The useful decision was more specific than adding another capacity number.

In 2023 we reviewed a proposed US$620 million platform acquisition carrying 1.2 GW of development pipeline. Eight hundred megawatts depended on the same planned connection reinforcement. The projects had different names and locations, but an important part of their progress relied on one common condition. I wanted that dependence visible before the total pipeline was described as a broad set of development choices. None of the pipeline figure represented an assertion that the capacity had been built or was producing power.

Ellis Brackenmere, our fictional development director, wanted to continue negotiations. The shared reinforcement could be an advantage if it progressed, and the platform offered a route to projects the company could not quickly reproduce. He was concerned that hesitation would lose the seller’s attention and the chance to shape the opportunity. I agreed that concentration did not automatically make the platform unattractive. My objection was that the strategic account presented project count and capacity as diversification without sufficiently explaining the shared condition.

We deferred acquisition negotiation after US$3.4 million in review. The proposed US$620 million purchase did not occur in this case. Engineering, connection, permitting, legal, finance and capital owners retained their specialist assessments. My team’s contribution was to reorganise the proposition around its dependencies, so the institution could judge whether it wanted this particular concentration rather than an implied collection of independent opportunities.

Deferral gave up momentum and risked losing access to the platform. The reinforcement might still progress, and another buyer might reasonably accept the concentration. I did not describe the decision as a quantified loss avoided or assume the review expense was recovered. It was a choice about the next commitment on the evidence available, not a prediction that the platform would fail.

The case changed the way I wanted capacity discussed. A total can describe scale while concealing how much of that scale moves together when one assumption changes. The leadership account should retain both views. This invented example reaches no conclusion about a live connection process, project approval or investment. A real public version would need authorised information and professional review of the project status before any capacity or dependency was described.

The 2016 portfolio account modelled 7.8 TWh of annual generation. Its commercial presentation suggested that a range of projects would support a diversified customer proposition, yet 58% of the proposed contracted volume was associated with customers in the same industrial sector. The generation model and the customer concentration were different measures. I asked that they be shown together so the institution could understand which demand conditions the commercial case shared across otherwise distinct projects.

The commercial sponsors favoured concentrating on a sector we understood. They argued that familiarity with customer requirements could improve the quality of the proposition and that entering other sectors would consume time without necessarily creating better business. I considered that a strong objection to diversification for its own sake. My concern was not that one industrial sector was inherently unsuitable. It was that the portfolio story claimed breadth without naming the concentrated commercial assumption on which much of it depended.

We reworked the customer strategy and committed US$2.7 million to research. That was a programme of commercial assessment, not a claim that new contracts had been signed or 7.8 TWh had been generated. Trading, customer-contract, engineering and financial owners retained their decisions. My contribution was to make the dependence explicit and to require the alternatives to be assessed as actual propositions rather than as a generic wish for a more varied customer list.

The revised work gave up the simplicity and speed of deepening one familiar sector account. It also risked finding that the alternative sectors were less suitable than the original sponsors believed. I did not promise that a broader mix would improve returns or remove uncertainty. The institution needed to understand the cost of learning and the possibility that concentration, knowingly chosen, might still be the more coherent direction.

The result was a more precise strategic question: did the company want the commercial exposure the proposed portfolio contained? The capacity and generation figures could not answer that by themselves. All customers and quantities are fictional. A real account would need verified definitions, contract status and permission to describe the commercial mix without identifying counterparties or implying an assurance about future demand.

In 2021 we compared two storage propositions with the same stated 200 MW power rating. One specified 400 MWh of energy capacity and the other 800 MWh. A headline comparison built around 200 MW made them appear closer than their intended service propositions were. I asked that the energy capacity and the commercial use being considered remain inside the strategic comparison. The nominal two-hour and four-hour ratios were arithmetic descriptions of the stated ratings, not assurances about actual delivered output under every condition.

The development sponsors preferred the smaller energy-capacity proposition as a quicker next step. They wanted to establish a position and refine the commercial account through further work. Their argument was not simply that less capacity costs less; it concerned timing, development effort and the opportunity to learn. I wanted the institution to examine whether that proposition addressed the use case it was discussing, rather than select a 200 MW headline and assume the underlying service could be treated as interchangeable.

