- Sector
- Power generation: coal, gas-fired and renewable plants selling under long-term contracts to state buyers in four ASEAN markets
- Ownership
- Listed on the SGX Mainboard since 2012; Kelawari Holdings Berhad, a fictional Malaysian state-linked investment company, holds 38 per cent
- Company scale
- US$2.94bn revenue and US$780m EBITDA in 2025
- Employees
- 3,800
- Geography
- Singapore headquarters; plants in Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines
- Reporting to
- Reports to the group chief executive; member of the executive committee; presents to the board and its Investment Committee and reports to the Sustainability and Risk Committee
- Team
- 46 across strategy, market analysis, carbon strategy, corporate development and the transition office; five direct reports
- Financial scope
- Group five-year capital plan of US$4.2bn for 2024 to 2028; development budget of US$60m to US$80m a year; acquisitions and disposals up to board approval
Mandate
Write a transition plan that the anchor shareholder, the state buyers and the lenders could all accept, and begin reshaping a coal-heavy portfolio without breaking its contracts.
Outcomes
- Agreed with Malaysia's single buyer, lenders and the government to retire the 1,000 MW Johor coal station at the end of 2029, four years before its contract ends.
- Raised renewable capacity from 760 MW in 2021 to 1,480 MW in 2025; coal fell from 48 to 39 per cent of attributable capacity.
- Introduced a shadow carbon price of US$40 a tonne, rising to US$80 by 2030, in every investment case from 2023.
- Took a 40 per cent stake in the Selat Hijau consortium, which received conditional approval in 2024 to export 1,000 MW from Indonesia's Riau Islands to Singapore.
Decisions in context
I became chief strategy officer in April 2021, when my predecessor retired, with a mandate from the chief executive and the board to produce a transition plan that our anchor shareholder, our state buyers and our lenders could all live with. The plan adopted in 2022 had three parts: retire coal by negotiation rather than announcement, grow renewables and storage where buyers would contract them, and enter cross-border trade only beside host-country partners. Since then I have led the Johor retirement agreement, introduced the shadow carbon price, structured our stake in Selat Hijau and overseen renewable growth from 760 to 1,480 megawatts. I lead 46 people with five direct reports, present to the board and its Investment Committee, and report twice a year to the Sustainability and Risk Committee on climate scenarios and transition risk. The East Java decision is the largest unfinished part of my mandate.
Reason for the move
Current role. Not seeking an executive move before the Johor closure; considering one independent directorship with the board's consent.
- Sector
- Power generation: coal, gas-fired and renewable plants under long-term contracts
- Ownership
- Listed on the SGX Mainboard; Kelawari Holdings Berhad held 38 per cent
- Company scale
- US$2.41bn revenue in 2020
- Employees
- 3,500
- Geography
- Singapore headquarters; plants in Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam; first Philippine wind farm under construction
- Reporting to
- Chief Strategy Officer, with a dotted line to the Chief Financial Officer; presented to the board's Investment Committee
- Team
- 14; three direct reports
- Financial scope
- Group long-range plan and regional price forecasts; administration of development stage gates; no approval authority
Mandate
Rebuild the long-range plan and the process by which development projects move from idea to investment.
Outcomes
- Recommended the exit from a 1,500 MW Vietnamese LNG-to-power project; net write-off of US$29m after the site rights were sold.
- Introduced a stage-gate rule capping development spending at US$5m until a buyer agrees heads of terms on risk sharing.
- Built power price and demand forecasts for four markets, used in two successful renewable bids.
- Wrote the group's first scenario analysis of carbon prices for the Investment Committee.
Decisions in context
I joined Lintasari in April 2018 to rebuild its long-range plan and the way development projects moved from idea to investment. The company had grown through acquisitions and contracted plants, and its pipeline was a list rather than a portfolio: projects entered easily and rarely left. With a team of fourteen I built regional power price and demand forecasts for four markets, introduced a stage-gate review for every development project and wrote the group's first carbon-price scenarios. My most consequential recommendation was to leave the Vietnamese LNG-to-power project, which the board approved in July 2020 after a six-month extension that I had argued against. I reported to the then chief strategy officer, with a dotted line to the chief financial officer, and presented at every Investment Committee meeting from late 2018. I was promoted when my predecessor retired in 2021.
