Arif Widyantara · Chief Human Resources Officer · Singapore / Southeast Asia
| Capacity | Committees |
|---|---|
| Ready to join | Remuneration committee · Nomination committee |
I am considering a first non-executive contribution in regulated financial services where remuneration and management succession require sustained attention. I would prefer a board that can articulate the contribution it needs and provide a serious induction, rather than seek a people specialist as a symbolic addition. The role must be compatible with my current employment and available time. No appointment is assumed by this profile, and no claim is made that committee presentations confer director eligibility. I would expect the nomination process to examine my experience, independence, conflicts and capacity alongside the institution's requirements.
IICA Independent Directors’ Databank: Not yet registered
My immediate interest concerns Singapore and Southeast Asia. Registration in the IICA Independent Directors' Databank is not part of my current professional record. Any later Indian appointment would require separate review of the applicable requirements; this profile makes no eligibility claim.
I would bring a people perspective grounded in the operating choices of a bank: how remuneration affects behaviour, whether critical successors have encountered the work they may inherit and what a workforce transition asks of receiving managers. I am accustomed to working with finance and risk colleagues when these questions compete with cost, delivery or commercial objectives. My contribution would be to make those consequences specific enough for a board to consider, rather than describe culture as an abstract quality that improves after a programme is announced.
I have presented to remuneration and nomination committees since January 2020, but I have not served as a director. That distinction shapes the contribution I am seeking. An executive can develop a proposal, organise implementation and direct a team. A non-executive director must examine management's account, consider the institution as a whole and respect the boundary between oversight and running the function. I would need induction in the particular bank's business, risk profile and governance arrangements before assuming that experience at Neralith transfers directly.
I would be interested in joining remuneration or nomination committee work, with no immediate claim to chair readiness. I could help examine whether incentive terms are understood before a performance period, whether discretion is applied through a defensible process and whether succession plans contain real preparation. I would also ask what management has chosen not to do and what cost follows from that choice. The value I offer is practical familiarity with the implementation consequences, combined with a willingness to test my own assumptions when the context differs.
Presented to the Board or a committee
Remuneration and nomination committees
January 2020–present
I present executive proposals on incentive design, senior succession and workforce implications. Committee attendance supports my management responsibilities; I have no director appointment or committee vote.
In the 2021 incentive review, I opposed using a new interpretation to alter the previous performance year's terms. Risk colleagues still needed to address particular conduct concerns, and the commercial team wanted an immediate answer. I proposed separate processes for those matters and a clearly prospective scheme for 2022. The decision accepted an untidy transition and additional management work. As a board member, I would ask whether management is using a policy change to avoid a more difficult procedural question. I would not direct the outcome of an individual employee case from a committee seat. My concern would be the adequacy of the process, the authority exercised and the consistency of the account presented to the board.
The 2024 critical-role review exposed a contradiction: managers described potential successors as important to the bank's future while refusing to release them from current work. I put the cost of backfill into the executive discussion and recommended four nine-month assignments. Two participants were subsequently assessed as ready, one needed more exposure and one declined the envisaged path. I would bring that mixed result into a nomination discussion without trying to make every development investment appear to culminate in promotion. The board should understand the remaining vulnerability and management's alternatives. A development programme has value when it improves the appointment decision, including by showing that an anticipated match should not proceed.
My first year would begin with the institution's actual management and risk arrangements. I would read the committee terms, remuneration policy, senior responsibility map and recent succession discussions, then ask the chair where challenge has been most useful and where the board lacks enough information. Meetings with the chief executive, people leader, finance and risk colleagues would help me understand how disagreements reach the board. I would avoid arriving with a ready-made version of Neralith's programmes.
For remuneration work, I would examine a small number of anonymised decision paths to understand how approved principles are applied. The purpose would be to test the system, not reopen individual decisions casually. For succession, I would ask management to distinguish ready-now candidates, development work and unresolved gaps. Workforce discussions would include the practical consequences for managers and employees as well as the expected cost change.
I can provisionally offer twenty-four days a year, subject to employer consent and the proposed calendar. That allowance must cover preparation, meetings and planned induction, with room to discuss exceptional demands. A committee facing an acute transition might need more time than I can responsibly provide alongside an executive role. I would raise that constraint before nomination rather than discover it after accepting the appointment.
My current employment creates a clear boundary around competing institutions, confidential employee matters and commercially sensitive information. Before considering a role, I would disclose relevant interests and relationships through the institution's process and obtain specific employer consent. I would not assume that an informal expression of support removes a conflict. If a matter later affected a former colleague, supplier or transaction relationship, I would notify the chair and follow the agreed approach to participation and recusal.
I would also be careful about the apparent authority of my specialist background. Familiarity with remuneration does not make me the board's employment lawyer, investigator or regulator. Where the question requires those disciplines, the board should receive qualified advice. My responsibility would be to ask whether the advice and management's proposal address the issue, and to exercise judgement within the director role. I would keep executive information from Neralith separate from the prospective institution's deliberations and decline a role if that separation could not be maintained.
I would disclose my Neralith employment, financial interests and relevant professional relationships before a nomination proceeds. Independence would require assessment against the proposed institution's circumstances and applicable requirements; my current executive title does not establish it. I would not accept a competing-bank role that created an unmanageable conflict.