Battery-Swapping Ecosystem Board Adviser

The mandate

Vehicle makers, battery suppliers, energy retailers and city partners each support a swapping network provided someone else carries battery residual value, station underutilisation and interface risk. The platform’s pilot performs well in dense courier corridors but the board must repeatedly decide what to own, where to standardise and when bilateral growth produces ecosystem lock-in. Management cases combine optimistic utilisation with incompatible degradation and safety assumptions. The adviser will help directors govern network shape before the next capital tranche.

The cadence is four days monthly: a fleet-and-station evidence review, a partner architecture session, chair preparation and either committee attendance or a market visit. Five investment-committee meetings are included, with forty-eight-hour availability for material partner term sheets or safety-triggered network choices. Every quarter, the adviser will examine one mature corridor and one proposed expansion market to compare density, behaviour, energy availability and operating partner capability.

The term lasts ten months through the capital-plan decision and two completed partner negotiations. Renewal for up to three months requires a new committee resolution tied to an unresolved interoperability choice, not general availability. At closure, the adviser will leave a board decision framework and partner-dependency map rather than remain attached to implementation. Any subsequent executive or transaction role would require a separate cooling-off and conflicts review.

The adviser has no line or executive authority and cannot direct station operations, approve battery designs, set safety limits, sign partnerships, allocate capital, determine tariffs, negotiate land or launch a market. Engineers own technical and safety judgments; management negotiates; directors reserve investment. The adviser may challenge utilisation cases, test control implications and recommend conditions, pilots or exit triggers, but does not become the ecosystem orchestrator or representative of any partner.

Battery, vehicle, charging, energy, property, fleet, insurance, investor and government relationships must be disclosed before relevant papers are received. Work for a prospective counterparty requires recusal or restricted access as determined by the chair. Non-competing commitments are permitted if the stated cadence and response time remain protected. Compensation cannot depend on a deal, standard choice, capital approval, vehicle volume, station count or valuation outcome.

Why the board wants this voice

The current board combines technology, finance and consumer-platform experience but lacks a director who has governed a shared physical network with contested asset ownership. Pilot density makes several models appear viable before residual value and partner power emerge. Independent ecosystem experience can expose irreversible dependencies early without advocating for a supplier, standard or transaction.

What you will own

• Press management to separate pilot density, mature utilisation, subsidy, courier concentration and replicable consumer demand.
• Test battery ownership choices against degradation, safety custody, financing, residual value and partner bargaining power.
• Challenge interoperability claims across physical interface, data, warranty, energy, service and commercial settlement dimensions.
• Examine station-density plans under low utilisation, peak queues, grid constraint, property loss and partner failure.
• Shape conditions for owned, partnered, franchised or interoperable expansion without selecting counterparties for management.
• Maintain ecosystem dependencies, assumption changes, dissent, conflict recusals and board reconsideration triggers.
• Equip directors with a capital-release framework tied to evidence rather than headline station or vehicle commitments.

Candidate qualifications

• Has governed battery swapping, charging, shared mobility or another capital-intensive multi-party service ecosystem.
• Can evidence an ownership or interoperability recommendation that changed after residual-value or partner-power analysis.
• Understands battery degradation, station operations, energy supply, asset finance, safety interfaces and network density.
• Has challenged pilot extrapolation while retaining trust with engineering founders, strategic partners and growth investors.
• Can distinguish technical compatibility from operational, commercial and data interoperability across different markets.
• Is free from undisclosed interests in likely battery, vehicle, energy, property, fleet and capital counterparties.

Non-negotiables

• Can attend five Seoul committee meetings and complete quarterly visits to operating or proposed network corridors.
• Will not endorse a standard, supplier or ownership model without exposing dependency and downside economics.
• Brings physical-network ecosystem experience; digital marketplace partnership work alone will not qualify.
• Will leave engineering safety decisions and commercial negotiations with formally accountable leaders and specialists.

1. 49 words maximum. Which battery or shared-infrastructure ownership risk became visible only after a pilot scaled?
2. 49 words maximum. Identify any mobility, energy, property, supplier or investor interests this committee should screen.
3. 49 words maximum. What evidence separates technical compatibility from commercially workable interoperability?