Election Infrastructure Trust Adviser — Democratic Services

The mandate

The assurance board cannot determine whether registration, results and public-information systems provide enough independent evidence to support trust under cyber disruption. Supplier certifications and technical tests do not yet connect to electoral authority, manual fallback or transparent communication. Its standing question is how directors can distinguish a technology incident from evidence affecting process integrity without allowing either premature reassurance or unsupported allegations to shape official decisions.

The adviser commits four days monthly, remotely, with quarterly Madrid and scheduled Barcelona and Brussels exercises. A monthly assurance session examines one system boundary, supplier claim or reconciliation pathway with statutory and technical owners. Urgent integrity questions receive acknowledgement within six hours and a documented view within twenty-four, while all outcome-related judgments are referred to the authorised electoral body.

The twelve-month term may renew once for one electoral quarter through a minuted independence review that examines influence, neutrality and institutional capability. Renewal must name an unresolved assurance question and reconfirm every political or commercial conflict. Political pressure, media attention or unfinished supplier work is not a renewal reason.

The adviser has no line authority, system access entitlement, certification power or role in determining election outcomes. Statutory officials retain operational and public decisions. The adviser cannot direct election staff, commission unapproved testing, issue public assurance or handle live voter records outside the evidence protocol.

Conflicts include political organisations, election vendors, campaign technology, assessors and foreign-state work. All relevant clients, donations, boards and investments require disclosure. New work for a candidate, party, advocacy group, media platform or supplier in scope requires immediate chair review and may end the appointment.

Why the board wants this voice

Technology teams understand systems while officials hold democratic authority. Neither alone can design credible independent assurance and communication. The board wants nonpartisan challenge grounded in evidence and recoverable operations.

What you will own

• Challenge trust claims across registration, authentication, tabulation interfaces, reconciliation, publication and archival evidence, identifying the statutory owner of each assertion.
• Test supplier evidence for system scope, assessor independence, test currency, operational representativeness and exclusions that could conceal an exploitable dependency.
• Press officials on reconciliation, manual fallback, chain-of-custody proof and the conditions under which electronic evidence must be treated as unavailable.
• Shape incident thresholds that trigger investigation, containment and public briefing without confusing a cyber concern with formal outcome determination.
• Review exercises for insider action, ransomware, data-integrity ambiguity, coordinated disinformation and prolonged availability loss across election and supplier teams.
• Examine public assurance language for verifiability, proportionality and premature certainty, linking every technical statement to an authorised source.
• Equip the board with open risks, evidence gaps, statutory boundaries, decision clocks and proportionate escalation choices before each electoral gate.

Candidate qualifications

• Advised election, democratic, public-sector or comparable high-trust infrastructure under formal independence requirements and sustained public scrutiny.
• Can evidence nonpartisan assurance during an incident that drew competing political claims, media pressure and incomplete technical facts.
• Connected cyber controls, chain of custody, manual reconciliation and retained records to the correct statutory decision authority.
• Challenged election-technology suppliers on test scope, subcontractors, privileged access and recovery evidence without assuming an operational or certification role.
• Designed exercises spanning technical compromise, evidence ambiguity, statutory escalation, supplier failure and public-confidence communication under time pressure.
• Maintained demonstrable independence across political stakeholders, including disclosure or recusal from affiliations that could reasonably undermine trust.

Non-negotiables

• Can meet response and all scheduled European sessions.
• Will disclose political, vendor, assessor and state-related conflicts.
• Accepts no outcome, certification or operational authority.
• Has board-level high-trust infrastructure assurance experience.

1. 49 words maximum. Which present affiliation could be perceived as compromising nonpartisan advice?
2. 49 words maximum. Describe assurance evidence that remained credible during a contested incident.
3. 49 words maximum. How would you separate cyber escalation from election-outcome authority?