Ethan MercierChief Technology Officer

A-01 · Subject

Ethan Mercier

Design for the duty the product will carry

I entered engineering through the detail of a product: the drawing, the fit and the question of what another person would need in order to make it.

Open to
  • Board appointments
  • Advisory roles
  • Speaking invitations
Portrait of Ethan Mercier
Elevation · Chief Technology Officer

I design for the duty a product will actually carry.

A pump can perform impressively at a carefully chosen point and still be a poor match for the work a customer needs it to do. I am interested in that distance between a favourable result and a useful product. My work connects design, measurement and manufacturing with the changing duty the equipment will encounter. I want a performance claim to carry its conditions with it, so the person choosing, operating or servicing the product can understand what the engineering actually established.

At Caldriven Motion, I lead 214 employees through six direct reports, with 36 contractors separately. My 2026 authority is C$88 million, divided between 54 million for product engineering and 34 million for testing and industrialisation. I report to chief executive Adele Vensault. Our fictional company has four Canadian and United States sites, 6,200 employees and C$2.4 billion 2025 revenue. Those company figures describe the setting. They do not give me every operating, quality or safety decision associated with the products and sites.

I began as a mechanical designer in June 1994. The progression into product leadership changed the questions I asked: from whether a part could be drawn and made, to whether its tolerance served a real requirement, and eventually to whether the company should sustain the product architecture behind it. A drawing, a test result and a service instruction each express part of the answer. Technical leadership should make their relationship clear enough that a promising design can become an explainable commitment.

An operating range that mattered more than a peak

A product programme compared alternatives across the customer's stated duty range instead of selecting a design solely for its best measured efficiency point. The chosen route accepted a less impressive peak figure in exchange for a more suitable account of the work the product was expected to perform. Its limits remained part of the selection discussion.

A measurement close to the boundary

An acceptance review required us to consider the uncertainty attached to a dimensional result, not merely its displayed digits. We improved the measurement approach and clarified the agreed decision rule. A calibration reference alone did not establish that the result could support every tolerance decision the programme wanted to make.

A serviceable assembly with a stated trade-off

A redesign made a wear assembly easier to replace while adding material and initial product cost. We reported those consequences alongside the service objective. A repairable feature can be useful without proving a whole-life environmental advantage; that wider conclusion would require its own defined comparison and evidence.

Current focus

I am asking product teams to connect performance promises with the duty, measurement and service conditions behind them. This includes the assumptions used in a test, the variants retained for installed customers and the decisions created when a purchased component becomes obsolete. The objective is not a single specification that conceals every difference. It is a product account that helps engineering, commercial and service colleagues make consistent choices as the equipment's circumstances change.

Conversations I welcome

I welcome a board or advisory discussion where an engineered product has a long life and technology choices create continuing obligations. My existing skills-foundation directorship requires twelve annual days; a further eighteen would bring the proposed external total to thirty, subject to the actual calendars and consent. For speaking, I am interested in an audience willing to examine a product claim closely, including the condition under which an attractive engineering choice becomes less suitable.

Specification

The scale of the work.

Ref.MeasureValueNote
S-01Engineering employees214Six direct reports; 36 contractors separately
S-022026 authorityC$88 mProduct 54 m; testing and industrialisation 34 m
S-03Mechanical engineering career32 yearsJune 1994 to October 2026

Modules of expertise

The load-bearing capabilities.

  • MOD-01Performance across the operating duty
  • MOD-02Measurement fit for the decision
  • MOD-03Product commonality and installed service
  • MOD-04Repair and component-life choices

Detail drawings

Where the decisions were made.

