A seven-year service needs more than access to the site today

## Put the premises inside the business model

The customer was willing to discuss a seven-year service, and our team could visit the premises. Those facts made the project feel more established than it was. In our fictional twenty-one-site proposal, some customers' present tenure was shorter than the proposed service term. The account assumed that renewal or consent would be resolved in the ordinary course. I wanted that assumption examined before the company committed assets to a relationship whose place of operation had not been established for the period being discussed.

A customer-site service joins several different things: a commercial relationship, equipment, a physical location and the authority to use that location in the proposed way. They may have different durations and owners. A customer can be serious about an improvement while still needing another party's agreement for the premises. A technically suitable installation can therefore sit inside an incomplete business proposition. Strategy needs to see that whole arrangement rather than treating the site as background once an initial visit has occurred.

The commercial sponsor had a sensible concern. Industrial businesses often expect to continue in premises they have occupied for years, and a requirement to resolve every question at the first conversation could make the company difficult to work with. We might lose relationships to a competitor willing to move faster. I did not regard that concern as evidence of poor judgement. The issue was the stage at which an expectation was being used to support a commitment, and whether the unresolved condition was visible to the people being asked to approve it.

There is a difference between exploring an opportunity and committing to a service that depends on continuing access. Early conversations can proceed while questions remain open. The investment account, however, should not silently treat those questions as settled. I asked legal, commercial and site owners to examine the actual arrangements and their significance. My role was to ensure that the findings reached the strategic decision. I could not interpret every lease or consent myself, nor assume that one general rule would describe twenty-one different circumstances.

That division of responsibility is useful because the strategic issue is broader than a document check. The company may need to reconsider the service duration, the allocation of obligations, the proposed equipment or the sequence of spending. Those choices affect the customer proposition and economics. Qualified advice informs them without automatically selecting the commercial route. Strategy should connect the findings with the options available to the authorised decision-makers, rather than leave a material site question in a legal workstream while the main proposal continues unchanged.

## Preserve unresolved sites in the portfolio account

Our review found nine sites with arrangements compatible with the proposed term and twelve that still needed resolution. Those categories described the position at the review date. They did not establish that the twelve were permanently unsuitable or that the nine were ready in every technical and commercial respect. The distinction mattered because a binary approved-or-rejected account would have concealed work still required on both sides. I wanted the portfolio to show which question had been answered and which questions remained with their respective owners.

An unresolved site can be commercially uncomfortable. It occupies space in a pipeline without supporting the same commitment as a site whose relevant arrangements have been examined. The temptation is to retain the location in the headline while assuming that somebody will resolve it before installation. That may sometimes happen, but the possibility should not be reported as a completed condition. A useful portfolio can retain the opportunity and its uncertainty together. Removing the distinction makes the list easier to present while making the investment choice harder to assess.

The review cost ₹39 lakh. I kept that expense in the account even though it did not create an asset or complete the original rollout. It improved our understanding of the proposition and allowed a narrower choice. The business still had to decide what to do with the unresolved sites and how much further effort was justified. I would not describe the review as proof that every similar project should be delayed. Its value was specific to the conditions of the programme we were considering and the commitments we had been asked to make.

The timing of the question also affects behaviour. Once equipment has been ordered and a public timetable announced, people have stronger reasons to interpret an unresolved arrangement favourably. That does not make a later review useless, but it can make the consequences more difficult. I prefer to identify the site relationship alongside the first serious commercial and technical account. Doing so gives the company more options and gives the customer a clearer explanation of what needs to be established before the proposed service can proceed.

Customers should not be treated as obstacles simply because they cannot answer every question immediately. A useful process explains why the arrangement matters and which parties need to participate. It distinguishes material conditions from administrative convenience. The company may choose to help develop a workable route, but that assistance should have a defined purpose and cost. A promise to solve everything later can make the early relationship pleasant while leaving both sides with a more expensive disagreement once the service has begun to take shape.

## Compare the narrower route on its actual scope

We selected a four-site pilot with ₹1.7 crore approved expenditure from the compatible group, subject to the remaining approvals. The original wider proposal had involved ₹8.4 crore. The difference was not a like-for-like saving because the two routes bought different scope. The pilot did not serve all twenty-one sites, and it did not automatically commit the other five sites whose tenure arrangements were compatible. The twelve unresolved locations remained outside the pilot's established basis. Those limits were part of the decision, not details to remove from its announcement.

The narrower route surrendered some commercial momentum and breadth. Some prospective customers could choose another provider or postpone the work. The pilot also could not establish every condition of a larger programme. Those were costs of the choice, and I wanted them considered alongside the better-defined site basis. A recommendation becomes more credible when it explains what the preferred option does not buy. Otherwise a smaller commitment can be made to look superior merely because its price is lower, while the omitted service is left out of the comparison.

Directors can examine whether the proposed service duration depends on arrangements that have actually been addressed. They can ask how unresolved locations affect the portfolio, which commitments are being approved now and what additional evidence would support expansion. They should also understand the consequence of waiting or narrowing the route. These questions keep the board at the level of enterprise choice. They do not require directors to negotiate site terms or replace the professional assessment of the underlying rights and obligations.

The practical lesson is to put the premises inside the business model. Access today is valuable, but a long service proposition may rely on a different relationship over time. The company should explain that relationship before investment makes it costly to reconsider. A sound strategy does not need every opportunity to have the same answer. It needs each proposed commitment to carry an honest account of the conditions on which it depends, so that a seven-year promise is assessed as the continuing undertaking it actually represents.