Raphael Laurier · Chief Strategy Officer · Canada

I moved from interpreting a market to remaining accountable for the portfolio account.

RECORD 01Sept 2017 — Present

Chief Strategy Officer

Vaurenne Therapeutics

Sector
Established medicines and pharmaceutical portfolio strategy
Ownership
Private company; founder trust 55% and institutional investors 45%
Company scale
C$860 million company revenue in 2025
Employees
1850 company employees at October 2026
Geography
Canada; headquarters in Montreal
Reporting to
Chief Executive Officer
Team
38 strategy colleagues through five direct reports at October 2026
Financial scope
C$9.6 million delegated 2026 strategy expense; scientific, medical, quality, safety, regulatory and capital authority remain separate

Mandate

Make the business portfolio’s dependencies and differences in evidence understandable in corporate choices.

Outcomes

  • Separated nine early development activities from five established-medicine extensions in the 2021 strategic account.
  • Recommended declining the 2023 acquisition after identifying 45% concentration in a familiar institutional purchasing group.
  • Kept the smaller established portfolio’s C$4.2 million annual support estimate visible during the 2025 options review.

Decisions in context

The CSO role brings the portfolio's different accounts into a common strategic discussion without making them equivalent. I work with specialists whose conclusions determine what the institution can responsibly say about its medicines and activities. My function helps decision-makers understand the business choices that follow, including a dependency that remains despite a new category or the work attached to an activity whose future is unsettled. The thirty-eight-person team and its expense delegation are my direct organisational remit. Company revenue and the professional authorities around the portfolio are separate. Executive presentations to the board began with this appointment; they are not recorded as statutory service. The acquisition and initiative cases show the value of a narrower claim, while the established-portfolio case keeps present responsibilities inside a discussion about future options. That combination describes the contribution more accurately than the total number of businesses considered.

Reason for the move

Appointed CSO after corporate-strategy leadership; current appointment.

RECORD 02Jun 2010 — Aug 2017

Vice President of corporate strategy

Vaurenne Therapeutics

Sector
Corporate strategy for an established-medicines business
Ownership
Private pharmaceutical company
Company scale
C$510 million company revenue in 2016
Employees
1200 company employees in 2016
Geography
Canada; corporate portfolio and international commercial assessments
Reporting to
Chief Strategy Officer
Team
23 corporate-strategy colleagues through four direct reports in 2016
Financial scope
C$4.7 million annual strategy-function expense in 2016; proposed market sales are forecasts, not personal budget authority

Mandate

Examine how portfolio and geographical proposals change the business’s actual commercial dependence.

Outcomes

  • Identified one proposed distribution group behind 56% of the 2016 two-market sales model.
  • Supported one market’s initial commercial preparation with C$2.4 million in assessment and preparation expense.
  • Kept the C$135 million annual sales-at-maturity estimate distinct from achieved revenue or permission to operate.

Decisions in context

The wider corporate appointment required me to look beyond the product categories I had previously helped organise. Geographical expansion was a useful test because the map and the commercial route could tell different stories about breadth. I wanted the proposed dependence on a distributor to remain as visible as the attraction of entering another setting. The sponsors' case for simultaneous preparation was credible and had to be retained in the decision. My recommendation for a smaller initial undertaking was not a claim that sequential entry always works better. It reflected the evidence and the commitment under discussion. The role strengthened my ability to coordinate a strategic account while leaving local, contractual and professional assessments with their owners. It also made me more careful about figures that describe possible future sales, since those could easily be read as results the business had already delivered.

Reason for the move

Promoted to CSO as the corporate portfolio required a broader institutional account.

RECORD 03Jul 2003 — May 2010

Head of portfolio planning

Vaurenne Therapeutics

Sector
Portfolio planning in established medicines
Ownership
Private founder-led pharmaceutical business
Company scale
C$240 million company revenue in 2009
Employees
680 company employees in 2009
Geography
Canada; product portfolio and institutional purchasing research
Reporting to
Vice President of corporate strategy
Team
10 planning colleagues through two direct reports in 2009
Financial scope
C$1.8 million annual planning expense in 2009; no clinical, product-quality or capital approval authority

Mandate

Develop a portfolio account that explains the business relationships beneath product and therapeutic categories.

Outcomes

  • Owned the 2008 inference that nine brand names represented diversified commercial exposure.
  • Revised the account after six brands were found to share one institutional procurement route.
  • Retained C$620,000 in research and reclassification expense and the product distinctions the correction did not invalidate.