We selected the 200 MW/800 MWh proposition for further engineering with US$5.6 million in development work. The decision did not authorise construction, establish a final design or report an operating facility. Engineering, safety, operations, commercial and capital colleagues retained their assessments. My role was to keep the difference in propositions visible and to connect the next development commitment with the question the institution wanted answered.

The selected route gave up some of the speed and narrower scope the sponsors saw in the 400 MWh alternative. It required more explanation and further evidence before a larger commitment could be considered. I did not claim that the longer nominal duration was always better, that it would deliver a particular return or that the ratings alone established suitability. The choice was specific to the fictional proposition under review.

I retain the case because a familiar unit can conceal a materially different strategic question. The account became more useful when it stated both power and energy, the stage selected and the work still required. A real profile would need qualified validation of technical descriptions and publication permission. This example demonstrates how a strategist can improve the comparison without assuming the role of the engineer or turning a development decision into a completed operating result.

In 2007 I described 600 MW of customer letters as committed demand in a portfolio-planning account. The documents did not all have the same status. Only 140 MW related to executed contracts, while 460 MW represented nonbinding expressions of interest. Mara Kelverton challenged the way I had combined them. The aggregate was useful as a description of the material received, but it could not support the stronger commitment claim I had allowed it to carry.

Colleagues argued that the interest was commercially valuable and could mature into agreements. They worried that separating it too sharply would understate the work done with potential customers and make the development opportunity look weaker than it was. I agreed that nonbinding interest should not disappear from the record. The correction was to preserve its actual status, rather than call it either worthless or already committed. I needed to change the interpretation I had helped make persuasive.

I withdrew the 600 MW commitment claim and supported US$900000 in review. The revised account stated 140 MW under executed contracts and 460 MW of nonbinding interest separately. Contract, commercial and legal owners retained responsibility for the agreements and their meaning. My team did not claim that the review itself converted interest, secured a project or improved a financial result. Its immediate outcome was a more accurate basis for the strategic discussion.

The change required colleagues to revisit a stronger story they had already used. It also made my own judgement part of the problem. I could not describe the correction as a matter of legal wording that someone else should resolve while continuing to rely on the original commercial impression. The institution had been asked to understand the total as a commitment, and I had contributed to that request. Accepting the narrower claim was part of my responsibility.

The lesson later affected how I read pipelines and projected generation. A number may combine items that have different status, conditions or dependence. The strategist needs to preserve the distinction that changes the decision. Every figure and document in this example is invented. A real public account would require permission and qualified interpretation of contract status, with confidential customer terms kept out of a profile written for general readers.

By 2025 a 300 MW solar proposal had consumed US$8.2 million in development spending and required a proposed US$22 million next-stage commitment. The commercial basis no longer fitted the direction we were prepared to pursue. I supported withdrawing before construction rather than use the prior expense as the main argument for continuing. The work already done mattered to the record, but it did not establish that the next stage had become worthwhile.

The project sponsors argued that withdrawal would discard accumulated knowledge and weaken the institution’s credibility with people who had invested effort in the proposal. They also believed a revised commercial approach might recover the opportunity. I wanted those possibilities examined rather than dismiss them with a general statement about sunk cost. My objection was to treating previous spending as if it supplied the missing commercial basis for the next commitment. The future proposition still needed its own account.

We withdrew the proposal before construction. The US$8.2 million remained historical spending; the case does not claim it was recovered. The proposed US$22 million next stage was not presented as an automatic saving, because the example supplies no complete comparison of alternative uses, obligations or outcomes. Project, legal, commercial, finance and capital owners retained responsibility for the consequences of withdrawal. My team clarified the strategic recommendation and its basis.

The choice gave up the possibility that further work could produce a viable revised proposition. It also required an explanation to colleagues whose effort was real even though the project did not proceed. I wanted the record to distinguish respect for that work from an obligation to continue spending. A stop decision can be consequential without becoming a story in which every person who preferred continuation was irrational.

No operating capacity, emissions reduction or customer supply result is claimed. The 300 MW figure describes the withdrawn proposal. The case illustrates how an energy strategist can examine the next stage on its own merits while retaining prior expense and the opportunity surrendered. A real version would need accurate project status, publication permission and professional review of any financial or contractual consequence. The public explanation should make the decision understandable without inventing a return from work that never reached construction.