Reason for the move
Promoted to chief strategy officer when my predecessor retired.
- Sector
- LNG import and gas-fired power development
- Ownership
- Private company backed by two fictional infrastructure private-equity funds
- Company scale
- Pre-revenue until 2018; first revenue from its Indonesian project from early 2018
- Employees
- 140 by 2017
- Geography
- Singapore headquarters; integrated LNG-to-power project in Indonesia; early-stage studies in Vietnam
- Reporting to
- Chief Executive
- Team
- Nine; three direct reports
- Financial scope
- Development budget of US$45m across three projects; led commercial negotiations for a US$640m integrated terminal and power project
Mandate
Take the company's first integrated LNG-to-power project from development to financial close.
Outcomes
- Took a floating LNG import terminal and a 400 MW gas-fired plant in Indonesia to financial close in 2016 and commercial operation in early 2018.
- Negotiated a power contract whose capacity charges covered the import vessel's charter, matching fuel and offtake obligations.
- Stopped a Vietnamese terminal study after the host province changed its zoning plan, limiting sunk cost to US$4m.
Decisions in context
Tirauna hired me in January 2014 to lead its gas-to-power development, at a time when the company had funding, a team of engineers and no project past feasibility. The first priority was an integrated scheme in Indonesia: a floating storage and regasification unit and a 400-megawatt gas-fired plant selling to the state electricity company. My job was the contract structure. We negotiated a power contract whose capacity charges paid for the vessel's charter, so that the obligation to pay for fuel and the buyer's obligation to pay for availability matched. The project reached financial close in 2016 and began operation early in 2018, shortly before I left. I also stopped a Vietnamese terminal study when the host province rezoned the site, after spending US$4 million rather than the US$15 million budgeted. I left because I wanted a broader portfolio than gas alone.
Reason for the move
Wanted to work for a generator with a broad portfolio, where gas would be one option among several rather than the whole strategy.
- Sector
- Independent advisory on infrastructure and project finance
- Ownership
- Partnership of eleven principals
- Company scale
- About US$22m of fee income in 2013
- Employees
- 60
- Geography
- Singapore office serving clients in Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand
- Reporting to
- Managing partner for power and utilities
- Team
- Teams of four to six on each mandate
- Financial scope
- Adviser on 14 power transactions with US$6.3bn of project debt; no balance-sheet responsibility
Mandate
Advise lenders and sponsors on the commercial structure and risks of power projects across Southeast Asia.
Outcomes
- Lenders' commercial adviser on two coal-fired plants, in Indonesia and Vietnam, which reached financial close in 2011 and 2013.
- Built a risk-allocation matrix for regional power purchase agreements, used on every later mandate.
- Advised a sponsor on one of the early utility-scale solar financings in Thailand in 2012.
Decisions in context
I moved to Singapore in July 2009 to join Corventis as an associate director and became a director in 2011. The firm advised lenders and sponsors on the commercial side of infrastructure finance, and my work was power: reading power purchase agreements, fuel contracts and government support letters, and telling banks where the risks really sat. Over four and a half years I worked on fourteen transactions carrying US$6.3 billion of project debt, including two coal-fired plants that reached financial close in 2011 and 2013 and one of the early utility-scale solar financings in Thailand. I built a matrix comparing how contracts in each country allocated volume, fuel, currency and change-in-law risk, which the firm used on every later mandate. I left at the end of 2013 because I wanted to be accountable for a project's outcome rather than for an opinion about it.
Reason for the move
Wanted to own the outcome of a project rather than advise on it.
