What we chose to fund, change and decline

In 2022, four of our regional titles were acquiring digital subscribers through a deeply discounted introduction. The campaign generated a convincing number of starts, but many accounts ended soon after the offer changed. Product colleagues proposed a clearer twelve-week introduction with less discounting and a more direct explanation of the continuing price. The acquisition team expected fewer starts and worried that the titles would lose visibility in the group performance review.

I approved a controlled change across those four titles and asked the teams to agree the comparison before launch. We tracked paid accounts from the start of each offer, rather than mixing new cohorts with long-standing subscribers. We also kept cancellation reasons and customer-service contacts in the review. The objective was to understand whether a more comprehensible offer attracted a different continuing relationship, not simply to replace one impressive conversion figure with another.

Starts fell by 18% in the observed comparison. Paid retention at week twenty-four rose from 41% to 58%. Net subscription receipts per starter increased from A$47 to A$61 over that period, before shared editorial costs. Those results did not establish that total publication profit had risen: fewer starters, campaign spending and the wider cost of reporting still mattered. We kept the absolute account numbers beside the rates so that the denominator could not disappear from the discussion.

The commercial director had been right about the immediate loss of volume. We accepted it and changed the internal review to give retention and receipts a place alongside starts. Some readers still found the full-price product insufficient, and we took that criticism into the publication plans. I regard the decision as a better basis for learning about the offer, not a universal formula for subscription pricing. Other regions had different audience habits and needed their own evidence before adopting the same approach.

I would test the explanation of the renewal price before approving another acquisition campaign, rather than wait for introductory growth to expose a misunderstanding about the continuing subscription.

A 2021 portfolio review proposed consolidating a smaller regional newsroom into a neighbouring operation. The six-person reporting team served a dispersed area, and its title carried a reported annual loss of A$710,000 after central allocations. The finance team saw a difficult commitment in a business already adapting its revenue mix. The editor-in-chief argued that consolidation would remove regular reporting presence from a region that a distant team could cover only intermittently.

I asked for a second account that separated direct local contribution from shared overhead, while retaining both views for the board. The direct funding gap was A$430,000. The difference did not make the allocated costs imaginary or prove that retaining the newsroom would cost nothing elsewhere. It showed more clearly which expenditure would actually change under the proposed closure and which enterprise costs would remain to be funded.

We recommended retaining the team with A$430,000 of annual support for two years and a defined review of the product, local subscriptions and commercial offer. The board approved that choice as part of the company's publishing purpose. We did not ask the editor to promise that a particular investigation would generate its own revenue, nor did we turn the support into an indefinite commitment that no future board could examine.

At the two-year review, the direct gap was A$310,000 on a comparable basis. Local subscription receipts had improved, but the title was still supported. The six reporting posts remained, and some planned central product work had been delayed to stay within the wider budget. Those consequences belong in the same account. The decision preserved a reporting presence at an explicit cost; it did not prove that every threatened newsroom can become profitable or that central allocation should be ignored whenever it produces an unwelcome result.

Next time I would bring the newsroom’s continuing funding requirement into the initial portfolio discussion, before colleagues start treating an undeclared subsidy as a temporary exception.

In 2023, a prospective partner offered A$620,000 for an annual programme combining regional events and associated content. The draft arrangement included advance approval of editorial coverage related to the programme's subject. Our sales team had spent months developing the opportunity and believed the approval wording could be managed through a cooperative relationship. Editorial colleagues considered it incompatible with their authority to decide what should be reported.

I paused the proposal before it became a commitment and brought the commercial lead, editor-in-chief and appropriate advisers into a review of the actual deliverables. An event sponsor could reasonably expect clarity about agreed branding and event services. That did not require a right to determine the conclusions of related reporting. I asked the team to separate those activities and prepare a narrower offer that made the boundary understandable to both the partner and the audience.

We declined the original terms. The partner subsequently agreed to an A$210,000 events arrangement without the editorial approval right. The remaining A$410,000 of proposed revenue was not replaced in that year's plan. The commercial team reduced discretionary promotional activity, and a planned audio series was postponed. I did not describe the difference as money we had lost from an existing contract, because the larger agreement had never been signed.

The episode changed how we prepared proposals. Editorial boundaries entered the brief before sales invested heavily in a concept, and the commercial forecast distinguished possible income from contracted work. The narrower agreement was useful, but it did not make the decision costless. My responsibility was to support the boundary in the operating plan as well as in a statement of principle. The account remains specific to that proposed arrangement; it is not legal advice about the wording of other publishers' contracts.

I would settle the boundary of sponsor influence before commercial negotiations begin, so the newsroom is not asked to defend its authority after revenue expectations have formed.

Our audio unit proposed a subscription archive in 2024 using approximately 4,800 hours of stored programmes. The initial presentation treated the catalogue's duration as the main evidence of value. Production colleagues warned that recordings had been made under different commissioning arrangements over many years. Some contributor permissions were incomplete, and some material had been agreed for a narrower use than the proposed new product.

I authorised a permissions and context review before a public catalogue announcement. The review involved production records and specialist rights advice, with uncertain material kept out of the launch set. The commercial team objected that a smaller catalogue would weaken the offer and delay a return on preparation costs. That was a reasonable concern, but announcing the larger figure would have transferred unresolved obligations into a public promise.

The first release contained 1,900 hours. We spent A$280,000 on review, clearance and preparation, compared with A$160,000 in the initial plan, and launched four months later than proposed. The excluded hours were not declared permanently unusable; some needed further evidence or different agreements, while others were unsuitable for the product. We avoided claiming that a percentage cleared in this exercise established a general rule about older audio rights.

After nine months, the service had 2,600 paying accounts and A$156,000 in gross subscription receipts. Those receipts had not recovered the preparation expenditure and did not include every ongoing service cost. I kept that position visible when discussing the launch. The useful result was a smaller catalogue whose included material had passed the required review, together with a clearer process for additions. The commercial proposition still had to prove itself through continued use and renewal rather than the size of a storage inventory.

My earlier intervention would be to require a sample of usable rights records before agreeing the catalogue launch, allowing the commercial scope to follow material we can actually offer.

In 2025, the commercial team proposed combining several digital audience measures into a group figure for advertiser presentations. Individual title reports included browser identifiers, app accounts and newsletter addresses, with overlap between them. Adding the totals produced an attractive claim about reach, but it could not establish the number of distinct people. The sales director worried that a more qualified account would look smaller than competing offers.

I asked audience and commercial colleagues to prepare a presentation that distinguished the measures we could support. We retained channel-specific figures, stated their periods and explained where overlap was unresolved. For campaigns with a defined delivery measure, the team used that measure rather than converting it into an unsupported estimate of unique readers. We also reviewed existing sales materials so that the correction did not appear only in the next annual presentation.

The revised proposal omitted a claimed 2.4 million combined audience and instead reported the separate channel measures with their limits. Three prospective campaigns, together worth A$190,000, did not proceed after the revised discussion. We could not attribute every lost proposal solely to the measurement change; budgets, timing and competing inventory also affected the decisions. The figure records the value of those proposals, not a proven causal loss or a refund on contracted work.

Sales colleagues received support to explain the narrower claims, and product teams began a longer measurement-improvement programme. We did not wait for a perfect identity system before correcting an account we knew was too strong. My lesson was that a commercial promise should fit the evidence available when it is made. Better measurement may later support a different offer, but it cannot retrospectively justify an audience number that the business could not substantiate at the time.

I would involve the measurement owner when shaping the advertiser proposition, before sales commitments depend on an audience definition that has not survived examination.