A board considering what to give away, whom to license or whether to accept a strategic partner would gain from someone who has made those decisions in a content business and watched the consequences. I can read an offer for what the company still owns afterwards, not only for its headline value. I can explain how state-owned shareholders, founders and venture investors are likely to view the same proposal, because I have worked for one, alongside the others, and negotiated between them. I understand the Chinese rules that shape content companies at the level a director needs: online publishing permits, content review for short dramas, personal-information and data-security law, the protection of minors online and the labelling of AI-generated content. I would also bring a habit of asking who bears the cost of a strategy, whether authors, narrators, subscribers or the company itself, before the board decides. I am not an engineer, an accountant or a lawyer, and I would rely on colleagues who are.
Judgement in practice
01
Asking what a joint venture would leave us owning
When Feiluanpai offered RMB60 million over three years for exclusive first access to our adaptation rights, the board's discussion began with the certainty of the income. I asked a different question: in three years, what would we own that we did not own already, and what could we no longer do? The answer was an equity stake in a producer, but no freedom to license our own stories to anyone else first and no voice for authors over who adapted them. On another board I would ask the same thing about any exclusive partnership. Certain income is valuable, but a board should also see the options it is selling. I would equally accept that, in a weaker market, the committed minimum might have been the right choice.
02
Separating overseas growth from overseas operation
In 2023 the board considered spending RMB85 million over three years on our own reading app in Southeast Asia. I recommended licensing translation rights to Serambika Reads and a Thai publisher instead, because operating abroad would have required local content compliance, payment arrangements, marketing and, if readers' data came back to China, compliance with the personal-information law's rules on transfers abroad. Licensing earned RMB29 million in 2025, though it gave up a direct relationship with overseas readers. As a director I would ask management to show both routes with their data and compliance obligations stated, and to set a date for reviewing whether the cautious choice has become too cautious.
My first year on a board
I would spend the first quarter learning where the company's catalogue, subscribers or channel are most exposed, and I would ask to see that through the people closest to it: editors, producers, partner managers and the team handling content review. Board papers alone would not show me where an author or a partner is about to leave. In the second quarter I would read the company's three largest partnership or licensing agreements with management and ask what each prevents the company from doing. Before the first strategy review I would ask the chair which questions the board itself considers unresolved, so that I add to its discussion rather than restart it. I would expect to say less in the first two meetings than in later ones. By the end of the year I would ask the chair for direct feedback on whether my contribution has been useful or simply familiar to my own company's experience.
Conflicts and their management
My principal conflict is commercial. Qiaoyuting licenses rights to short-drama producers, audio platforms, overseas publishers and a state-owned broadcaster, and it competes with other reading companies for authors and readers. Before accepting any seat I would list every licensing partner, competitor and shared shareholder relationship and give it to the prospective chair and to Qiaoyuting's chief executive. I would not join the board of a direct competitor for authors or readers. Where the company is a licensing counterparty, I would withdraw from any discussion of our terms and would not see the other side's papers, and if such discussions became frequent I would step down rather than be absent from the board's main business. I would never carry information about one company's pricing, authors or partners to the other. Time is a second consideration: twenty-four days must cover preparation and unplanned meetings, and I would tell the chair early if Qiaoyuting's demands changed.
My independence statement
I have no shareholding, family tie or paid relationship with any company I would consider joining. Qiaoyuting licenses rights to producers, platforms and publishers across China, so any company that buys from us, competes with us or shares a partner with us needs a careful review before I could call myself independent of it, and that judgement belongs to the board concerned, not to me.
Board and committee exposure
Presented to the Board or a committee
Qiaoyuting Digital Reading Company
Board of directors and its strategy and investment committee
January 2021–present
Presents strategy, licensing, partnership and synthetic-content recommendations as chief strategy officer; not a director.
Reported to a committee
Shuzhenghe Publishing Group
Group investment committee
March 2012–February 2017
Brought five minority-investment proposals to the committee, of which three were approved; not a member.
Governance learning and readiness
IICA Independent Directors’ Databank: Not yet registered
The IICA Independent Directors' Databank is an Indian requirement and does not apply to me; my board interest is in Chinese companies, and I have not registered.
Since 2024 I have attended a director-education course for executives at a Chengdu business school covering directors' duties under China's Company Law and the work of board committees.
I observe our own board's strategy and investment committee closely and have asked our company secretary to review my committee papers as if a director had written them.