- Sector
- Gas-fired power generation in Peninsular Malaysia
- Ownership
- Listed on Bursa Malaysia; a family-controlled group held 46 per cent
- Company scale
- RM2.1bn revenue in 2008
- Employees
- 900
- Geography
- Kuala Lumpur head office; three gas-fired plants with 1,950 MW in Peninsular Malaysia
- Reporting to
- Head of Commercial
- Team
- Five by 2009; two direct reports
- Financial scope
- Administration of three power purchase agreements and the gas supply contract, with about RM1.4bn of annual fuel purchases
Mandate
Build the commercial models and contract administration for a generator whose earnings depended entirely on three long-term agreements.
Outcomes
- Built the tariff model used in the 2008 negotiation of one plant's contract extension.
- Recovered RM38m of availability deductions disputed with the buyer between 2005 and 2008.
- Prepared the company's bid for a new 700 MW combined-cycle plant, which was lost on price.
Decisions in context
I joined Bayuraya in March 2002 as a commercial analyst, moving from engineering into the contracts that decided how a generator was paid. The company owned three gas-fired plants in Peninsular Malaysia, and its earnings depended entirely on their power purchase agreements and its gas supply contract. I built the tariff models, prepared monthly availability claims and became manager for commercial and regulatory matters in 2006, with a team that grew to five. Between 2005 and 2008 we recovered RM38 million of availability deductions that the buyer had applied and we disputed. In 2008 my model underpinned the negotiation of one plant's contract extension, and I prepared our bid for a new 700-megawatt plant, which we lost on price. I studied energy economics part-time during these years and left in 2009 to see how power projects were financed across the region.
Reason for the move
Wanted regional experience of how power projects are financed, which advisory work in Singapore offered.
- Sector
- Electrical and civil engineering consultancy
- Ownership
- Private company owned by its five founding engineers
- Company scale
- About RM40m of fees in 2001
- Employees
- 220
- Geography
- Kuala Lumpur head office; projects across Peninsular Malaysia
- Reporting to
- Principal engineer, power systems
- Team
- Two to three engineers on each study
- Financial scope
- Grid-connection and protection studies for generation and industrial clients; no budget authority
Mandate
Carry out the network studies that new power plants and large industrial loads needed before they could connect to the grid.
Outcomes
- Completed about 30 load-flow, fault and stability studies for plant and industrial connections.
- Wrote the firm's first standard method for grid-connection studies.
- Supervised two graduate engineers from 2000.
Decisions in context
I joined Halverine in August 1998, two months after graduating, as a power systems engineer in its Kuala Lumpur office. The firm carried out the network studies that new generators and large industrial users needed before they could connect to the Peninsular Malaysian grid. I ran about thirty load-flow, fault and stability studies over three and a half years, usually with one or two colleagues, and from 2000 supervised two graduate engineers. I also wrote the firm's first standard method for connection studies, so that clients received the same quality whichever team they drew. The work gave me a lasting respect for the network as the real constraint on any power plan. It also made me curious about decisions taken long before we were asked whether a plant could be connected, and in 2002 I moved to a generator to see them made.
Reason for the move
Wanted to understand why plants were built where they were, which meant moving to the commercial side of a generator.
What I am looking for next
I intend to stay at Lintasari until the Johor station closes at the end of 2029 and the East Java decision has been made and is being carried out. Both are commitments I recommended, and I would not hand them to a successor half-finished.
After that, I would consider becoming chief executive of a regional power or energy-infrastructure business of similar or larger scale, ideally one with a mixed portfolio and a credible plan to reduce its coal exposure, or leading the transition business of a larger utility. I would want a board that expects strategy to be tested against the counterparties who must sign it, and a shareholder base, state-linked or not, willing to accept a known loss for a more durable position. I am less drawn to a pure renewables developer, where the hard questions about coal and gas have been left to someone else.
Until then my next chapter is a board one: a single independent directorship in Singapore or Malaysia outside power generation, taken with my board's consent, so that I learn the discipline of a non-executive director before any executive move.