From yard planning to the investment committee

Mandate

Decide where the company invests in vessels, berths and routes, and where it withdraws, after the pandemic and the fund's entry.

Outcomes

• Closed two loss-making overnight routes in 2023, removing a ₱128 million annual operating loss
• Structured a ₱1.15 billion common-user terminal joint venture with a provincial government, opened in August 2024
• Recommended three new-build day ferries over four used vessels; the first uses 24% less fuel per crossing
• Withdrew from a ₱1.3 billion acquisition after vessel and crew-certification diligence

Decisions in context

The role was created when the company came out of the pandemic with a smaller fleet, a new minority shareholder and more questions than capital. I report to our president and bring investment cases to the board's investment committee, which approves any commitment above ₱150 million. My team does not run ships or terminals; operating, technical and safety decisions stay with the people licensed and accountable for them. What we own is the choice of where money goes and the honesty of the papers that ask for it. In five years that has meant closing routes the company was proud of, sharing a terminal we could have tried to control, and paying more for ships that will cost less to run. I also sit on the joint-venture terminal's board as a nominee director, which is a different discipline from writing proposals and has made my proposals better.

Reason for the move

Current appointment; seeking a first independent board seat alongside it, with my board's consent.

Mandate

Build a route-level view of profitability and prepare the company for outside capital.

Outcomes

• Created the first route-by-route review of contribution, berth time and vessel condition
• Supported the sale of a 30% stake to Halvenbridge Infrastructure Partners in 2019
• Planned the reduced, cargo-led timetable that kept island supply moving during 2020 travel restrictions

Decisions in context

I came back to the Philippines to be accountable for decisions rather than to advise on them. Banagra had good instincts about its routes but no single place where contribution, berth time and vessel condition were compared. My team built that review in the first year, and it became the basis of the discussions with Halvenbridge Infrastructure Partners when the family decided to bring in outside capital. The fund's diligence was demanding and improved our own discipline. In 2020 passenger sailings stopped for long periods, and I worked with operations on a reduced timetable that kept food, fuel and medicines moving between islands while most ships stayed in port. That year taught me that resilience carries a cost which a good year's model will always want to remove. The board then asked me to take the new strategy role.

Reason for the move

Appointed chief strategy officer when the board separated strategy from day-to-day network planning.

Mandate

Build the firm's ferry and island-port work across Southeast Asia.

Outcomes

• Led 23 route, concession and lender studies for public agencies, banks and operators
• Grew the practice's annual fees from about S$2.6 million to S$5.1 million
• Developed a demand method for island crossings that separated tourist, freight and resident travel

Decisions in context

Advisory work gave me range. In four and a half years I worked for provincial and national agencies on port plans, for lenders deciding whether to finance fleets, and for operators testing new crossings. I learnt how different the same port looks from a treasury, a governor's office and a ship's bridge. I also learnt the limit of the adviser's position. Our reports were careful, but implementation belonged to others, and several recommendations changed shape once politics, crews or financing pressed on them. I kept clear of clients' commercial interests and declined two assignments where we had already advised a competing bidder. The most lasting habit I took from the firm was writing down the assumption most likely to be wrong and naming who would notice first. I left when Banagra offered me the chance to be the person who owns the consequence.

Reason for the move

Returned to the Philippines to take accountability for implementation as an operator.

Mandate

Improve schedule reliability and connection rates at the hub.

Outcomes

• Raised on-time hub arrivals from 71% to 86% by redesigning six rotations
• Withdrew two port calls whose delays were breaking connections across the network
• Returned two chartered vessels early during the 2009 downturn, accepting lower frequency on thin lanes

Decisions in context

Feeder planning is arithmetic with consequences. Each rotation had to deliver boxes to the hub in time for the mainline vessels, and a delay at one small port could cost dozens of customers their onward sailings. I redesigned rotations with the operations team, and we dropped two calls whose congestion was breaking connections for everyone else. Telling the shippers at those ports was hard, and I learnt to prepare their alternative before the conversation. The 2009 downturn forced a different discipline: we returned two chartered ships early and accepted lower frequency on thinner lanes. I completed my maritime economics master's part-time during these years, which gave structure to instincts I had built on the quay. Living in Singapore also showed me how a hub port thinks about its feeders, a view I still use when we negotiate with larger ports at home.

Reason for the move

Recruited to lead ports and ferry advisory work in Singapore.

Mandate

Show which services and port calls earned their cost.

Outcomes

• Built the company's first voyage-level profitability model
• Supported the withdrawal of three loss-making port calls, with alternatives for affected shippers
• Added empty-container repositioning costs to pricing reviews

Decisions in context

At Luzvista I learnt that a voyage has more than one bill. Freight revenue was easy to count; the cost of carrying empty containers back from islands that consumed more than they produced was not. I built a voyage model that included repositioning, port time and fuel, and it showed that three port calls lost money on almost every voyage. I went with the sales team to explain the withdrawals to shippers and to offer routing through larger ports nearby. One trader told me the call was his town's only link to Manila prices, and he had a point. We kept a fortnightly call for another year while he and two others moved their volume. That compromise cost money and taught me that an exit plan needs a timetable for the people affected, not only a closing date.

Reason for the move

Moved to Singapore to learn network planning in a hub-and-feeder system.

Mandate

Plan container positions and handling so that vessels sailed on time.

Outcomes

• Introduced yard plans organised by vessel and destination, reducing rehandling
• Helped cut average container-vessel turnaround from 19 to 14 hours over two years
• Supervised night shifts with no lost-time injury in 1999 or 2000

Decisions in context

I started in the yard because an engineering degree had taught me about flow, and the port was the busiest flow in Cebu. My job was to decide where containers sat so that the right ones could be reached when a ship arrived. Bad plans meant rehandling, and rehandling meant ships sailing late while passengers and perishable cargo waited. With the operations manager I introduced yard plans organised by vessel and destination, and turnaround fell over two years. As a supervisor from 1999 I ran night shifts of forty workers, which taught me more about authority than any later title. People followed an instruction when they understood its reason and its risk, and quietly ignored it when they did not. I left to understand the decisions made upstream of the quay: why ships called, how often and at what price.

Reason for the move

Joined a domestic shipping line to understand why ships called where they did.