Open-Hardware ISA Governance Adviser — Sovereign Compute

The mandate

The board’s standing question is how a publicly supported processor programme should use and contribute to an open instruction-set ecosystem while preserving compatibility, security review and legitimate national differentiation. Research partners propose custom extensions, industrial members want preferential access and procurement leaders equate openness with guaranteed supplier independence. Directors need governance that creates upstream influence without funding a private fork or making unsupported sovereignty claims.

The adviser contributes four days monthly, attends quarterly Brussels board sessions and joins the planned Barcelona, Prague and Zurich forums. Each month, one proposed extension, contribution or membership right is examined across technical need, compatibility, licensing, decision process and ecosystem adoption. Written counsel is available within three working days before a board or public-funding gate, without assuming architecture or policy authority.

The appointment lasts ten months and may renew once for two months if an upstream ballot or public consortium agreement remains unresolved. Renewal requires the chair to record the specific external decision, remaining advisory sessions and updated member interests. It cannot become a permanent standards office, programme secretariat or processor-development role once governance is adopted.

The adviser has no line authority and assumes no executive responsibility for ISA design, contributions, procurement, public funding or industrial awards. Technical committees and accountable public executives retain those decisions. The adviser may challenge extension rationale, recommend upstream routes and expose capture risk, but cannot cast member votes, submit code, negotiate grants or promise national control of a supply chain.

Conflicts include processor and IP vendors, open-hardware foundations, universities, industrial consortium members, design-service companies, governments and investors. Employment, elected offices, board seats, patents, grants, equity and retained policy work must be disclosed. A new paid role with a member seeking preferential governance rights requires board review and may require recusal.

Why the board wants this voice

An open ISA creates shared rules, not automatic control over implementations, tools, fabrication or supply. Custom differentiation can be valuable, but poorly governed extensions fragment software and concentrate maintenance in the original authors. Independent counsel helps the board distinguish upstream influence from symbolic openness and design member rights that survive political and commercial pressure.

What you will own

• Challenge proposed extensions through workload need, architectural coherence, compatibility, verification, software support and maintenance burden.
• Examine contribution and voting rights for public funders, universities, startups, incumbents and international foundation members.
• Frame upstream, experimental, vendor-specific and national-profile routes with explicit convergence or retirement conditions.
• Test licensing, patents, contributor agreements, certification marks and implementation rights with accountable legal counsel.
• Advise procurement language that rewards interoperable evidence without falsely requiring one approved implementation.
• Surface governance capture, private-fork, maintainer concentration, export and ecosystem retaliation scenarios before commitments.
• Leave the board a decision charter, extension gates, member conflicts, contribution roadmap and sovereignty claim boundaries.

Candidate qualifications

• Advised open-hardware, processor-architecture or technical-foundation governance across public and commercial stakeholders with contested member interests.
• Can evidence a custom extension or member right redesigned through formal decision records to avoid ecosystem fragmentation or governance capture.
• Understands instruction-set evolution, profiles, extensions, compatibility, toolchains, software ecosystems and conformance limits.
• Has worked with governments and universities without treating public funding as automatic technical control.
• Translated open-source licences, patents and governance into implementable architecture and procurement choices.
• Maintained independence amid foundation offices, vendor roles, grants, policy retainers and processor-IP interests.

Non-negotiables

• Will attend Brussels, Barcelona, Prague and Zurich forums in the published advisory cadence.
• Holds no undisclosed foundation office, patent, grant or vendor role affecting proposed governance.
• Accepts no authority to design extensions, cast votes, submit code, award funding or set procurement.
• Brings direct processor-ecosystem governance judgment beyond general digital-sovereignty policy.

1. 49 words maximum. Which open-hardware extension created the greatest hidden compatibility or maintenance burden?
2. 49 words maximum. How would you distinguish upstream influence from symbolic sovereign control?
3. 49 words maximum. Which foundation, vendor, grant or government role could require your recusal?