01Detail

Choosing the pump against the working day

In April 2024, two pump designs were competing for the next industrial product programme. The commercial team favoured the design with the higher peak efficiency on its curve. Our application review described a different problem: the intended duty moved between three operating conditions during a twelve-hour reference day. A peak measured elsewhere on the curve did not tell us which design would use less electrical energy while providing those same required conditions. I funded a ten-week comparison costing C$1.4 million. Test specialists established matched flow and head requirements at each point and measured electrical input using the agreed method. The reference schedule assigned six hours to the first point, four to the second and two to the third. Design A drew 12.4,17.6 and 24.1 kilowatts respectively. Design B drew 11.2,16.9 and 25.0 kilowatts. B was worse at the third point, a fact the product recommendation needed to retain. Multiplying each input by its scheduled hours gave 193.0 kilowatt-hours for A and 184.8 for B: an 8.2 kilowatt-hour difference over the defined reference day. These were calculated duty totals using measured points, not an annual customer saving. A changed schedule could alter the comparison, and the experiment did not represent every installation. We chose B for further product development because the stated application weighted its stronger conditions more heavily. The commercial sponsor objected that a lower peak figure would make the headline specification harder to sell. I accepted that communication cost and asked the application team to explain the relevant duty instead of replacing one selective claim with another. The C$1.4 million study cost remained separate from a modelled energy difference. We did not multiply the result across the installed population to manufacture a financial return. Next time I would require the duty assumptions before approving the initial comparison brief. The test team could execute either brief accurately; leadership had to ensure it was answering the selection question the customer actually faced. A technically sound measurement at the wrong operating point can still support a commercially poor choice.

02Detail

Giving the digits an uncertainty account

In October 2024, a pilot shaft programme used a 50.000 millimetre nominal diameter with a±0.020 millimetre tolerance. One reported measurement was 50.014 millimetres. It lay below the 50.020 upper limit, but the expanded uncertainty associated with the existing measurement approach was±0.008 millimetres. The corresponding interval extended from 50.006 to 50.022. The displayed central value alone could not establish acceptance under the quality team's agreed rule requiring that interval to remain within the limits. Production wanted to use the existing gauge because its calibration was current and a more demanding measurement arrangement would slow the pilot. Metrology colleagues explained why a calibration reference did not establish suitability for this particular decision. I supported an eight-week C$740,000 programme to improve the measurement arrangement, including preparation, fixturing, environmental control and specialist evaluation of the uncertainty account. Martin Orswick retained the acceptance decision. The revised approach produced a documented expanded uncertainty of±0.003 millimetres for the stated measurement conditions. The same 50.014 illustrative central value would then correspond to 50.011–50.017, inside the limits under that rule. We did not use this arithmetic to declare every pilot part acceptable. Each actual result required the appropriate measurement and review, and the improvement did not retrospectively change the uncertainty associated with earlier observations. The new arrangement added approximately four minutes of preparation per examined part in the pilot work. I accepted that cost while manufacturing and metrology considered a supportable longer-term method. We did not repeatedly measure until a favourable number appeared or quietly widen the drawing tolerance to avoid the issue. Any requirement change would need its own technical justification and authorised approval. My improvement next time would be to review measurement capability while the tolerance is being proposed. The team should know whether the required decision can be supported before a drawing and production schedule assume that it can. More decimal places on a report cannot supply the missing understanding, and a traceability statement should never be asked to do that work by itself.

03Detail

Simplifying a family without stranding the installed equipment

In January 2025, a seal-cartridge redesign offered a common assembly for two pump families. The engineering proposal reduced duplicated design work and made future purchasing more straightforward. Service colleagues identified a complication: earlier installations used a housing interface that could not accept the new cartridge directly. A catalogue showing one replacement part would look simpler while leaving maintainers to discover the difference on site. I chose a staged commonality programme with two explicit service routes. New production could use the common assembly after its own qualification work. Earlier equipment would retain the supported original replacement or use a separately defined conversion kit where the installation assessment permitted it. Sales preferred to describe the new cartridge as a universal replacement; I declined that wording because the interface condition was material to the purchase and the maintenance task. The nine-month programme cost C$3.6 million and completed in September 2025. It included development examination, service documentation and preparation for both routes. The conversion kit added C$420 to the parts cost for an eligible earlier installation, excluding labour and other site work. The original service cartridge remained in the support plan. We did not count its continuing obligation as a failure to standardise; it was part of the decision to keep the installed population supportable. The useful outcome was a common design for new production with a service account that preserved the earlier interface. It did not establish that every installed pump had been converted, nor did the programme claim a fleet-wide maintenance saving. The service team could identify the appropriate route from the equipment record and the assessed circumstances before making a promise to the customer. I would involve field-service specialists at the concept review next time, before a common-component drawing becomes the preferred commercial story. Their knowledge of installed conditions changes what commonality can responsibly mean. A product family is simpler only when the people maintaining it can understand the exceptions that remain, rather than being expected to solve them after the replacement arrives.

