Confidential mandate

Endowment Illiquidity-and-Distribution Board Adviser

Planned Hiring / New

Endowment Illiquidity-and-Distribution Board Adviser mandate in Helsinki, Finland · Research and Education Foundation

A research foundation needs an independent board adviser to test private-market pacing, donor-restricted liquidity and spending resilience before approving its next three-year investment programme and grant cycle.

The mandate

The foundation funds long-horizon scientific programmes from an endowment whose apparent solvency masks a difficult liquidity shape. Commitments to buyout, venture, infrastructure and forestry funds overlap with donor-restricted pools, an inflation-linked spending rule and multi-year grants that cannot be paused without damaging research. Recent distributions arrived later than manager cases assumed, while currency hedges and tax calls consumed cash reserved for awards. Trustees need a sharper view of which obligations are legally restricted, economically committed or merely customary before accepting another private-market allocation.

The adviser will challenge a twelve-quarter liquidity map built from capital-call probabilities, distribution lags, grant schedules, operating reserves, collateral needs and currencies rather than a single percentage-of-net-assets limit. Attention must extend to subscription facilities, continuation vehicles, side-pocket valuations, recallable distributions and the sequence risk created when public assets fall before private marks adjust. The board also wants an intelligible link between its annual spending decision and the probability of interrupting already-promised research.

The working cadence comprises a fortnightly ninety-minute session with the investment and finance leads, a monthly paper review with the committee chair and three formal committee appearances in Helsinki. Between meetings, the adviser will annotate assumptions, frame questions for external managers and test management’s proposed pacing cases. A short written dissent is expected whenever the recommended commitment envelope depends on an assumption the evidence cannot support.

This is a board counsel appointment, not a delegated investment office. The adviser has no line authority, assumes no executive responsibility and cannot select managers, approve commitments, alter the spending rule, move cash or speak for trustees. Management retains model production and execution; the committee retains risk appetite and approvals. Advice must distinguish a prudent challenge from an investment recommendation and must respect donor instruments, Finnish foundation obligations and counsel’s legal interpretations.

The appointment runs for ten months. Renewal requires a recorded committee decision tied to unresolved pacing or spending questions, rather than automatic continuation. Before accepting the seat, the adviser must disclose current or recent relationships with asset managers, placement agents, secondary buyers, consultants, custodians and potential grant recipients; any conflicted agenda item will require recusal, and no manager-paid benefit or referral economics may be accepted.

Why the board wants this voice

Investment staff are measured on access and long-term return, programme leaders on continuity of research and trustees on stewardship, so each reads the same cash reserve differently. The existing illiquidity limit does not expose timing, restriction or valuation-lag risk. An adviser who has governed genuine capital-call stress can make those trade-offs visible without selling a portfolio product or displacing management.

What you will own

  • Challenge the twelve-quarter cash map across grants, operating needs, donor restrictions, commitments, collateral and foreign-exchange settlements.
  • Test capital-call and distribution cases by strategy, vintage, manager behaviour, subscription facilities, recallability and valuation lag.
  • Translate proposed annual spending into research-continuity probabilities under public-market drawdown and delayed private distributions.
  • Review commitment pacing, reserve floors, secondary-sale triggers and temporary funding options without recommending individual securities or managers.
  • Frame committee decision papers that identify assumptions, downside paths, reversible choices and consequences for beneficiaries.
  • Maintain an evidence ledger for management responses, unresolved model weaknesses, adviser dissents, recusals and trustee decisions.
  • Deliver a closing governance memo covering liquidity indicators, escalation thresholds, calendar ownership and questions requiring future specialist advice.

Candidate qualifications

  • Has advised or governed a sizeable endowment, foundation, pension pool or similarly commitment-heavy institutional portfolio through stressed liquidity.
  • Understands private-equity capital calls, distribution waterfalls, subscription facilities, continuation vehicles, secondary pricing and stale-valuation effects.
  • Can reconcile donor restrictions, grant commitments, operating reserves, spending policy and investment liquidity without collapsing unlike obligations.
  • Has challenged stochastic or scenario-based pacing models and can explain their limitations clearly to non-specialist trustees.
  • Brings independent board judgement, including written dissent, conflict management and disciplined separation of advice from delegated execution.
  • Can evidence decisions that protected beneficiary programmes when market liquidity and manager distributions diverged sharply from base cases.

Non-negotiables

  • Can attend all three Helsinki committee sessions and sustain the remote fortnightly working cadence for the full appointment.
  • Will disclose manager, placement-agent, consultant, custodian, secondary-buyer and beneficiary relationships before committee materials are shared.
  • Brings direct institutional illiquidity governance; liquid-portfolio allocation or wealth-management advice alone is not sufficient.
  • Will not market products, solicit mandates, accept referral value or privately approach managers using confidential foundation information.
  1. 49 words maximum. Which private-market assumption most often causes a board to overstate spendable liquidity?
  2. 49 words maximum. How would you separate legally restricted cash from economically unavailable cash in a trustee paper?
  3. 49 words maximum. Describe one indicator that should stop new commitments before a headline illiquidity limit is breached.

This mandate is confidential. The client is named only under a mutual NDA, and your own record is never listed, sold or shown to a company under your name until you release it for this specific mandate.