Decisions in context

The move from advisory work gave me continuing responsibility for an account that colleagues would use repeatedly. I could no longer treat the clarity of the initial recommendation as the end of the work. The nine-brand mistake showed why that mattered. I had described a real set of product differences, then allowed the reader to infer a level of commercial independence I had not established. Camille Dervelune's challenge required me to revisit the classification and explain the correction to colleagues who had relied on it. Keeping the products' legitimate distinctions was as important as identifying their shared route. I did not want one oversimplification replaced by another. This appointment supplied the error that later made my acquisition and expansion questions more specific, and it taught me to keep responsibility for the original inference visible when presenting the subsequent improvement.

Reason for the move

Moved into broader corporate strategy after seven years close to the portfolio’s commercial evidence.

RECORD 04Apr 1996 — Jun 2003

Engagement Director

Orvanel Health Advisory

Sector
Healthcare business research and advisory
Ownership
Privately owned advisory firm
Company scale
C$31 million company fee revenue in 2002
Employees
120 company employees in 2002
Geography
Canada; institutional healthcare and pharmaceutical business assignments
Reporting to
Partner responsible for healthcare business research
Team
11 engagement colleagues through two direct reports in 2002
Financial scope
C$1.1 million annual advisory-delivery expense in 2002; clients retained investment and professional authority

Mandate

Make business evidence and its limitations useful to the leaders considering a healthcare portfolio choice.

Outcomes

  • Led research that separated a market label from the route through which a client expected to reach it.
  • Retained qualifications in the recommendation instead of relying solely on a simplified portfolio chart.
  • Prepared for a continuing in-house role by following how clients interpreted completed assessments.

Decisions in context

Engagement leadership changed my responsibility from producing sound analysis to helping a client understand what it could and could not conclude from that analysis. The team needed a clear recommendation, but clarity could not come from removing every qualification. I learned to distinguish details that complicated the decision unnecessarily from relationships that changed its meaning. My expense delegation covered the advisory work, not the resources a client might subsequently commit. The director title was a position within the firm and did not represent a statutory appointment. Over time I wanted to see more of what happened after the presentation. A category could become institutional shorthand and lose the context with which we had introduced it. Joining Vaurenne allowed me to remain close to that process and accept responsibility for revising the account when later evidence exposed a weakness in the original interpretation.

Reason for the move

Joined Vaurenne to remain accountable for a portfolio account beyond the duration of an advisory project.

RECORD 05Aug 1989 — Mar 1996

Healthcare Business Analyst

Orvanel Health Advisory

Sector
Commercial research in healthcare and pharmaceuticals
Ownership
Private research and advisory firm
Company scale
C$12 million company fee revenue in 1995
Employees
55 company employees in 1995
Geography
Canada; research supporting healthcare business assessments
Reporting to
Engagement manager
Team
Member of a five-person analyst team; no direct reports
Financial scope
No independent expense delegation or authority over client investment

Mandate

Reconcile the definitions and limits behind business comparisons used in healthcare strategy assignments.

Outcomes

  • Learned to identify when similar commercial labels referred to different underlying activities.
  • Prepared research notes that kept prospective estimates separate from recorded company results.
  • Developed the habit of referring medical and scientific interpretations to qualified colleagues.

Decisions in context

My first appointment followed a business administration degree rather than a scientific or clinical qualification. That starting point made the boundaries of the role clear. I could examine a commercial comparison, question its definitions and explain what the available evidence supported. I could not use familiarity with pharmaceutical terminology as authority to assess a medicine. Working inside a small analyst team also showed me how a minor change in classification could affect a senior reader's impression of a market. I began to pay attention to the relationship between the underlying research and the simpler account presented at the end. The task was not to preserve every detail indiscriminately, but to identify the distinctions that a decision would depend on. Those early habits became useful when later roles required me to challenge a portfolio description I had helped create myself.

Reason for the move

Promoted to engagement leadership after developing research and client-explanation responsibilities.

What I am looking for next

I would like the next phase of my work to contribute to a more exact discussion of pharmaceutical business breadth. A board or leadership team may need someone who can ask what a portfolio addition actually changes, then help the institution hear the professional qualifications that belong alongside the commercial argument. My record would support that conversation through specific decisions and an owned classification error, rather than a claim to expertise in every discipline that surrounds a medicine.

A first non-executive appointment would require preparation for collective responsibilities, a suitable company context and a realistic review of time and conflicts. I could initially discuss twenty-four days a year, subject to employer agreement and the demands of the actual role. I would not assume that executive presentations confer the experience of serving on a board. This fictional chronology provides a model for explaining the transition carefully. A real candidacy would need evidence for each appointment, permission to discuss the cases and institution-specific assessment of the contribution still to be developed.