Medical-Device Security Remediation Leader — Connected Diagnostics

The mandate

Researchers disclosed a remotely reachable weakness affecting diagnostic analysers whose software versions, hospital network exposure and updateability vary across the installed base. Product teams proposed one patch but cannot reliably identify affected configurations or show that update failure preserves clinical operation. The product-security head departed after disclosure timing diverged from quality and regulatory assessments, leaving no executive owner for field remediation.

The interim must start within three weeks for fourteen months, combining Hyderabad leadership with monthly Bengaluru engineering and quarterly Singapore market reviews. The first ninety days require direct authority over vulnerability triage, compensating guidance and patch evidence. A permanent search begins after the first two product families complete field rollout in month nine, with six weeks of overlap; extension is possible only for successor availability.

Handover requires a reconciled installed-base and software inventory, documented clinical cyber-risk decisions, validated updates or compensating controls for every supported affected product, tested hospital deployment and a governed coordinated-disclosure process. High-risk unsupported products must have approved treatment, field-service teams must prove update and rollback, and the successor must chair one post-market security review with quality and regulatory owners.

The leader may stop a software release, classify product-security findings, direct remediation evidence, commission specialist testing within ₹7 crore and issue approved field technical guidance. Product recall, clinical-risk acceptance, regulator submissions, permanent hiring and end-of-support decisions remain with authorised quality, medical and board officers. Sales commitments cannot override the interim's security test gates.

New-product feature strategy, hospital enterprise cybersecurity and replacement of the device-management platform are excluded. The appointee records interfaces where they affect vulnerability exposure or update delivery but does not direct customer networks. The remit spans the manufacturer's product lifecycle, installed-base evidence and accountable remediation, not general IT security or clinical practice.

Why this seat is open

The disclosure exposed conflicting security, quality and regulatory decision paths at the point of customer urgency. Previous leadership could not establish one configuration truth or agreed external timeline. Temporary executive authority is needed to protect fielded devices, rebuild lifecycle governance and prepare a permanent product-security leader.

What you will own

• Reconstruct affected product, software, connectivity and customer populations from manufacturing, service, licensing and distributor records.
• Decide vulnerability severity and remediation priority using exploitability, clinical workflow, patient consequence, exposure and compensating protection.
• Direct patch, configuration and monitoring options through secure design, verification, clinical safety and regulatory evidence gates.
• Validate update authentication, interrupted-install recovery, rollback, retained settings and service-tool compatibility on representative devices.
• Establish coordinated disclosure records covering researcher contact, decision timing, customer guidance, regulator interfaces and residual uncertainty.
• Govern unsupported and hard-to-update products through compensating controls, customer segmentation, end-of-support evidence and authorised risk decisions.
• Transfer installed-base truth, vulnerability cases, field evidence, disclosure obligations and lifecycle metrics through successor-led post-market review.

Candidate qualifications

• Held product-security authority for regulated connected medical devices with substantial fielded and version-diverse installed bases.
• Can evidence coordinated remediation of a remotely exploitable device weakness through clinical, quality, regulatory and customer decisions.
• Built or reconciled installed-base intelligence from manufacturing, servicing, distributor and software records to target remediation accurately.
• Validated authenticated device updates, interrupted-install recovery and rollback under clinical workflow and safety constraints.
• Worked directly with security researchers, hospitals, regulators and field-service teams while protecting coordinated disclosure timing.
• Handed a sustainable post-market cybersecurity, vulnerability and lifecycle process to permanent product or quality leadership.

Non-negotiables

• Available within three weeks for the Hyderabad, Bengaluru and Singapore operating cadence.
• Independent of testing laboratories, device-management platforms and remediation suppliers involved in the disclosed issue.
• Will respect clinical-risk, quality and regulatory signoff while refusing unsupported security closure.
• Has director or CTO-1 authority in regulated medical-device security, not hospital IT or generic application security.

1. 49 words maximum. State your availability and one fielded medical-device vulnerability you personally remediated.
2. 49 words maximum. Which records would you reconcile first to establish the affected installed base?
3. 49 words maximum. Describe an update test whose failure changed your clinical remediation plan.