04Detail

Making a wear assembly replaceable without overstating the benefit

In June 2025, a product team proposed a modular wear assembly for a pump used in abrasive service. The existing design required a larger subassembly to be removed when the wear element needed replacement. The modular route offered a more accessible task but added interfaces, 2.4 kilograms of material and C$180 to the initial unit manufacturing cost. Marketing wanted to introduce it as a lower-impact product before those trade-offs had been examined together. I supported a fourteen-week development and service trial costing C$960,000. The programme examined the proposed interface, the replacement task and the instructions under defined workshop conditions. Six service technicians each performed both tasks after familiarisation, with the order alternated across the group. The median observed replacement time was 94 minutes for the existing route and 61 minutes for the modular route. Those twelve observations described a small workshop exercise, not every field repair. I approved further introduction work with the service result stated at that scope. We retained the extra material and initial cost in the product account and did not convert a faster task into a whole-life environmental claim. Such a comparison would need assumptions about operating life, replacement frequency, materials, transport and the fate of removed components. The workshop exercise had not answered those questions, and no customer downtime claim followed from the timing result. The commercial team accepted a narrower description focused on replaceability. The decision preserved a useful design feature while giving up a more ambitious launch claim. Engineering also retained the examination and maintenance responsibilities created by the additional interface; modularity did not make them disappear. The product's value would depend on the service circumstances in which that feature was actually used. Next time I would agree the proposed public claims at the start of development. That would help separate the evidence needed for a repair task from the much wider evidence needed for an environmental comparison. A good service feature does not need an unsupported second story to justify being investigated, and the team should not discover that distinction only when the launch language is already written.

05Detail

Buying time for a component transition

In February 2026, a supplier announced the planned end of a control-board component used in a mature pump-drive assembly. A final purchase could support continuing service, but it would also create inventory, ageing and forecasting obligations. The product group wanted to buy enough for the full remaining support horizon. Finance questioned a large stock commitment based on a service-demand estimate with considerable uncertainty. An immediate redesign would avoid some inventory but could not responsibly be completed before the supplier's order deadline. I recommended a bounded bridge: C$1.8 million of component inventory against an eighteen-month planning period, alongside a C$2.7 million redesign programme scheduled for twelve months. The inventory period was an assumption for planning, not an assurance of demand coverage. We agreed review points for actual consumption and the redesign's progress, with service, procurement and engineering sharing the account. Storage conditions and the suitability of later use remained matters for the relevant specialists. The final order was placed in May 2026. By September the redesign had completed its architecture review and prototype preparation; examination and release work remained ahead. I reported that stage explicitly instead of describing the replacement as complete because a new design existed. The bridge inventory supported the current service route while the next route was developed. It did not remove the possibility of excess stock or a need to reconsider the schedule. The decision gave up the apparent simplicity of either buying for every possible future need or declaring an immediate replacement. It created two commitments that had to be managed together, with different costs and completion conditions. No saving was claimed from comparing the purchase with an unapproved larger inventory estimate. The board discussion focused on the exposure retained and the evidence that would trigger another decision. I would make component-life review a regular part of mature-product planning earlier. The supplier notice made the timing urgent, but the installed support obligation existed long before it arrived. A deliberate review would give engineering and service more room to choose a transition before an order deadline narrows the available options.

Board record

Governance structures served.

  • Belverne Skills Foundation

    Non-executive director

    Collective board service; no committee-chair claim

    July 2019–present

Peer review

Notes from those who appoint.

Ethan showed us the operating condition at which the preferred pump was worse. That made the recommendation easier to examine because the executive team could see why the customer's schedule mattered.
Adele VensaultChief executive, Caldriven Motion · fictional colleague
When the shaft measurement approached its limit, Ethan funded the specialist work and kept the acceptance responsibility clear. He did not ask a more convenient reading to substitute for a defensible method.
Martin OrswickQuality leader, Caldriven Motion · fictional colleague

Working notes

Essays and perspectives.

An invitation

Contact

I welcome a board or advisory discussion where an engineered product has a long life and technology choices create continuing obligations. My existing skills-foundation directorship requires twelve annual days; a further eighteen would bring the proposed external total to thirty, subject to the actual calendars and consent. For speaking, I am interested in an audience willing to examine a product claim closely, including the condition under which an attractive engineering choice becomes less suitable.

Open to
  • Board appointments
  • Advisory roles
  • Speaking invitations

office@ethanmercier.example