Three operating choices and what each one cost

Turning split shifts into full-time driving days

In the 2021–22 school year our driver turnover reached 34%. On the worst mornings 61 of roughly 1,090 school routes had no assigned driver, so dispatchers doubled routes and children reached school late. Districts deducted US$412,000 from our invoices under their performance clauses, and two of our largest contracts were due for renewal within eighteen months. Exit interviews agreed: drivers liked the work but could not live on five paid hours split by a long unpaid gap.

I proposed a combined day. A driver would run a morning school route, drive paratransit or field trips at midday and return for the afternoon route, with a minimum of seven and a half paid hours. Our chief financial officer disagreed. She calculated a gross cost of US$3.6 million a year and preferred a US$1.1 million sign-on bonus. Our paratransit director feared that school drivers would vanish each summer and leave her short in July. Both concerns were fair. I accepted a lower operating margin for at least two years and committed to a summer paratransit schedule for combined-day drivers.

We launched at six yards in August 2022 and reached all seventeen by January 2023. Of 390 drivers offered the role, 226 accepted, and each completed wheelchair-securement and passenger-assistance training before carrying a paratransit rider.

By 2024–25 turnover had fallen to 21%, peak uncovered routes to nine and district deductions to US$58,000. Lower overtime and training spending offset about US$2 million, leaving a net cost near US$1.6 million a year. Both contracts renewed. The company now reports driver tenure to the board as an operating measure rather than a personnel statistic.

Thirty-one drivers soon returned to split shifts, mostly because they disliked paratransit work. I would pilot at one yard first, design the role with drivers' representatives and offer a midday yard option, such as bus-aide training or pre-trip support, for people who prefer not to carry paratransit riders.

Declining to rebid a district at the edge of our network

In 2017, as vice president of school transportation, I supported a bid for a district 48 miles from our nearest yard. Its 38 buses ran from a leased outstation lot. By 2023 the contract earned US$4.1 million a year but lost about 4% after maintenance travel and cover costs. Deadhead was 22% of its miles against 9% across the network. When a driver called in sick, the replacement drove seventy minutes before reaching the first stop, and buses arrived after the bell on 11% of mornings, against 3% elsewhere.

The district announced a rebid for 2024 with a likely price ceiling about 4% above the existing rate. Breaking even needed roughly 19%. Our chief executive and commercial vice president wanted to bid regardless, keep the relationship and find savings later. They feared withdrawal would signal weakness to neighbouring districts. I argued that no saving could fix a yard in the wrong place, and that our core districts were already short of spare buses.

The board accepted my recommendation not to rebid. We told the district in September 2023, ten months before the contract ended, and offered transition support. We gave up 2.5% of revenue, paid US$96,000 for the rest of the lot lease and lost drivers who had served those families for years. Of 41 drivers, 17 joined the district's new in-house operation, 15 moved to our other yards and nine left.

The 29 buses we brought back became spares and covered 12 new routes in a core district during 2024–25 without additional purchases. Arrival before first bell rose across the network from 94.6% in 2022–23 to 97.2% in 2024–25, although the driver programme contributed too. Every bid now passes a density test.

I should have applied that test before supporting the 2017 bid. I would also tell a district far earlier. Ten months is a short time to build an in-house operation, and the district's first autumn was needlessly hard.

Matching twelve electric buses to routes they could finish

In late 2023 one of our districts won federal clean-bus grant funding for twelve electric school buses and asked us to operate them from our yard under the existing contract. The yard's electrical service could support eight chargers. Twelve needed a US$610,000 utility upgrade with a nine-month lead time, and we agreed to fund half.

The district's sustainability office wanted the buses on its longest rural routes, which ran 52 to 68 miles a day and would displace the most diesel. Our fleet director feared those routes in January, when cabin heating can cut usable range sharply. Public commitment and maintenance judgement pointed different ways.

I proposed assigning the buses to suburban routes of 34 to 46 miles, with midday top-up charging, and keeping four diesel buses on standby through the first winter. The trade-off was explicit. The pilot would displace about 12,300 gallons of diesel in its first year instead of an estimated 18,500, and the standby buses would cost us US$118,000 that the contract did not cover. The district agreed on condition that we review the assignment after a full year of data.

Our technicians completed high-voltage safety training before delivery, and a cold-morning procedure told dispatchers when to substitute diesel. That winter we made 37 substitutions, nearly all on mornings below 10°F. Across 2024–25 the electric buses achieved 91% availability against 96% for diesel, and energy cost US$0.31 a mile against US$0.57. In the first two months, demand charges ran US$11,400 above our model because buses all began charging on arrival.

With a year of evidence, the district moved four buses to longer routes for 2025–26. The pilot also gave our board its first data on yard power as a constraint on fleet replacement.

I would agree the tariff and a managed charging schedule with the utility before the first day, and write the standby cost into the contract instead of absorbing it.