FPGA Verification-Crisis Leader — Civil Avionics

The mandate

The programmable-hardware director departed after hardware-in-loop tests produced intermittent actuator-command sequencing that simulation and timing sign-off had not predicted. The laboratory bitstream cannot be traced cleanly to reviewed source, synchroniser assumptions differ across clock domains, and mitigation for configuration upsets is verified separately from functional behaviour. The interim leader must establish one releasable evidence chain without allowing schedule pressure to turn unexplained nondeterminism into a test waiver.

Ten months provide a fixed recovery window. The first forty-five days secure source, tools and bitstreams, reproduce the laboratory event and classify affected requirements. Months two through six close clock-domain, reset, timing and fault-response evidence. Months seven through nine complete independent reviews and regression. The final month transfers authority to a permanent leader through a witnessed build, failure investigation and release-readiness board.

Handover is achieved when every released bitstream traces to controlled requirements, source, constraints, tool versions, verification results and device configuration; the intermittent event is reproduced and dispositioned; and priority fault cases pass on representative hardware. The successor must reject one seeded evidence defect, lead a clean build and defend residual verification limits to design assurance. Waived coverage cannot be silently excluded from the completion baseline.

The leader may quarantine bitstreams, stop hardware tests, approve verification priorities, control tool-version use, allocate independent review and commit CAD 4 million within the authorised recovery envelope. They recommend programmable-hardware release after safety and assurance consultation. Aircraft safety classification, system requirements, certification findings, supplier contracts and flight-test authority remain with named accountable executives and authorised representatives.

Excluded are redesigning the entire avionics unit, changing aircraft-level hazards, acting as certification authority, conducting unauthorised flight tests or replacing every FPGA tool. The mandate covers requirements-based verification, configuration custody and fault evidence for the selected devices. Personnel misconduct, export-control decisions and contractual liability are handled independently from the technical recovery.

Why this seat is open

The event exposed a gap between logical simulation, implemented timing, physical laboratory behaviour and the identity of the loaded device image. No current manager holds enough authority across design, tools, laboratories and independent assurance to restore the chain quickly. A temporary executive can make conservative release decisions now and leave a permanent leader who has personally reproduced the evidence.

What you will own

• Reconcile requirements, HDL, generated IP, constraints, tool versions, reports, programming files and hardware configuration under traceable custody.
• Reproduce intermittent sequencing using clock, reset, timing, temperature, voltage, laboratory stimulus and instrumentation evidence.
• Reassess clock-domain crossings, asynchronous resets, constraints, metastability assumptions and reconvergence through appropriate verification methods.
• Integrate configuration-upset detection, scrubbing, redundancy and safe-state response with normal functional and timing behaviour.
• Govern simulation, formal checks, gate-level evidence and hardware tests by requirement risk rather than historical tool ownership.
• Restore independent review, problem-report closure, change impact, reproducible builds and justified verification-credit decisions.
• Transfer open anomalies, tool qualifications, coverage arguments, release criteria and successor-led clean-build evidence.

Candidate qualifications

• Led FPGA design assurance or verification recovery for airborne, space, rail or similarly high-integrity electronic systems.
• Can evidence a hardware-only nondeterministic event traced through timing, clock-domain, reset or configuration investigation.
• Understands requirements-based verification, static timing, CDC, generated IP, upset mitigation and reproducible bitstream custody.
• Has challenged clean simulation or coverage claims when implemented hardware evidence remained inconsistent.
• Worked with independent assurance and certification stakeholders without claiming authority reserved to authorised representatives.
• Developed a successor able to reject incomplete build and verification evidence under schedule pressure.

Non-negotiables

• Will lead onsite in Montreal and attend every scheduled Ottawa and Phoenix assurance session.
• Has personally governed release evidence for production programmable hardware in a high-integrity application.
• Accepts no authority over aircraft hazards, certification findings, flight-test release or export classification.
• Will disclose FPGA vendor, EDA, avionics customer and independent-assessment relationships before appointment.

1. 49 words maximum. Which hardware-only FPGA failure defeated otherwise persuasive simulation and timing evidence?
2. 49 words maximum. How would you prove the laboratory bitstream corresponds to the reviewed design baseline?
3. 49 words maximum. What seeded defect should a successor detect before inheriting release-readiness authority?