In November 2021, a core-banking vendor proposed replacing our deposit and mortgage ledger with a cloud-hosted platform for C$38 million over five years. The offer carried a 12 per cent discount, worth about C$4.6 million, if we signed by March 2022. Our mainframe hosting contract expired in 2023, and the chief executive and two directors saw the replacement as overdue. They were right that the ledger needed replacing.
I was less sure what we would be replacing it for. The workaround register was two months old and already held 212 entries. Tracing each one, we found that 131 began upstream of the ledger: broker mortgage files arriving with missing or inconsistent fields, deposit brokers sending GIC instructions in eleven different formats, and estate payments keyed from paper. A new core would have received the same inputs, and the vendor's plan counted 81 custom interfaces to accommodate them.
I recommended that we let the deadline pass, fix intake first and return to market in 2024. Our CFO, Denise Ouimette, disagreed; the discount was real money, and a two-year hosting extension would cost C$1.9 million. The board accepted my recommendation after the risk committee reviewed the register, and we gave up the discount.
Over two years we added validation to the broker portal, agreed a single file format with all eleven deposit brokers and replaced paper estate instructions with a structured form. Seventy-four workarounds were retired by December 2023. The revised specification needed 46 interfaces instead of 81. In September 2024 we signed a C$36.2 million contract, about C$2.8 million more than the discounted 2021 price before counting the hosting extension. Conversion is planned for 2027.
Every technology proposal now lists the workarounds it removes and those it leaves.
I would start the inventory before any vendor process begins. Because the register arrived after the offer, the board faced a deadline-driven choice, and the hosting extension cost more than I had first estimated.