment, and a more deliberate selection that can produce a better-defined configuration but requires reliable guidance and fulfilment.
Anagha Vervankar’s challenge was whether catalogue breadth had become a substitute for understanding use. The research suggested a common set, but it also showed a substantial group with broader requirements. We did not treat the 108 routine-core sites as evidence that the other seventy-two should accept less. The choice was to preserve range breadth while changing the default proposition. That distinction allowed the company to discuss a smaller core without implying that every site should operate in the same way or that the optional functions lacked value.
Make the selection process credible
An option is useful only if the buyer can understand when it is relevant and the supplier can provide an accurate configuration. I would want product, sales, service and the responsible technical owners to define that process together. A list of part names is not necessarily enough. The customer may need to know which task the part supports, what else it depends on and which combinations require assessment. Those explanations should stay within verified evidence and authorised claims. A reassuring description cannot replace a compatibility review the actual product requires.
The company also needs an explicit answer when a buyer is unsure. Automatically adding every part recreates the original universal bundle under the appearance of choice. Automatically excluding uncertain items can leave a requirement unmet. I would establish a route for the appropriate assessment and make its status clear in the proposal. The commercial team should know when a selection is ready to confirm and when another owner’s input remains necessary. That protects the meaning of the offer without asking every salesperson to become the specialist responsible for each technical conclusion.
Our eight-point-seven-crore programme funded the fictional work of changing and evaluating the proposition. It was not a quantified saving achieved by removing parts, and it did not establish the total continuing cost of a configurable range. The more complex selection and fulfilment process could create costs of its own. Finance and the operating owners would need to assess them. I would keep that trade-off in the account rather than claim that a smaller core automatically improves margin or customer economics. The product argument should be clear enough to stand alongside those assessments.
Keep observed choices within their evidence
The pilot’s fifty-eight core selections and thirty-eight extended selections described ninety-six participating sites. They should not be projected directly onto the earlier research population or the wider market. They also do not show that a core customer will never need an additional accessory. A later change in work may create a legitimate new requirement. I would ask the team to preserve the path for that discussion while avoiding an unsupported promise that every future addition will be compatible or available. The continuing product relationship deserves the same precision as the initial order.
There is a temptation to choose an adoption measure that rewards only the new optional parts or only the smaller core, depending on the internal sponsor. I would instead begin with whether the selected configuration fits the stated task and has passed the necessary assessment. The commercial outcome still matters, but it should not quietly redefine a valid customer choice as a failure. A site that appropriately selects the core may be well served. Another that needs several options may be equally well served. Their different selections are not automatically evidence that one understood the range better than the other.
For the board, the useful account would explain why the offer changed, what additional responsibilities the selection model creates and what the pilot actually showed. Directors need not choose the contents of a bundle. They may need to understand whether management has considered the implications of moving from one standard package to a configurable proposition. I would include the operational complexity and remaining evidence needs alongside the customer rationale. The story becomes less useful if it is presented solely as a reduction in the number of parts supplied.
My broader view is that portfolio breadth should support appropriate choices, rather than become a default quantity that every buyer must absorb. A real programme would require authorised product evidence, compatibility assessment and a clear account of applicable requirements. This fictional example illustrates a commercial-product decision with limits: we identified a common set, retained genuine variation and accepted the work needed to explain it. The result was not a universal claim that less is better. It was a more explicit relationship between the range the company offered and the particular job a customer needed that range to perform.