Chief Strategy Officer / India
The capabilities, coverage and restrictions we chose
- Strategy function
- 27 colleagues
- Four heads across planning, research and partnerships
- Annual function expense
- ₹7.1 crore
- Includes ₹1.3 crore research; enterprise investments separately approved
- Enterprise workforce
- 268 employees
- Maintenance, engineering and planning services in FY 2025–26
- FY 2025–26 revenue
- ₹118 crore
- ₹70 crore maintenance and ₹48 crore engineering and planning
Decisions & consequences
01Withdrawing a depot acquisition that did not establish customer continuity
In 2019 I recommended acquiring two field-service depots for a proposed ₹8.4 crore. Their locations were close to customer assignments we wanted to serve, and the facilities appeared to offer a faster entry than building an equivalent regional presence ourselves. The strategic attraction was real, but my paper allowed that proximity to stand in for a separate question: whether customers would transfer their assignments to the acquired operation under our ownership.
Three anchor customers had not agreed to that transfer. I had described their work as part of the acquisition opportunity without establishing the decision on which continuity depended. The commercial team wanted to keep the transaction moving while discussions continued. Gurleen wanted clarity about the work the depots would actually receive before committing the field organisation. Satish asked the question that should have been central in my original paper: were we buying facilities capable of serving a market, or a relationship that customers had agreed to continue?
We spent ₹36 lakh over ten weeks on diligence and commercial review. I could not support the customer-continuity assumption and withdrew the recommendation before a purchase commitment. The withdrawal did not declare the depots worthless or the customers unwilling to work with us in any future arrangement. It meant the transaction case presented to the decision-makers relied on an unestablished condition. A different proposal would have needed a defensible value for the capabilities alone or firmer customer arrangements before treating their work as part of the acquired proposition.
The outcome was a declined proposal after incurred diligence expense. There was no completed acquisition, no cash recovered and no known loss we can claim to have avoided. My own approval error remains part of the account because the map and operating logic were persuasive. They made it easier to overlook the customer’s separate authority to choose a service provider. The lesson I carry into subsequent recommendations is to identify which value moves with the asset and which value still depends on another party’s decision.
02Renewing two districts after learning what five-district coverage required
The 2023 expansion trial covered five districts for twelve months at a cost of ₹73 lakh. We wanted to learn whether our regional maintenance proposition could support a wider operating presence without asking field teams to carry obligations the commercial terms did not recognise. Completed visits were visible in the account, but standby availability and travel also consumed resources. A low visit count did not mean the commitment had been inexpensive to maintain.
The growth team favoured renewing all five arrangements because the expanded footprint made the enterprise more attractive in future discussions. Gurleen questioned whether that footprint described a service we could continue supplying under the proposed terms. I asked the strategy team to bring the standby and travel requirements into the renewal recommendation instead of treating them as a delivery problem that would be solved after the commercial decision. The review considered the terms offered for each arrangement, not an abstract judgement about the worth of the district.
We renewed two arrangements. We declined three proposed renewals whose terms did not cover the availability and travel commitment the intended service required. Existing obligations were completed; the choice did not mean abandoning an active contract or leaving customers without a service we had promised. It also did not establish that a different price, coverage pattern or customer arrangement could never make those districts attractive. The recommendation was specific to the proposition we had examined and the terms then available.
The consequence was a smaller continuing footprint than the growth team had hoped to present. We gave up the immediate breadth of a five-district story and retained an operating proposition whose requirements were clearer. I do not claim a measured improvement in service quality or a company-wide margin result from this decision. The ₹73 lakh was the cost of the trial, not a savings figure. Its strategic value was that the renewal decision changed after the operating commitment became visible, while the field team’s responsibility remained to deliver the arrangements actually accepted.
03Choosing a partner proposition that preserved mixed-equipment service
In 2025 an equipment partner proposed an exclusive arrangement with a ₹4.8 crore annual opportunity. A non-exclusive proposition offered a smaller ₹3.1 crore annual prospect. These were proposed opportunities, not signed contracts or income recognised in our accounts. The larger figure made exclusivity commercially attractive, but the restriction would narrow our ability to support customers whose networks contained equipment from more than one source.
The partnership team argued that a stronger relationship with one supplier could improve access to future work. Gurleen asked what would happen when an existing customer needed service across a mixed fleet. I supported a seven-week assessment costing ₹42 lakh to examine the strategic consequences of the restriction, including the bids and relationships it could constrain. Professional advisers considered proposed terms within their remit; my role was to ensure the recommendation described the service choices the enterprise would be giving up.
I recommended the non-exclusive proposition. That did not mean exclusivity was inherently unsuitable for every service enterprise, or that the larger opportunity had no value. It meant the version offered would change our role in customers’ mixed-equipment environments in a way we were not prepared to accept. Satish and the authorised decision-makers supported pursuing the narrower proposition, subject to its own commercial process. We did not describe that decision as a completed agreement or a realised revenue result.
The difference of ₹1.7 crore between the two annual prospects was not money lost from existing income. It illustrated the prospective scale we were willing to leave uncommitted while preserving service freedom. There is no claim that later wins compensated for the difference or that every customer preferred our choice. The strategic result was a clearer boundary around the partner relationship we wished to pursue. I wanted the company to understand the restriction before a larger headline number made it seem like an ordinary extension of the service business we already ran.
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